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Oct. 24th – Presenter Bios

Moderator
Adam S. Herbst, Esq.
Senior Vice President, Chief Legal and Strategic Planning Officer of Blythedale’s Children
Hospital; Adjunct Professor at New York Law School teaching Health Law and Policy; Co-director
of the NYLS Health Law and Patient Safety Project; Lecturer, Mailman School of Public Health at
Columbia University
Adam S. Herbst, Esq., is Senior Vice President, Chief Legal, Compliance, Planning, and
Government Relations Officer for Blythedale Children’s Hospital. In this role, Mr. Herbst has
legal and compliance oversight for the Hospital and is responsible for developing corporate
planning strategies and administering government relations. In addition, he oversees human
resources, advocacy and community relations.
Mr. Herbst has devoted a considerable portion of his career specializing at the intersection of
where health care law meets with communications, technology and employment issues. He has
extensive experience structuring agreements on behalf of the Hospital while advising on risk
mitigation and offering solutions on operations, board governance, and regulatory matters.
Mr. Herbst has worked on issues related to housing, education, public health, economic
development and has trial experience in both federal and state courts, as well as arbitrations
throughout the country. He is a frequent speaker on health care access and is an adjunct law
professor focusing on health policy and advocacy.
Mr. Herbst received his Juris Doctor cum laude from Albany Law School, Masters in Business
Administration from Union College and his Bachelor of Arts cum laude from American
University. Mr. Herbst is admitted to practice law in New York and New Jersey.
Distinguished Panelists
Honorable Richard N. Gottfried
New York State Assembly (District 75) & Chairman of the Assembly's Committee on Health and
Sponsor of the New York Health Act
Richard N. Gottfried has chaired the New York State Assembly Committee on Health since 1987.
He is a Democrat representing a Manhattan district including Chelsea, Hell’s Kitchen, Midtown,
and part of the Upper West Side.
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He sponsors the N.Y. Health Act to create a universal “improved Medicare for all” single-payer
health plan for New York. He is a leading proponent of patient autonomy and reproductive
freedom. He was the sponsor of the law to allow medical use of marijuana in New York and the
HIV Testing and Confidentiality Law.
He works to protect funding for Medicaid, community health centers, school health clinics,
HIV/AIDS services, and other health concerns, and creating and expanding public health
insurance programs in New York, including Child Health Plus.
His legislative work includes: promoting primary and preventive care; the Health Care Proxy
Law (which allows people to designate an agent to make health care decisions for them if they
lose decision-making capacity); the Family Health Care Decisions Act (which enables family
members to make health care decisions for incapacitated patients who have not signed a health
care proxy); managed care reforms; giving patients access to information about a doctor's
background and malpractice record; licensing of midwives; and insurance coverage for midwife
services.
He is a graduate of Cornell University (1968) and Columbia Law School (1973). He is licensed to
practice law in New York, but does not maintain a private practice; his only occupation is
Assembly Member. He is a member of the New York Academy of Medicine, the National
Academy for State Health Policy, the Public Health Association of New York City, and the New
York Civil Liberties Union. He was first elected to the Assembly in 1970 while in law school.

Niyum Gandhi
Executive Vice President and Chief Population Health Officer, Mount Sinai Health System
Niyum Gandhi is the Executive Vice President and Chief Population Health Officer of the Mount
Sinai Health System. In this role, he oversees Mount Sinai’s transition from a primarily fee-forservice model of care to one that is focused on value and risk-based population health.
Niyum leads Mount Sinai Health Partners and helps align the Health System’s clinical and
economic transformations in support of Mount Sinai’s vision to be the leading population
health manager in the competitive New York market, as well as the best possible partner to
plan sponsors, health insurers, and other population health managers who are responsible for
total cost of care of patient groups. This includes fostering care management and clinical model
redesign to ensure that high-value care is delivered by the Health System and its partners, and
working with payers and employers to establish the new economic models that support the
delivery of value-based care.
Prior to his position at Mount Sinai, Niyum served as a Partner in the Health and Life Sciences
consulting practice of Oliver Wyman in Chicago, where he focused on value-based health care
strategy and transformation for physician groups, hospitals, and health plans. At Oliver Wyman,
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Niyum also worked with a variety of Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs) and other
population health management companies, helping them design and implement value-based
clinical models, develop value-based contracts and integrated product distribution strategies,
align physician incentives toward value, and establish the appropriate infrastructure to support
population health management.
Niyum holds an A.B. in economics and finance from Harvard University. He has authored
several articles on ACOs, payer/provider partnerships, and physician engagement, and served
as a conference speaker on a variety of issues related to population health and value-based
care. He also serves as an Assistant Professor in the Department of Health System Design and
Global Health at the Icahn School of Medicine at Mount Sinai.

Honorable Gustavo Rivera
New York State Senate (33rd District), and Chairman of the Senate's Committee on Health and
Sponsor of the New York Health Act
State Senator Gustavo Rivera represents the 33rd Senate District in the Bronx, which includes the
neighborhoods of Kingsbridge Heights, Belmont, Fordham, University Heights, Van Nest, East
Tremont, Crotona and Mount Hope.
Since taking office, Senator Rivera has focused his efforts on addressing issues of health inequity
both legislatively and on the ground.
In 2018, his passion to improve the health of New Yorkers led Majority Leader Andrea StewartCousins to appoint Senator Rivera as the Chair of the New York State Senate’s Health Committee.
As the Chair, Senator Rivera’s goal is to collaborate with his colleagues, stakeholders, and
constituents to improve health outcomes, increase access to health coverage, and ensure a
financially viable system for the 20 million New Yorkers he proudly serves.
Prior to his appointment as Chair, Senator Rivera served as the ranking member of the Senate
Health Committee for six years. As a sitting member of the committee, Senator Rivera passed
three laws to ban smoking around schools, after schools, and libraries, and has been a champion
of public health and harm reduction policies.
In March 2017, he became the main sponsor of the “New York Health Act,” an innovative bill to
create a single payer health system in New York State. In 2011, Senator Rivera launched the
Bronx CAN (Changing Attitudes Now) Health Initiative. The goal of this community oriented
health initiative is not only to encourage Bronx residents to develop healthy behaviors, but to
shape policies that will help tear down some of the institutional barriers that stand in the way
of Bronxites having a healthier lifestyle.
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Senator Rivera also worked as a community organizer on New York State campaigns, as well as
on President Barack Obama’s 2008 campaign. He has worked as a college professor and briefly
was a staff member for U.S. Senator Kirsten Gillibrand.

Michael S. Sparer, J.D., Ph.D.
Professor and Chair in the Department of Health Policy and Management at the Mailman School
of Public Health at Columbia University
Michael S. Sparer, J.D., Ph.D. is Professor and Chair in the Department of Health Policy and
Management at the Mailman School of Public Health at Columbia University. Professor Sparer
studies and writes about the politics of health care, with a particular emphasis on the health
insurance and health delivery systems for low-and-middle income populations, both in the
United States and globally. His current projects include a study of efforts to enact “public
option” insurance programs, the impact of federalism on the implementation of the Affordable
Care Act, and the rise (and demise) of non-profit insurance “cooperatives.” He is a two-time
winner of the Mailman School’s Student Government Association Teacher of the Year Award,
the recipient of a 2010 Columbia University Presidential Award for Outstanding Teaching, and a
two-time winner of the Core Curriculum Teaching Excellence Award. Professor Sparer spent
seven years as a litigator for the New York City Law Department, specializing in intergovernmental social welfare litigation. After leaving the practice of law, Sparer obtained a
Ph.D. in Political Science from Brandeis University. Sparer is the former editor of the Journal of
Health Politics, Policy and Law, and the author of Medicaid and the Limits of State Health
Reform, as well as numerous articles and book chapters.
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New York Health Act
A.5248 (Gottfried); S.3577 (Rivera)
Underlined text is new law to be added. Text in brackets [ ] is existing law being repealed.
Footnotes are only for explanation and are not part of the actual bill.

AN ACT to amend the public health law and the state finance law, in relation to enacting the
"New York health act" and to establishing New York Health
The People of the State of New York, represented in Senate and Assembly, do enact as
follows:
Section 1. Short title. This act shall be known and may be cited as the "New York health
act".
§ 2. Legislative findings and intent. 1. The state constitution states: "The protection and
promotion of the health of the inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such
manner, and by such means as the legislature shall from time to time determine." (Article
XVII, §3.) The legislature finds and declares that all residents of the state have the right to
health care. While the federal Affordable Care Act brought many improvements in health
care and health coverage, it still leaves many New Yorkers without coverage or with
inadequate coverage. Millions of New Yorkers do not get the health care they need or face
financial obstacles and hardships to get it. That is not acceptable. There is no plan other than
the New York health act that will enable New York state to meet that need. New Yorkers - as
individuals, employers, and taxpayers - have experienced a rise in the cost of health care and
coverage in recent years, including rising premiums, deductibles and co-pays, restricted
provider networks and high out-of-network charges. Many New Yorkers go without health
care because they cannot afford it or suffer financial hardship to get it. Businesses have also
experienced increases in the costs of health care benefits for their employees, and many
employers are shifting a larger share of the cost of coverage to their employees or dropping
coverage entirely. Including long-term services and supports (LTSS) in New York Health is
a major step forward for older adults, people with disabilities, and their families. Older adults
and people with disabilities often cannot receive the services necessary to stay in the
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community or other LTSS. Even when older adults and people with disabilities receive
LTSS, especially services in the community, it is often at the cost of unreasonable demands
on unpaid family caregivers, depleting their own or family resources, or impoverishing
themselves to qualify for public coverage. Health care providers are also affected by
inadequate health coverage in New York state. A large portion of hospitals, health centers
and other providers now experience substantial losses due to the provision of care that is
uncompensated. Individuals often find that they are deprived of affordable care and choice
because of decisions by health plans guided by the plan's economic interests rather than the
individual's health care needs. To address the fiscal crisis facing the health care system and
the state and to assure New Yorkers can exercise their right to health care, affordable and
comprehensive health coverage must be provided. Pursuant to the state constitution's charge
to the legislature to provide for the health of New Yorkers, this legislation is an enactment of
state concern for the purpose of establishing a comprehensive universal guaranteed health
care coverage program and a health care cost control system for the benefit of all residents of
the state of New York. 1
2. (a) It is the intent of the Legislature to create the New York Health program to provide a
universal single payer health plan for every New Yorker, funded by broad-based revenue
based on ability to pay. The legislature intends that federal waivers and approvals be sought
where they will improve the administration of the New York Health program, but the
legislature intends that the program be implemented even in the absence of such waivers or
approvals. The state shall work to obtain waivers and other approvals relating to Medicaid,
Child Health Plus, Medicare, the Affordable Care Act, and any other appropriate federal
programs, under which federal funds and other subsidies that would otherwise be paid to
New York State, New Yorkers, and health care providers for health coverage that will be
equaled or exceeded by New York Health will be paid by the federal government to New
York State and deposited in the New York Health trust fund, or paid to health care providers
and individuals in combination with New York Health trust fund payments, and for other
program modifications (including elimination of cost sharing and insurance premiums).
1

This subdivision is meant to lay a constitutional foundation.
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Under such waivers and approvals, health coverage under those programs will, to the
maximum extent possible, be replaced and merged into New York Health, which will operate
as a true single-payer program.
(b) If any necessary waiver or approval is not obtained, the state shall use state plan
amendments and seek waivers and approvals to maximize, and make as seamless as possible,
the use of federally-matched health programs and federal health programs in New York
Health. Thus, even where other programs such as Medicaid or Medicare may contribute to
paying for care, it is the goal of this legislation that the coverage will be delivered by New
York Health and, as much as possible, the multiple sources of funding will be pooled with
other New York Health funds and not be apparent to New York Health members or
participating providers.
(c) This program will promote movement away from fee-for-service payment, which tends
to reward quantity and requires excessive administrative expense, and towards alternate
payment methodologies, such as global or capitated payments to providers or health care
organizations, that promote quality, efficiency, investment in primary and preventive care,
and innovation and integration in the organizing of health care.
(d) The program shall promote the use of clinical data to improve the quality of health care
and public health, consistent with protection of patient confidentiality. The program shall
maximize patient autonomy in choice of health care providers and health care decision
making. Care coordination within the program shall ensure management and coordination
among a patient's health care services, consistent with patient autonomy and person-centered
service planning, rather than acting as a gatekeeper to needed services.
3. This act does not create any employment benefit, nor does it require, prohibit, or limit
the providing of any employment benefit. 2
4. In order to promote improved quality of, and access to, health care services and promote
improved clinical outcomes, it is the policy of the state to encourage cooperative,
collaborative and integrative arrangements among health care providers who might otherwise
be competitors, under the active supervision of the commissioner of health. It is the intent of
2

This subdivision is meant to make clear that this does not violate ERISA.
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the state to supplant competition with such arrangements and regulation only to the extent
necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act, and to provide state action immunity under
the state and federal antitrust laws to health care providers, particularly with respect to their
relations with the single-payer New York Health plan created by this act. 3
§ 3. Article 50 and sections 5000, 5001, 5002 and 5003 of the public health law are
renumbered article 80 and sections 8000, 8001, 8002 and 8003, respectively, and a new
article 51 is added to read as follows:
ARTICLE 51
NEW YORK HEALTH Section 5100. Definitions.
5101. Program created.
5102. Board of trustees.
5103. Eligibility and enrollment.
5104. Benefits.
5105. Health care providers; care coordination; payment
methodologies.
5106. Health care organizations.
5107. Program standards.
5108. Regulations.
5109. Provisions relating to federal health programs.
5110. Additional provisions.
5111. Regional advisory councils.
§ 5100. Definitions. As used in this article, the following terms shall have the following
meanings, unless the context clearly requires otherwise:
1. "Board" means the board of trustees of the New York Health program created by
section fifty-one hundred two of this article, and "trustee" means a trustee of the board.
2. "Care coordination" means, but is not limited to, managing, referring to, locating,
coordinating, and monitoring health care services for the member to assure that all medically
necessary health care services are made available to and are effectively used by the member
3

This language, and similar language in the body of the bill, lays the foundation for a “state-action”
exemption from anti-trust laws.
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in a timely manner, consistent with patient autonomy. Care coordination does not include a
requirement for prior authorization for health care services or for referral for a member to
receive a health care service.
3. "Care coordinator" means an individual or entity approved to provide care coordination
under subdivision two of section fifty-one hundred five of this article.
4. "Federally-matched public health program" means the medical assistance program
under title eleven of article five of the social services law, the basic health program under
section three hundred sixty-nine-gg of the social services law, 4 and the child health plus
program under title one-A of article twenty-five of this chapter. 5
5. "Health care organization" means an entity that is approved by the commissioner 6 under
section fifty-one hundred six of this article to provide health care services to members under
the program.
6. "Health care provider" means any individual or entity legally authorized to provide a
health care service under Medicaid or Medicare or this article. "Health care professional"
means a health care provider that is an individual licensed, certified, registered or otherwise
authorized to practice under title eight of the education law to provide such health care
service, acting within his or her lawful scope of practice.
7. "Health care service" means any health care service, including care coordination,
included as a benefit under the program.
8. "Implementation period" means the period under subdivision three of section fifty-one
hundred one of this article during which the program will be subject to special eligibility and
financing provisions until it is fully implemented under that section.
10. "Medicaid" or "medical assistance" means title eleven of article five of the social
services law and the program thereunder. "Child health plus" means title one-A of article
twenty-five of this chapter and the program thereunder. "Medicare" means title XVIII of the
4

The basic health program is authorized by the federal Affordable Care Act. It operates under the name
“Essential Plan” in New York.

5
6

New York’s Child Health Insurance Program.

In the Public Health Law, “commissioner” means the Commissioner of Health.
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federal social security act and the programs thereunder. "Affordable care act" means the
federal patient protection and affordable care act, public law 111-148, as amended by the
health care and education reconciliation act of 2010, public law 111-152, and as otherwise
amended and any regulations or guidance issued thereunder. "Basic health program" means
section three hundred sixty-nine-gg of the social services law and the program thereunder.
11. "Member" means an individual who is enrolled in the program.
12. "New York Health", "New York Health program", and "program" mean the New York
Health program created by section fifty-one hundred one of this article.
13. "New York Health trust fund" means the New York Health trust fund established
under section eighty-nine-j of the state finance law. 7
14. "Out-of-state health care service" means a health care service provided to a member
while the member is temporarily out of the state and (a) it is medically necessary that the
health care service be provided while the member is out of the state, or (b) it is clinically
appropriate that the health care service be provided by a particular health care provider
located out of the state rather than in the state. However, any health care service provided to
a New York Health enrollee by a health care provider qualified under paragraph (a) of
subdivision three of section fifty-one hundred five of this article that is located outside the
state shall not be considered an out-of-state service and shall be covered as otherwise
provided in this article.
15. "Participating provider" means any individual or entity that is a health care provider
qualified under subdivision three of section fifty-one hundred five of this article that provides
health care services to members under the program, or a health care organization.
16. "Person" means any individual or natural person, trust, partnership, association,
unincorporated association, corporation, company, limited liability company, proprietorship,
joint venture, firm, joint stock association, department, agency, authority, or other legal
entity, whether for-profit, not-for-profit or governmental.
17. "Prescription and non-prescription drugs" means prescription drugs as defined in
section two hundred seventy of this chapter, and non-prescription smoking cessation
7

See below in the bill.
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products or devices.
18. "Resident" means an individual whose primary place of abode is in the state, without
regard to the individual's immigration status, as determined according to regulations of the
commissioner.
§ 5101. Program created. 1. The New York Health program is hereby created in the
department. The commissioner shall establish and implement the program under this article.
The program shall provide comprehensive health coverage to every resident who enrolls in
the program.
2. The commissioner shall, to the maximum extent possible, organize, administer and
market the program and services as a single program under the name "New York Health" or
such other name as the commissioner shall determine, regardless of under which law or
source the definition of a benefit is found including (on a voluntary basis) retiree health
benefits. 8 In implementing this article, the commissioner shall avoid jeopardizing federal
financial participation in these programs and shall take care to promote public understanding
and awareness of available benefits and programs.
3. The commissioner shall determine when individuals may begin enrolling in the
program. There shall be an implementation period, which shall begin on the date that
individuals may begin enrolling in the program and shall end as determined by the
commissioner.
4. An insurer authorized to provide coverage pursuant to the insurance law or a health
maintenance organization certified under this chapter may, if otherwise authorized, offer
benefits that do not cover any service for which coverage is offered to individuals under the
program, but may not offer benefits that cover any service for which coverage is offered to
individuals under the program. Provided, however, that this subdivision shall not prohibit (a)
the offering of any benefits to or for individuals, including their families, who are employed
or self-employed in the state but who are not residents of the state, or (b) the offering of
benefits during the implementation period to individuals who enrolled or may enroll as
members of the program, or (c) the offering of retiree health benefits.
8

Retiree health benefits are covered by contracts and ERISA. §5102(8)(b) requires the board to develop
further proposals for dealing with retiree benefits.
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5. A college, university or other institution of higher education in the state may purchase
coverage under the program for any student, or student's dependent, who is not a resident of
the state.
6. To the extent any provision of this chapter, the social services law, the insurance law or
the elder law:
(a) is inconsistent with any provision of this article or the legislative intent of the New
York Health Act, this article shall apply and prevail, except where explicitly provided
otherwise by this article; and
(b) is consistent with the provisions of this article and the legislative intent of the New
York Health Act, the provision of that law shall apply.
7. The program shall be deemed to be a health care plan for purposes of utilization review
and external appeal under article forty-nine of this chapter. An enrollee may designate a
person or entity, including, but not limited to, a representative of the enrollee's care
coordinator, a health care organization providing the service under review or appeal, or a
labor union or Taft-Hartley fund of which such enrollee or enrollee's family member is a
member to serve as the enrollee's designee for purposes of that article, if the person or entity
agrees to be the designee.
8. (a) No member shall be required to receive any health care service through any entity
organized, certified or operating under guidelines under article forty-four of this chapter, or
specified under section three hundred sixty-four-j of the social services law, the insurance
law or the elder law. No such entity shall receive payment for health care services (other than
care coordination) from the program.
(b) However, this subdivision shall not preclude the use of a Medicare managed care
("Medicare advantage") entity or other entity created by or under the direction of the
program where reasonably necessary to maximize federal financial participation or other
federal financial support under any federally-matched public health program, Medicare or the
Affordable Care Act. Any entity under this paragraph shall, to the maximum extent feasible,
operate in the background, without burden on or interference with the member and health
care provider, without depriving the member or health care provider of any right or benefit
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under the program and otherwise consistent with this article. 9
9. The program shall include provisions for an appropriate reserve fund.
10. (a) This subdivision applies to every person who is a retiree of a public employer, as
defined in section two hundred one of the civil service law, and any person who is a
beneficiary of the retiree's public employee retiree health benefit. Any reference to the retiree
shall mean and include any beneficiary of the retiree. This subdivision does not create or
increase any eligibility for any public employee retiree health benefit that would not
otherwise exist and does not diminish any public employee retiree health benefit.
(b) This paragraph applies to the retiree while he or she is a resident of New York state.
The retiree shall enroll in the program. If, by the implementation date, the retiree has not
enrolled in the program, the appropriate public employee retirement system and the
commissioner shall enroll the retiree in the New York Health program. If the retiree's public
employee retiree health benefit includes any service for which coverage is not offered under
the New York Health program, the retiree shall continue to receive that benefit from the
public employee retirement program.
(c) For every retiree, while he or she is not a resident of New York state, the appropriate
public employee retirement system shall maintain the retiree's public employee retiree health
benefit as if this article had not been enacted.
§ 5102. Board of trustees. 1. The New York Health board of trustees is hereby created in
the department. The board of trustees shall, at the request of the commissioner, consider any
matter to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this article, and may advise the
commissioner thereon; and it may, from time to time, submit to the commissioner any
recommendations to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this article. The commissioner
may propose regulations under this article and amendments thereto for consideration by the
board. The board of trustees shall have no executive, administrative or appointive duties
except as otherwise provided by law. The board of trustees shall have power to establish, and

9

This enables the program to use insurance- or managed care-like entities so the program can fit into some
requirements of Medicaid or the ACA to continue to draw federal support. The entities would operate “in the
background,” so patients and health care providers would see no difference from the ordinary operation of
New York Health.
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from time to time, amend regulations to effectuate the provisions and purposes of this article,
subject to approval by the commissioner. 10
2. The board shall be composed of:
(a) the commissioner, the superintendent of financial services, and the director of the
budget, or their designees, as ex officio members;
(b) twenty-six trustees appointed by the governor;
(i) six of whom shall be representatives of health care consumer advocacy organizations
which have a statewide or regional constituency, who have been involved in issues of interest
to low- and moderate-income individuals, older adults, and people with disabilities; at least
three of whom shall represent organizations led by consumers in those groups;
(ii) two of whom shall be representatives of professional organizations representing
physicians;
(iii) two of whom shall be representatives of professional organizations representing
licensed or registered health care professionals other than physicians;
(iv) three of whom shall be representatives of general hospitals, one of whom shall be a
representative of public general hospitals;
(v) one of whom shall be a representative of community health centers;
(vi) two of whom shall be representatives of rehabilitation or home care providers;
(vii) two of whom shall be representatives of behavioral or mental health or disability
service providers;
(viii) two of whom shall be representatives of health care organizations;
(ix) two of whom shall be representatives of organized labor;
(x) two of whom shall have demonstrated expertise in health care finance; and
(xi) two of whom shall be employers or representatives of employers who pay the payroll
tax under this article, or, prior to the tax becoming effective, will pay the tax;
(c) fourteen trustees appointed by the governor; five of whom to be appointed on the
recommendation of the speaker of the assembly; five of whom to be appointed on the
recommendation of the temporary president of the senate; two of whom to be appointed on
10

This subdivision is modeled largely on the Public Health and Health Planning Council.
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the recommendation of the minority leader of the assembly; and two of whom to be
appointed on the recommendation of the minority leader of the senate.
3. After the end of the implementation period, no person shall be a trustee unless he or she
is a member of the program, except the ex officio trustees. Each trustee shall serve at the
pleasure of the appointing officer, except the ex officio trustees.
4. The chair of the board shall be appointed, and may be removed as chair, by the governor
from among the trustees. The board shall meet at least four times each calendar year.
Meetings shall be held upon the call of the chair and as provided by the board. A majority of
the appointed trustees shall be a quorum of the board, and the affirmative vote of a majority
of the trustees voting, but not less than ten, shall be necessary for any action to be taken by
the board. The board may establish an executive committee to exercise any powers or duties
of the board as it may provide, and other committees to assist the board or the executive
committee. The chair of the board shall chair the executive committee and shall appoint the
chair and members of all other committees. The board of trustees may appoint one or more
advisory committees. Members of advisory committees need not be members of the board of
trustees.
5. Trustees shall serve without compensation but shall be reimbursed for their necessary
and actual expenses incurred while engaged in the business of the board.
6. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, no officer or employee of the
state or any local government shall forfeit or be deemed to have forfeited his or her office or
employment by reason of being a trustee.
7. The board and its committees and advisory committees may request and receive the
assistance of the department and any other state or local governmental entity in exercising its
powers and duties.
8. No later than two years after the effective date of this article:
(a) The board shall develop proposals for: (i) incorporating retiree health benefits into
New York Health; (ii) accommodating employer retiree health benefits for people who have
been members of New York Health but live as retirees out of the state; and (iii)
accommodating employer retiree health benefits for people who earned or accrued such
benefits while residing in the state prior to the implementation of New York Health and live
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as retirees out of the state. The board shall present its proposals to the governor and the
legislature.
(b) The board shall develop a proposal for New York Health coverage of health care
services covered under the workers' compensation law, including whether and how to
continue funding for those services under that law and whether and how to incorporate an
element of experience rating.
§ 5103. Eligibility and enrollment. 1. Every resident of the state shall be eligible and
entitled to enroll as a member under the program.
2. No individual shall be required to pay any premium or other charge for enrolling in or
being a member under the program.
3. A newborn child shall be enrolled as of the date of the child's birth if enrollment is done
prior to the child's birth or within sixty days after the child's birth.
§ 5104. Benefits. 1. The program shall provide comprehensive health coverage to every
member, which shall include all health care services required to be covered under any of the
following, without regard to whether the member would otherwise be eligible for or covered
by the program or source referred to:
(a) child health plus;
(b) Medicaid;
(c) Medicare;
(d) article forty-four of this chapter or article thirty-two or forty-three of the insurance law;
(e) article eleven of the civil service law, as of the date one year before the beginning of
the implementation period;
(f) any cost incurred defined in paragraph one of subsection (a) of section fifty-one
hundred two of the insurance law, provided that this coverage shall not replace coverage
under article fifty-one of the insurance law;
(g) any additional health care service authorized to be added to the program's benefits by
the program; and
(h) provided that where any state law or regulation related to any federally-matched public
health program states that a benefit is contingent on federal financial participation, or words
to that effect, the benefit shall be included under the New York Health program without
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regard to federal financial participation. 11
2. No member shall be required to pay any premium, deductible, co-payment or coinsurance under the program.
3. The program shall provide for payment under the program for:
(a) emergency and temporary health care services provided to a member or individual
entitled to become a member who has not had a reasonable opportunity to become a member
or to enroll with a care coordinator; and
(b) health care services provided in an emergency to an individual who is entitled to
become a member or enrolled with a care coordinator, regardless of having had an
opportunity to do so.
§ 5105. Health care providers; care coordination; payment methodologies. 1. Choice of
health care provider. (a) Any health care provider qualified to participate under this section
may provide health care services under the program, provided that the health care provider is
otherwise legally authorized to perform the health care service for the individual and under
the circumstances involved.
(b) A member may choose to receive health care services under the program from any
participating provider, consistent with provisions of this article relating to care coordination
and health care organizations, the willingness or availability of the provider (subject to
provisions of this article relating to discrimination), and the appropriate clinically-relevant
circumstances.
2. Care coordination. (a) A care coordinator may be an individual or entity that is
approved by the program that is:
(i) a health care practitioner who is: (A) the member's primary care practitioner; (B) at the
option of a female member, the member's provider of primary gynecological care; or (C) at
the option of a member who has a chronic condition that requires specialty care, a specialist
health care practitioner who regularly and continually provides treatment for that condition to

11

Many provisions of NY’s Medicaid and other laws say they only apply if there is “federal financial
participation” (i.e., if it would qualify for federal matching funds). But under NY Health, services covered by
Medicaid would be covered for all New Yorkers, even though they might not be federally Medicaid eligible.
This language makes sure these benefits would be fully available.
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the member;
(ii) an entity licensed under article twenty-eight of this chapter or certified under article
thirty-six of this chapter, or, with respect to a member who receives chronic mental health
care services, an entity licensed under article thirty-one of the mental hygiene law or other
entity approved by the commissioner in consultation with the commissioner of mental health;
(iii) a health care organization;
(iv) a Taft-Hartley fund or labor union, with respect to its members and their family
members; provided that this provision shall not preclude a Taft-Hartley fund or labor union
from becoming a care coordinator under subparagraph (v) of this paragraph or a health care
organization under section fifty-one hundred six of this article; or
(v) any not-for-profit or governmental entity approved by the program.
(b)(i) Every member shall enroll with a care coordinator that agrees to provide care
coordination to the member prior to receiving health care services to be paid for under the
program. Health care services provided to a member shall not be subject to payment under
the program unless the member is enrolled with a care coordinator at the time the health care
service is provided.
(ii) This paragraph shall not apply to health care services provided under subdivision three
of section fifty-one hundred four of this article.
(iii) The member shall remain enrolled with that care coordinator until the member
becomes enrolled with a different care coordinator or ceases to be a member. Members have
the right to change their care coordinator on terms at least as permissive as the provisions of
section three hundred sixty-four-j of the social services law relating to an individual
changing his or her primary care provider or managed care provider.
(c) Care coordination shall be provided to the member by the member's care coordinator.
A care coordinator may employ or utilize the services of other individuals or entities to assist
in providing care coordination for the member, consistent with regulations of the
commissioner.
(d) A health care organization may establish rules relating to care coordination for
members in the health care organization, different from this subdivision but otherwise
consistent with this article and other applicable laws.
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(e) The commissioner shall develop and implement procedures and standards for an
individual or entity to be approved to be a care coordinator in the program, including but not
limited to procedures and standards relating to the revocation, suspension, limitation, or
annulment of approval on a determination that the individual or entity is not competent to be
a care coordinator or has exhibited a course of conduct which is either inconsistent with
program standards and regulations or which exhibits an unwillingness to meet such standards
and regulations, or is a potential threat to the public health or safety. Such procedures and
standards shall not limit approval to be a care coordinator in the program for economic
purposes and shall be consistent with good professional practice. In developing the
procedures and standards, the commissioner shall: (i) consider existing standards developed
by national accrediting and professional organizations; and (ii) consult with national and
local organizations working on care coordination or similar models, including health care
practitioners, hospitals, clinics, and consumers and their representatives. When developing
and implementing standards of approval of care coordinators for individuals receiving
chronic mental health care services, the commissioner shall consult with the commissioner of
mental health. An individual or entity may not be a care coordinator unless the services
included in care coordination are within the individual's professional scope of practice or the
entity's legal authority.
(f) To maintain approval under the program, a care coordinator must: (i) renew its status at
a frequency determined by the commissioner; and (ii) provide data to the department as
required by the commissioner to enable the commissioner to evaluate the impact of care
coordinators on quality, outcomes and cost.
(g) Nothing in this subdivision shall authorize any individual to engage in any act in
violation of title eight of the education law.
3. Health care providers. (a) The commissioner shall establish and maintain procedures
and standards for health care providers to be qualified to participate in the program,
including but not limited to procedures and standards relating to the revocation, suspension,
limitation, or annulment of qualification to participate on a determination that the health care
provider is not competent to be a provider of specific health care services or has exhibited a
course of conduct which is either inconsistent with program standards and regulations or
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which exhibits an unwillingness to meet such standards and regulations, or is a potential
threat to the public health or safety. Such procedures and standards shall not limit health care
provider participation in the program for economic purposes and shall be consistent with
good professional practice. Such procedures and standards may be different for different
types of health care providers and health care professionals. Any health care provider who is
qualified to participate under Medicaid, child health plus or Medicare shall be deemed to be
qualified to participate in the program, and any health care provider's revocation, suspension,
limitation, or annulment of qualification to participate in any of those programs shall apply to
the health care provider's qualification to participate in the program; provided that a health
care provider qualified under this sentence shall follow the procedures to become qualified
under the program by the end of the implementation period.
(b) The commissioner shall establish and maintain procedures and standards for
recognizing health care providers located out of the state for purposes of providing coverage
under the program for out-of-state health care services.
(c) Procedures and standards under this subdivision shall include provisions for expedited
temporary qualification to participate in the program for health care professionals who are (i)
temporarily authorized to practice in the state or (ii) are recently arrived in the state or
recently authorized to practice in the state.
4. Payment for health care services. (a) The commissioner may establish by regulation
payment methodologies for health care services and care coordination provided to members
under the program by participating providers, care coordinators, and health care
organizations. There may be a variety of different payment methodologies, including those
established on a demonstration basis. All payment rates under the program shall be
reasonable and reasonably related to the cost of efficiently providing the health care service
and assuring an adequate and accessible supply of the health care service. Until and unless
another payment methodology is established, health care services provided to members under
the program shall be paid for on a fee-for-service basis, except for care coordination.
(b) The program shall engage in good faith negotiations with health care providers'
representatives under title III of article forty-nine of this chapter, including, but not limited
to, in relation to rates of payment and payment methodologies.
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(c) Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, payment for drugs provided by
pharmacies under the program shall be made pursuant to title one of article two-A of this
chapter. However, the program shall provide for payment for prescription drugs under
section 340B of the federal public service act where applicable. Payment for prescription
drugs provided by health care providers other than pharmacies shall be pursuant to other
provisions of this article.
(d) Payment for health care services established under this article shall be considered
payment in full. A participating provider shall not charge any rate in excess of the payment
established under this article for any health care service provided under the program and
shall not solicit or accept payment from any member or third party for any such service
except as provided under section fifty-one hundred nine of this article. However, this
paragraph shall not preclude the program from acting as a primary or secondary payer in
conjunction with another third-party payer where permitted under section fifty-one hundred
nine of this article.
(e) The program may provide in payment methodologies for payment for capital related
expenses for specifically identified capital expenditures incurred by not-for-profit or
governmental entities certified under article twenty-eight of this chapter. Any capital related
expense generated by a capital expenditure that requires or required approval under article
twenty-eight of this chapter must have received that approval for the capital related expense
to be paid for under the program.
(f) Payment methodologies and rates shall include a distinct component of reimbursement
for direct and indirect graduate medical education as defined, calculated and implemented
pursuant to section twenty-eight hundred seven-c of this chapter.
(g) The commissioner shall provide by regulation for payment methodologies and
procedures for paying for out-of-state health care services.
5. Prior authorization. The program shall not require prior authorization for any health care
service in any manner more restrictive of access to or payment for the service than would be
required for the service under Medicare Part A or Part B. Prior authorization for prescription
drugs provided by pharmacies under the program shall be under title one of article two-A of
this chapter.
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§ 5106. Health care organizations. 1. A member may choose to enroll with and receive
health care services under the program from a health care organization.
2. A health care organization shall be a not-for-profit or governmental entity that is
approved by the commissioner that is:
(a) an accountable care organization under article twenty-nine-E of this chapter; or
(b) a Taft-Hartley fund (i) with respect to its members and their family members, and (ii)
if allowed by applicable law and approved by the commissioner, for other members of the
program.
3. A health care organization may be responsible for providing all or part of the health care
services to which its members are entitled under the program, consistent with the terms of its
approval by the commissioner.
4. (a) The commissioner shall develop and implement procedures and standards for an
entity to be approved to be a health care organization in the program, including but not
limited to procedures and standards relating to the revocation, suspension, limitation, or
annulment of approval on a determination that the entity is not competent to be a health care
organization or has exhibited a course of conduct which is either inconsistent with program
standards and regulations or which exhibits an unwillingness to meet such standards and
regulations, or is a potential threat to the public health or safety. Such procedures and
standards shall not limit approval to be a health care organization in the program for
economic purposes and shall be consistent with good professional practice. In developing the
procedures and standards, the commissioner shall: (i) consider existing standards developed
by national accrediting and professional organizations; and (ii) consult with national and
local organizations working in the field of health care organizations, including health care
practitioners, hospitals, clinics, long-term supports and service providers, consumers and
their representatives and labor organizations representing health care workers. When
developing and implementing standards of approval of health care organizations, the
commissioner shall consult with the commissioner of mental health, the commissioner of
developmental disabilities, the director of the state office for the aging and the commissioner
of the office of alcoholism and substance abuse services.
(b) To maintain approval under the program, a health care organization must: (i) renew its
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status at a frequency determined by the commissioner; and (ii) provide data to the department
as required by the commissioner to enable the commissioner to evaluate the health care
organization in relation to quality of health care services, health care outcomes, and cost.
5. The commissioner shall make regulations relating to health care organizations
consistent with and to ensure compliance with this article.
6. The provision of health care services directly or indirectly by a health care organization
through health care providers shall not be considered the practice of a profession under title
eight of the education law by the health care organization.
§ 5107. Program standards. 1. The commissioner shall establish requirements and
standards for the program and for health care organizations, care coordinators, and health
care providers, consistent with this article, including requirements and standards for, as
applicable:
(a) the scope, quality and accessibility of health care services;
(b) relations between health care organizations or health care providers and members; and
(c) relations between health care organizations and health care providers, including (i)
credentialing and participation in the health care organization; and (ii) terms, methods and
rates of payment.
2. Requirements and standards under the program shall include, but not be limited to,
provisions to promote the following:
(a) simplification, transparency, uniformity, and fairness in health care provider
credentialing and participation in health care organization networks, referrals, payment
procedures and rates, claims processing, and approval of health care services, as applicable;
(b) primary and preventive care, care coordination, efficient and effective health care
services, quality assurance, coordination and integration of health care services, including
use of appropriate technology, and promotion of public, environmental and occupational
health;
(c) elimination of health care disparities;
(d) non-discrimination with respect to members and health care providers on the basis of
race, ethnicity, national origin, religion, disability, age, sex, sexual orientation, gender
identity or expression, or economic circumstances; provided that health care services
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provided under the program shall be appropriate to the patient's clinically-relevant
circumstances;
(e) accessibility of care coordination, health care organization services and health care
services, including accessibility for people with disabilities and people with limited ability to
speak or understand English, and the providing of care coordination, health care organization
services and health care services in a culturally competent manner; and
(f) especially in relation to long-term supports and services, the maximization and
prioritization of the most integrated community-based supports and services.
3. Any participating provider or care coordinator that is organized as a for-profit entity
(other than a professional practice of one or more health care professionals) shall be required
to meet the same requirements and standards as entities organized as not-for-profit entities,
and payments under the program paid to such entities shall not be calculated to accommodate
the generation of profit or revenue for dividends or other return on investment or the
payment of taxes that would not be paid by a not-for-profit entity.
4. Every participating provider shall furnish to the program such information to, and
permit examination of its records by, the program, as may be reasonably required for
purposes of reviewing accessibility and utilization of health care services, quality assurance,
promoting improved patient outcomes and cost containment, the making of payments, and
statistical or other studies of the operation of the program or for protection and promotion of
public, environmental and occupational health.
5. In developing requirements and standards and making other policy determinations under
this article, the commissioner shall consult with representatives of members, health care
providers, care coordinators, health care organizations employers, organized labor including
representatives of health care workers, and other interested parties.
6. The program shall maintain the security and confidentiality of all data and other
information collected under the program when such data would be normally considered
confidential patient data. Aggregate data of the program which is derived from confidential
data but does not violate patient confidentiality shall be public information including for
purposes of article six of the public officers law.
§ 5108. Regulations. The commissioner may make regulations under this article by
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approving regulations and amendments thereto, under subdivision one of section fifty-one
hundred two of this article. The commissioner may make regulations or amendments thereto
under this article on an emergency basis under section two hundred two of the state
administrative procedure act, provided that such regulations or amendments shall not become
permanent unless adopted under subdivision one of section fifty-one hundred two of this
article.
§ 5109. Provisions relating to federal health programs. 1. The commissioner shall seek all
federal waivers and other federal approvals and arrangements and submit state plan
amendments necessary to operate the program consistent with this article to the maximum
extent possible.
2. (a) The commissioner shall apply to the secretary of health and human services or other
appropriate federal official for all waivers of requirements, and make other arrangements,
under Medicare, any federally-matched public health program, the affordable care act, and
any other federal programs that provide federal funds for payment for health care services,
that are necessary to enable all New York Health members to receive all benefits under the
program through the program to enable the state to implement this article and to receive and
deposit all federal payments under those programs (including funds that may be provided in
lieu of premium tax credits, cost-sharing subsidies, and small business tax credits) in the state
treasury to the credit of the New York Health trust fund and to use those funds for the New
York Health program and other provisions under this article. To the extent possible, the
commissioner shall negotiate arrangements with the federal government in which bulk or
lump-sum federal payments are paid to New York Health in place of federal spending or tax
benefits for federally-matched health programs or federal health programs. The
commissioner shall take actions under paragraph (b) of subdivision eight of section fifty-one
hundred one of this article as reasonably necessary.
(b) The commissioner may require members or applicants to be members to provide
information necessary for the program to comply with any waiver or arrangement under this
subdivision.
3. (a) The commissioner may take actions consistent with this article to enable New York
Health to administer Medicare in New York state, to create a Medicare managed care plan
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("Medicare Advantage") that would operate consistent with this article, and to be a provider
of drug coverage under Medicare part D for eligible members of New York Health.
(b) The commissioner may waive or modify the applicability of provisions of this section
relating to any federally-matched public health program or Medicare as necessary to
implement any waiver or arrangement under this section or to maximize the benefit to the
New York Health program under this section, provided that the commissioner, in
consultation with the director of the budget, shall determine that such waiver or modification
is in the best interests of the members affected by the action and the state.
(c) The commissioner may apply for coverage under any federally-matched public health
program on behalf of any member and enroll the member in the federally-matched public
health program or Medicare if the member is eligible for it. Enrollment in a federallymatched public health program or Medicare shall not cause any member to lose any health
care service provided by the program or diminish any right the member would otherwise
have.
(d) The commissioner shall by regulation increase the income eligibility level, increase or
eliminate the resource test for eligibility, simplify any procedural or documentation
requirement for enrollment, and increase the benefits for any federally-matched public health
program, and for any program to reduce or eliminate an individual's coinsurance, costsharing or premium obligations or increase an individual's eligibility for any federal financial
support related to Medicare or the affordable care act notwithstanding any law or regulation
to the contrary. The commissioner may act under this paragraph upon a finding, approved by
the director of the budget, that the action (i) will help to increase the number of members
who are eligible for and enrolled in federally-matched public health programs, or for any
program to reduce or eliminate an individual's coinsurance, cost-sharing or premium
obligations or increase an individual's eligibility for any federal financial support related to
Medicare or the affordable care act; (ii) will not diminish any individual's access to any
health care service, benefit or right the individual would otherwise have; (iii) is in the interest
of the program; and (iv) does not require or has received any necessary federal waivers or
approvals to ensure federal financial participation.
(e) To enable the commissioner to apply for coverage or financial support under any
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federally-matched public health program, the Affordable Care Act, or Medicare on behalf of
any member and enroll the member in any such program, including an entity under
paragraph (b) of subdivision eight of section fifty-one hundred one of this article if the
member is eligible for it, the commissioner may require that every member or applicant to be
a member shall provide information to enable the commissioner to determine whether the
applicant is eligible for such program. The program shall make a reasonable effort to notify
members of their obligations under this paragraph. After a reasonable effort has been made
to contact the member, the member shall be notified in writing that he or she has sixty days
to provide such required information. If such information is not provided within the sixty day
period, the member's coverage under the program may be terminated.
(f) To the extent necessary for purposes of this section, as a condition of continued
eligibility for health care services under the program, a member who is eligible for benefits
under Medicare shall enroll in Medicare, including parts A, B and D.
(g) The program shall provide premium assistance for all members enrolling in a Medicare
part D drug coverage under section 1860D of Title XVIII of the federal social security act
limited to the low-income benchmark premium amount established by the federal centers for
Medicare and Medicaid services and any other amount which such agency establishes under
its de minimis premium policy, except that such payments made on behalf of members
enrolled in a Medicare advantage plan may exceed the low-income benchmark premium
amount if determined to be cost effective to the program.
(h) If the commissioner has reasonable grounds to believe that a member could be eligible
for an income-related subsidy under section 1860D-14 of Title XVIII of the federal social
security act, the member shall provide, and authorize the program to obtain, any information
or documentation required to establish the member's eligibility for such subsidy, provided
that the commissioner shall attempt to obtain as much of the information and documentation
as possible from records that are available to him or her.
(i) The program shall make a reasonable effort to notify members of their obligations
under this subdivision. After a reasonable effort has been made to contact the member, the
member shall be notified in writing that he or she has sixty days to provide such required
information. If such information is not provided within the sixty day period, the member's
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coverage under the program may be terminated.
§ 5110. Additional provisions. 1. The commissioner shall contract with not-for-profit
organizations to provide:
(a) consumer assistance to individuals with respect to selection and changing selection of a
care coordinator or health care organization, enrolling, obtaining health care services, and
other matters relating to the program;
(b) health care provider assistance to health care providers providing and seeking or
considering whether to provide, health care services under the program, with respect to
participating in a health care organization and dealing with a health care organization; and
(c) care coordinator assistance to individuals and entities providing and seeking or
considering whether to provide, care coordination to members.
2. The commissioner shall provide grants from funds in the New York Health trust fund or
otherwise appropriated for this purpose, to health systems agencies under section twenty-nine
hundred four-b of this chapter to support the operation of such health systems agencies.
3. Retraining and re-employment of impacted employees. (a) As used in this subdivision:
(i) "Third party payer" means an insurer authorized to provide health coverage under the
insurance law, a health maintenance organization under article forty-four of this chapter, a
self-insured plan providing health coverage, or any other third party payer for health care
services.
(ii) "Health care provider administrative employee" means an employee of a health care
provider primarily engaged in relations or dealings with third party payers or seeking
payment or reimbursement for health care services from third party payers.
(iii) "Impacted employee" means an individual who, at any time from the date this section
becomes a law until two years after the end of the implementation period, is employed by a
third party payer or is a health care provider administrative employee, and whose
employment ends as a result of the implementation of the New York Health program.
(b) Within ninety days after this section shall become a law, the commissioner of labor
shall convene a retraining and re-employment task force including but not limited to:
representatives of potential impacted employees, human resource departments of third party
payers and health care providers, individuals with experience and expertise in retraining and
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re-employment programs relevant to the circumstances of impacted employees, and
representatives of the commissioner of labor. The commissioner of labor and the task force
shall review and provide:
(i) analysis of potential impacted employees by job title and geography;
(ii) competency mapping and labor market analysis of impacted employee occupations
with job openings; and
(iii) establishment of regional retraining and re-employment systems, including but not
limited to job boards, outplacement services, job search services, career advisement services,
and retraining advisement, to be coordinated with the regional advisory councils established
under section fifty-one hundred eleven of this article.
(c) (i) Three or more impacted employees, a recognized union of workers including
impacted employees, or an employer of impacted employees may file a petition with the
commissioner of labor to certify such employees as being impacted employees.
(ii) Impacted employees shall be eligible for:
(A) up to two years of retraining at any training provider approved by the commissioner of
labor; and
(B) up to two years of unemployment benefits, provided that the impacted employee is
enrolled in a department of labor approved training program, is actively seeking
employment, and is not currently employed full time; provided, however, that such impacted
employee may maintain unemployment benefits for up to two years even if he or she does
not meet the criteria set forth in this clause but is sixty-three years of age or older at the time
of loss of employment as an impacted employee.
(d) The commissioner shall provide funds from the New York Health trust fund or
otherwise appropriated for this purpose to the commissioner of labor for retraining and reemployment programs for impacted employees under this subdivision.
(e) The commissioner of labor shall make regulations and take other actions reasonably
necessary to implement this subdivision. This subdivision shall be implemented consistent
with applicable law and regulations.
4. The commissioner shall, directly and through grants to not-for-profit entities, conduct
programs using data collected through the New York Health program, to promote and protect
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the quality of health care services, patient outcomes, and public, environmental and
occupational health, including cooperation with other data collection and research programs
of the department, consistent with this article, the protection of the security and
confidentiality of individually identifiable patient information, and otherwise applicable law.
§ 5111. Regional advisory councils. 1. The New York Health regional advisory councils
(each referred to in this article as a "regional advisory council") are hereby created in the
department.
2. There shall be a regional advisory council established in each of the following regions:
(a) Long Island, consisting of Nassau and Suffolk counties;
(b) New York City;
(c) Hudson Valley, consisting of Delaware, Dutchess, Orange, Putnam, Rockland,
Sullivan, Ulster, Westchester counties;
(d) Northern, consisting of Albany, Clinton, Columbia, Essex, Franklin, Fulton, Greene,
Hamilton, Herkimer, Jefferson, Lewis, Montgomery, Otsego, Rensselaer, Saratoga,
Schenectady, Schoharie, St. Lawrence, Warren, Washington counties;
(e) Central, consisting of Broome, Cayuga, Chemung, Chenango, Cortland, Livingston,
Madison, Monroe, Oneida, Onondaga, Ontario, Oswego, Schuyler, Seneca, Steuben, Tioga,
Tompkins, Wayne, Yates counties; and
(f) Western, consisting of Allegany, Cattaraugus, Chautauqua, Erie, Genesee, Niagara,
Orleans, Wyoming counties.
3. Each regional advisory council shall be composed of not fewer than twenty-seven
members, as determined by the commissioner and the board, as necessary to appropriately
represent the diverse needs and concerns of the region. Members of a regional advisory
council shall be residents of or have their principal place of business in the region served by
the regional advisory council.
4. Appointment of members of the regional advisory councils.
(a) The twenty-seven members shall be appointed as follows:
(i) nine members shall be appointed by the governor;
(ii) six members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the speaker
of the assembly;
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(iii) six members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the
temporary president of the senate;
(iv) three members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the
minority leader of the assembly; and
(v) three members shall be appointed by the governor on the recommendation of the
minority leader of the senate.
Where a regional advisory council has more than twenty-seven members, additional
members shall be appointed and recommended by these officials in the same proportion as
the twenty-seven members.
(b) Regional advisory council membership shall include but not be limited to:
(i) representatives of organizations with a regional constituency that advocate for health
care consumers, older adults, and people with disabilities including organizations led by
members of those groups, who shall constitute at least one third of the membership of each
regional council;
(ii) representatives of professional organizations representing physicians;
(iii) representatives of professional organizations representing health care professionals
other than physicians;
(iv) representatives of general hospitals, including public hospitals;
(v) representatives of community health centers;
(vi) representatives of mental health, behavioral health (including substance use), physical
disability, developmental disability, rehabilitation, home care and other service providers;
(vii) representatives of women's health service providers;
(viii) representatives of health care organizations;
(ix) representatives of organized labor including representatives of health care workers;
(x) representatives of employers; and
(xi) representatives of municipal and county government.
5. Members of a regional advisory council shall be appointed for terms of three years
provided, however, that of the members first appointed, one-third shall be appointed for one
year terms and one-third shall be appointed for two year terms. Vacancies shall be filled in
the same manner as original appointments for the remainder of any unexpired term. No
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person shall be a member of a regional advisory council for more than six years in any period
of twelve consecutive years.
6. Members of the regional advisory councils shall serve without compensation but shall
be reimbursed for their necessary and actual expenses incurred while engaged in the business
of the advisory councils. The program shall provide financial support for such expenses and
other expenses of the regional advisory councils.
7. Each regional advisory council shall meet at least quarterly. Each regional advisory
council may form committees to assist it in its work. Members of a committee need not be
members of the regional advisory council. The New York City regional advisory council
shall form a committee for each borough of New York City, to assist the regional advisory
council in its work as it relates particularly to that borough.
8. Each regional advisory council shall advise the commissioner, the board, the governor
and the legislature on all matters relating to the development and implementation of the New
York Health program.
9. Each regional advisory council shall adopt, and from time to time revise, a community
health improvement plan for its region for the purpose of:
(a) promoting the delivery of health care services in the region, improving the quality and
accessibility of care, including cultural competency, clinical integration of care between
service providers including but not limited to physical, mental, and behavioral health,
physical and developmental disability services, and long-term supports and services;
(b) facility and health services planning in the region;
(c) identifying gaps in regional health care services;
(d) promoting increased public knowledge and responsibility regarding the availability and
appropriate utilization of health care services. Each community health improvement plan
shall be submitted to the commissioner and the board and shall be posted on the department's
website;
(e) identifying needs in professional and service personnel required to deliver health care
services; and
(f) coordinating regional implementation of retraining and re-employment programs for
impacted employees under subdivision three of section fifty-one hundred ten of this article.
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10. Each regional advisory council shall hold at least four public hearings annually on
matters relating to the New York Health program and the development and implementation
of the community health improvement plan.
11. Each regional advisory council shall publish an annual report to the commissioner and
the board on the progress of the community health improvement plan. These reports shall be
posted on the department's website.
12. All meetings of the regional advisory councils and committees shall be subject to
article six of the public officers law.
§ 4. Financing of New York Health. 1. The governor shall submit to the legislature a
revenue plan and legislative bills to implement the plan (referred to collectively in this
section as the "revenue proposal") to provide the revenue necessary to finance the New York
Health program, as created by article 51 of the public health law and all provisions of that
article (referred to in this section as the "program"), taking into consideration anticipated
federal revenue available for the program. The revenue proposal shall be submitted to the
legislature as part of the executive budget under article VII of the state constitution, for the
fiscal year commencing on the first day of April in the calendar year after this act shall
become a law. In developing the revenue proposal, the governor shall consult with
appropriate officials of the executive branch; the temporary president of the senate; the
speaker of the assembly; the chairs of the fiscal and health committees of the senate and
assembly; and representatives of business, labor, consumers and local government.
2. (a) Basic structure. The basic structure of the revenue proposal shall be as follows:
Revenue for the program shall come from two taxes (referred to collectively in this section as
the "taxes"). First, there shall be a progressively graduated tax on all payroll and selfemployed income (referred to in this section as the "payroll tax"), paid by employers,
employees and self-employed individuals. Second, there shall be a progressively graduated
tax on taxable income (such as interest, dividends, and capital gains) not subject to the
payroll tax (referred to in this section as the "non-payroll tax"). Income in the bracket below
twenty-five thousand dollars per year shall be exempt from the taxes. Higher brackets of
income subject to the taxes shall be assessed at a higher marginal rate than lower brackets.
The taxes shall be set at levels anticipated to produce sufficient revenue to finance the
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program, to be scaled up as enrollment grows, taking into consideration anticipated federal
revenue available for the program. Provision shall be made for state residents (who are
eligible for the program) who are employed out-of-state, and non-residents (who are not
eligible for the program) who are employed in the state.
(b) Payroll tax. The income to be subject to the payroll tax shall be all income subject to
the Medicare Part A tax. The tax shall be set at a percentage of that income, which shall be
progressively graduated, so the percentage is higher on higher brackets of income. For
employed individuals, the employer shall pay eighty percent of the tax and the employee
shall pay twenty percent of the tax, except that an employer may agree to pay all or part of
the employee's share. A self-employed individual shall pay the full tax.
(c) Non-payroll income tax. There shall be a tax on income that is subject to the personal
income tax under article 22 of the tax law and is not subject to the payroll tax. It shall be set
at a percentage of that income, which shall be progressively graduated, so the percentage is
higher on higher brackets of income.
(d) Phased-in rates. Early in the program, when enrollment is growing, the amount of the
taxes shall be at an appropriate level, and shall be changed as anticipated enrollment grows,
to cover the actual cost of the program. The revenue proposal shall include a mechanism for
determining the rates of the taxes.
(e) Cross-border employees. (i) State residents employed out-of-state. If an individual is
employed out-of-state by an employer that is subject to New York state law, the employer
and employee shall be required to pay the payroll tax as to that employee as if the
employment were in the state. If an individual is employed out-of-state by an employer that
is not subject to New York state law, either (A) the employer and employee shall voluntarily
comply with the tax or (B) the employee shall pay the tax as if he or she were self-employed.
(ii) Out-of-state residents employed in the state. (A) The payroll tax shall apply to any outof-state resident who is employed or self-employed in the state. (B) In the case of an out-ofstate resident who is employed or self-employed in the state, such individual and individual's
employer shall be able to take a credit against the payroll taxes each would otherwise pay as
to that individual for amounts they spend respectively on health benefits for the individual
that would otherwise be covered by the program if the individual were a member of the
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program. For the employer, the credit shall be available regardless of the form of the health
benefit (e.g., health insurance, a self-insured plan, direct services, or reimbursement for
services), to make sure that the revenue proposal does not relate to employment benefits in
violation of the federal ERISA. For non-employment-based spending by the individual, the
credit shall be available for and limited to spending for health coverage (not out-of-pocket
health spending). The credit shall be available without regard to how little is spent or how
sparse the benefit. The credit may only be taken against the payroll tax. Any excess amount
may not be applied to other tax liability. The credit shall be distributed between the employer
and employee in the same proportion as the spending by each for the benefit and may be
applied to their respective portion of the tax. (C) If any provision of this subparagraph or any
application of it shall be ruled to violate federal ERISA, the provision or the application of it
shall be null and void and the ruling shall not affect any other provision or application of this
section or the act that enacted it.
3. (a) The revenue proposal shall include a plan and legislative provisions for ending the
requirement for local social services districts to pay part of the cost of Medicaid and
replacing those payments with revenue from the taxes under the revenue proposal.
(b) The taxes under this section shall not supplant the spending of other state revenue to
pay for the Medicaid program as it exists as of the enactment of the revenue proposal as
amended, unless the revenue proposal as amended provides otherwise.
4. To the extent that the revenue proposal differs from the terms of subdivision two or
paragraph (b) of subdivision three of this section, the revenue proposal shall state how it
differs from those terms and reasons for and the effects of the differences.
5. All revenue from the taxes shall be deposited in the New York Health trust fund account
under section 89-j of the state finance law.
§ 5. Article 49 of the public health law is amended by adding a new title 3 to read as
follows:
TITLE III
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS BY HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS WITH
NEW YORK HEALTH
Section 4920. Definitions.
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4921. Collective negotiation authorized.
4922. Collective negotiation requirements.
4923. Requirements for health care providers' representative.
4924. Mediation.
4925. Certain collective action prohibited.
4926. Fees.
4927. Confidentiality.
4928. Severability and construction.
§ 4920. Definitions. For purposes of this title:
1. "New York Health" means the program under article fifty-one of this chapter.
2. "Person" means an individual, association, corporation, or any other legal entity.
3. "Health care providers' representative" means a third party that is authorized by health
care providers to negotiate on their behalf with New York Health over terms and conditions
affecting those health care providers.
4. "Strike" means a work stoppage in part or in whole, direct or indirect, by a body of
workers to gain compliance with demands made on an employer.
5. "Health care provider" means a health care provider under article fifty-one of this
chapter. A health care professional as defined in article fifty-one of this chapter who
practices as an employee or independent contractor of another health care provider shall not
be deemed a health care provider for purposes of this title.
§ 4921. Collective negotiation authorized. 1. Health care providers may meet and
communicate for the purpose of collectively negotiating with New York Health on any
matter relating to New York Health, including but not limited to rates of payment and
payment methodologies.
2. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow or authorize an alteration of the terms
of the internal and external review procedures set forth in law.
3. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow a strike of New York Health by
health care providers.
4. Nothing in this section shall be construed to allow or authorize terms or conditions
which would impede the ability of New York Health to obtain or retain accreditation by the
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national committee for quality assurance or a similar body or to comply with applicable state
or federal law.
§ 4922. Collective negotiation requirements. 1. Collective negotiation rights granted by
this title must conform to the following requirements:
(a) health care providers may communicate with other health care providers regarding the
terms and conditions to be negotiated with New York Health;
(b) health care providers may communicate with health care providers' representatives;
(c) a health care providers' representative is the only party authorized to negotiate with
New York Health on behalf of the health care providers as a group;
(d) a health care provider can be bound by the terms and conditions negotiated by the
health care providers' representatives; and
(e) in communicating or negotiating with the health care providers' representative, New
York Health is entitled to offer and provide different terms and conditions to individual
competing health care providers.
2. Nothing in this title shall affect or limit the right of a health care provider or group of
health care providers to collectively petition a government entity for a change in a law, rule,
or regulation.
3. Nothing in this title shall affect or limit collective action or collective bargaining on the
part of any health care provider with his or her employer or any other lawful collective action
or collective bargaining.
§ 4923. Requirements for health care providers' representative. Before engaging in
collective negotiations with New York Health on behalf of health care providers, a health
care providers' representative shall file with the commissioner, in the manner prescribed by
the commissioner, information identifying the representative, the representative's plan of
operation, and the representative's procedures to ensure compliance with this title.
§ 4924. Mediation. 1. In the event the commissioner determines that an impasse exists in
the negotiations, the commissioner shall render assistance as follows:
(a) to assist the parties to effect a voluntary resolution of the negotiations, the
commissioner shall appoint a mediator who is mutually acceptable to both the health care
providers' representative and the representative of New York Health. If the mediator is
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successful in resolving the impasse, then the health care providers' representative shall
proceed as set forth in this article;
(b) if an impasse continues, the commissioner shall appoint a fact-finding board of not
more than three members, who are mutually acceptable to both the health care providers'
representative and the representative of New York Health. The fact-finding board shall have,
in addition to the powers delegated to it by the board, the power to make recommendations
for the resolution of the dispute;
(c) the fact-finding board, acting by a majority of its members, shall transmit its findings
of fact and recommendations for resolution of the dispute to the commissioner, and may
thereafter assist the parties to effect a voluntary resolution of the dispute. The fact-finding
board shall also share its findings of fact and recommendations with the health care
providers' representative and the representative of New York Health. If within twenty days
after the submission of the findings of fact and recommendations, the impasse continues, the
commissioner shall order a resolution to the negotiations based upon the findings of fact and
recommendations submitted by the fact-finding board.
§ 4925. Certain collective action prohibited. 1. This title is not intended to authorize
competing health care providers to act in concert in response to a health care providers'
representative's discussions or negotiations with New York Health except as authorized by
other law.
2. No health care providers' representative shall negotiate any agreement that excludes,
limits the participation or reimbursement of, or otherwise limits the scope of services to be
provided by any health care provider or group of health care providers with respect to the
performance of services that are within the health care provider's lawful scope or terms of
practice, license, registration, or certificate.
§ 4926. Fees. Each person who acts as the representative of negotiating parties under this
title shall pay to the department a fee to act as a representative. The commissioner, by
regulation, shall set fees in amounts deemed reasonable and necessary to cover the costs
incurred by the department in administering this title.
§ 4927. Confidentiality. All reports and other information required to be reported to the
department under this title shall not be subject to disclosure under article six of the public
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officers law.
§ 4928. Severability and construction. If any provision or application of this title shall be
held to be invalid, or to violate or be inconsistent with any applicable federal law or
regulation, that shall not affect other provisions or applications of this title which can be
given effect without that provision or application; and to that end, the provisions and
applications of this title are severable. The provisions of this title shall be liberally construed
to give effect to the purposes thereof.
§ 6. Subdivision 11 of section 270 of the public health law, as amended by section 2-a of
part C of chapter 58 of the laws of 2008, is amended to read as follows:
11. "State public health plan" means the medical assistance program established by title
eleven of article five of the social services law (referred to in this article as "Medicaid"), the
elderly pharmaceutical insurance coverage program established by title three of article two of
the elder law (referred to in this article as "EPIC"), and the [family health plus program
established by section three hundred sixty-nine-ee of the social services law to the extent that
section provides that the program shall be subject to this article] New York Health program
established by article fifty-one of this chapter.
§ 7. The state finance law is amended by adding a new section 89-j to read as follows:
§ 89-j. New York Health trust fund. 1. There is hereby established in the joint custody of
the state comptroller and the commissioner of taxation and finance a special revenue fund to
be known as the "New York Health trust fund", referred to in this section as "the fund". The
definitions in section fifty-one hundred of the public health law shall apply to this section.
2. The fund shall consist of:
(a) all monies obtained from taxes pursuant to legislation enacted as proposed under
section three of the New York Health act;
(b) federal payments received as a result of any waiver or other arrangements agreed to by
the United States secretary of health and human services or other appropriate federal officials
for health care programs established under Medicare, any federally-matched public health
program, or the affordable care act;
(c) the amounts paid by the department of health that are equivalent to those amounts that
are paid on behalf of residents of this state under Medicare, any federally-matched public
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health program, or the affordable care act for health benefits which are equivalent to health
benefits covered under New York Health;
(d) federal and state funds for purposes of the provision of services authorized under title
XX of the federal social security act that would otherwise be covered under article fifty-one
of the public health law; and
(e) state monies that would otherwise be appropriated to any governmental agency, office,
program, instrumentality or institution which provides health services, for services and
benefits covered under New York Health. Payments to the fund pursuant to this paragraph
shall be in an amount equal to the money appropriated for such purposes in the fiscal year
beginning immediately preceding the effective date of the New York Health act.
3. Monies in the fund shall only be used for purposes established under article fifty-one of
the public health law.
§ 8. Temporary commission on implementation. 1. There is hereby established a
temporary commission on implementation of the New York Health program, referred to in
this section as the commission, consisting of fifteen members: five members, including the
chair, shall be appointed by the governor; four members shall be appointed by the temporary
president of the senate, one member shall be appointed by the senate minority leader; four
members shall be appointed by the speaker of the assembly, and one member shall be
appointed by the assembly minority leader. The commissioner of health, the superintendent
of financial services, and the commissioner of taxation and finance, or their designees shall
serve as non-voting ex-officio members of the commission.
2. Members of the commission shall receive such assistance as may be necessary from
other state agencies and entities, and shall receive reasonable and necessary expenses
incurred in the performance of their duties. The commission may employ staff as needed,
prescribe their duties, and fix their compensation within amounts appropriated for the
commission.
3. The commission shall examine the laws and regulations of the state and make such
recommendations as are necessary to conform the laws and regulations of the state and
article 51 of the public health law establishing the New York Health program and other
provisions of law relating to the New York Health program, and to improve and implement
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the program. The commission shall report its recommendations to the governor and the
legislature. The commission shall immediately begin development of proposals consistent
with the principles of article 51 of the public health law for provision of health care services
covered under the workers' compensation law; and incorporation of retiree health benefits, as
described in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) of subdivision 8 of section 5102 of the public health
law. The commission shall provide its work product and assistance to the board established
pursuant to section 5102 of the public health law upon completion of the appointment of the
board.
§ 9. Severability. If any provision or application of this act shall be held to be invalid, or to
violate or be inconsistent with any applicable federal law or regulation, that shall not affect
other provisions or applications of this act which can be given effect without that provision
or application; and to that end, the provisions and applications of this act are severable.
§ 10. This act shall take effect immediately.
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From
Assembly Member Richard N. Gottfried
Senator Gustavo Rivera

What makes the NY Health Act work.
And why no other plan does.
1. End the burdens and obstacles to
health care.
Every year, millions of New Yorkers with health
insurance go without health care because they can’t afford it.
Deductibles, copays, out-of-network charges and unfair
denials of coverage get in the way. People choose between
health care and other basic necessities. And most New
Yorkers say they have fears about the affordability of health
care.
Insurance companies don’t care if you’re a multimillionaire CEO or a receptionist. They impose the same
financial obstacles regardless of your ability to pay.
If someone in a family needs home health care or nursing
home care, the cost can wipe out a lifetime of savings or
force family members to give up a career to care for a loved
one. Instead, the NY Health Act covers the
long-term care people need, in the setting of
their choice.
The NY Health Act has no premiums,
deductibles, copays, restricted provider
networks or out-of-network charges. It
lowers costs for seniors by picking up Medicare Part B
premiums and eliminating Medicare “cost-sharing.” It brings
local tax relief by eliminating the “local share” of Medicaid.
NY Health would save billions that New Yorkers now
spend for coverage and out-of-pocket costs – and is paid for
by a broad-based progressively-graduated tax based on
ability to pay.
The tax would apply to payroll income (i.e., subject to the
Medicare Part A tax) paid at least 80% by the employer, and
“unearned” income (e.g., capital gains, dividends, etc.) that is
currently subject to the NY state personal income tax.
Income in lower brackets would be taxed at lower rates or
exempt from the tax, and income in higher brackets would be
taxed at a higher rate. That’s just fair.

2. Stop wasting money.
Getting insurance companies off our backs will save
billions of dollars to pay for health care and to put money
back into New Yorkers’ pockets. Getting rid of insurance
company bureaucracy and profits saves us over $20 billion.
We save over $16 billion we now pay to doctors, hospitals
and other providers for the administrative cost of fighting
with insurance companies. We’ll cut drug prices over $18
billion with the bargaining power of 20 million consumers.
That’s $55 billion a year.

44

These savings are what frees up the money to pay for
ending deductibles, co-pays, restricted provider networks,
and out-of-network charges, and covering long-term care.
The fragmentation of the current system is the enemy of
affordability, quality and real reform.

3. All in the same boat.
Covering all of us in the same plan isn’t just a matter of
fairness. Making the plan universal and publicly accountable
also guarantees that NY Health will be top quality.
How? Legislators, governors and other officials, their
families, friends will be covered by the same plan as all their
constituents. They’ll have a personal stake in making sure
the plan treats them and their doctors, hospitals and other
providers as best as can be. All 20 million New Yorkers will
benefit by being in the same plan with
them.
We all want to hold down costs and the
taxes that pay for the plan. But we’ll also
have a stake in keeping NY Health top
quality. That balance of pressures is key.
Insurance companies have to deliver as
much of our money to their stockholders as possible. That
means cutting what they spend on our health care any way
they can.
The NY Health Act explicitly requires that payments to
health care providers must be “reasonably related to the cost
of efficiently providing the health care service and assuring
an adequate and accessible supply of the health care service.”
No insurance company promises or delivers that.

No other plan can do the job.
Some argue that we should just try to get health
insurance for the 5% of New Yorkers who are still
uninsured.
But plans that keep our fractured insurance company
system can’t remove the burdens and financial obstacles to
health care and don’t give us the savings that will pay for
health care and put money back in New Yorkers’ pockets.
They won’t relieve the administrative burdens on doctors,
hospitals and other providers.
Millions of New Yorkers go without needed health care
or face financial obstacles and burdens to get it. No one
says that’s acceptable. And the NY Health Act is the only
plan that meets that need.

NEW YORK STATE ASSEMBLY
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF LEGISLATION
submitted in accordance with Assembly Rule III, Sec 1(f)
BILL NUMBER: A5248
SPONSOR: Gottfried (MS)

TITLE OF BILL:
An act to amend the public health law and the state finance law, in
relation to enacting the "New York health act" and to establishing New
York Health

PURPOSE OR GENERAL IDEA OF BILL:
This bill would create a universal single payer health plan - New York
Health - to provide comprehensive health coverage for all New Yorkers.

SUMMARY OF SPECIFIC PROVISIONS:
Every New York resident would be eligible to enroll, regardless of age,
income, wealth, employment, or other status.
There would be no network restrictions, deductibles, or co-pays. Coverage would be publicly funded. The benefits will include comprehensive
outpatient and inpatient medical care, long-term care, primary and
preventive care, prescription drugs, laboratory tests, rehabilitative,
dental, vision, hearing, etc. - all benefits required by current state
insurance law or provided by the state public employee package, Family
Health Plus, Child Health Plus, Medicare, or Medicaid, and others added
by the plan.
Everyone would choose a primary care practitioner or other provider to
provide care coordination - helping to get the care and follow-up the
patient needs, referrals, and navigating the system. But there would be
no "gatekeeper" obstacles to care.
As with most health coverage, New York Health covers health care
services when a member is out of state, either because health care is
needed while the member is traveling or because there is a clinical
reason for going to a particular out-of-state provider.
A broadly representative Board of Trustees will advise the Commissioner
of Health. The Board shall develop proposals relating to retiree health
benefits and coverage of health care services covered under the workers'
compensation law.
In addition to the Board, there will be six regional advisory councils
to represent the diverse needs and concerns of the region. The councils
shall include but not be limited to representatives of health care
consumers, providers, municipal and county government, and organized
labor. The councils shall advise the Board, Commissioner, Governor, and
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Legislature on matters relating to the NY Health program and shall adopt
community health improvement plans to promote health care access and
quality in their regions.
Health care providers, including those providing care coordination,
would be paid in full by New York Health, with no co-pays or other
charges to patients. The plan would develop alternative payment methods
to replace old-style fee-for-service (which rewards volume but not quality), and would negotiate rates with health care provider organizations.
(Fee-for-service would continue until new methods are phased in.) The
bill would authorize health care providers to form organizations to
collectively negotiate with New York Health. Health care would no longer
be paid for by insurance companies charging a regressive "tax" insurance
premiums, deductibles and co-pays imposed regardless of ability to pay.
Instead, New York Health would be paid for based on ability to pay,
through a progressively-graduated payroll-based tax (paid at least 80%
by employers and not more than 20% by employees, and 100% by self-employed) and a progressively-graduated tax based on other taxable income,
such as capital gains, interest and dividends. A specific revenue plan,
following guidelines in the bill, would be submitted to the Legislature
by the Governor.
Federal funds now received for Medicare, Medicaid, Family Health and
Child Health Plus would be combined with the state revenue in a New York
Health Trust Fund. New York would seek federal waivers that will allow
New York to completely fold those programs into New York Health. The
"local share" of Medicaid funding - a major burden on local property
taxes - would be ended.
Private insurance that duplicates benefits offered under New York Health
could not be offered to New York residents. (Existing retiree coverage
could be phased out and replaced with New York Health.)

JUSTIFICATION:
The state constitution states: "The protection and promotion of the
health of the inhabitants of the state are matters of public concern and
provision therefor shall be made by the state and by such of its subdivisions and in such manner, and by such means as the legislature shall
from time to time determine." (Article XVII, § 3.) All residents of the
state have the right to health care.
New Yorkers - as individuals, employers, and taxpayers - have experienced a rapid rise in the cost of health care and coverage in recent
years. This increase has resulted in a large number of people without
health coverage. Businesses have also experienced extraordinary
increases in the costs of health care benefits for their employees. An
unacceptable number of New Yorkers have no health coverage, and many
more are severely underinsured.
Health care providers are also affected by inadequate health coverage in
New York State. A large portion of voluntary and public hospitals,
health centers and other providers now experience substantial losses due
to the provision of care that is uncompensated. Individuals often find
that they are deprived of affordable care and choice because of decisions by health plans guided by the plan's economic needs rather than
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their health care needs.
To address the fiscal crisis facing the health care system and the state
and to assure New Yorkers can exercise their right to health care, this
legislation would establish a comprehensive universal single-payer
health care coverage program, funded by broad-based revenue based on
ability to pay, for the benefit of all residents of the state of New
York.
The state will work to obtain waivers relating to Medicaid, Family
Health Plus, Child Health Plus, Medicare, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, and any other appropriate federal programs, under
which federal funds and other subsidies that would otherwise be paid to
New York State will be paid by the federal government to New York State
and deposited in the New York Health trust fund. Under such a waiver,
health coverage under those programs will be replaced and merged into
New York Health, which will operate as a true single-payer program. If
such a waiver is not obtained, the state shall use state plan amendments
and seek waivers to maximize, and make as seamless as possible, the use
of federally-matched health programs and federal health programs in New
York Health, The goal of this legislation is that coverage be delivered
by New York Health and, as much as possible, the multiple sources of
funding will be pooled with other New York Health funds and not be
apparent to New York Health members or participating providers. This
program will promote movement away from fee-for-service payment, which
tends to reward quantity and requires excessive administrative expense,
and towards alternate payment methodologies, such a s global or capitated payments to providers or health care organizations, that promote
quality, efficiency, investment in primary and preventive care, and
innovation and integration in the organizing of health care.
This act does not create any employment benefit, nor does it require,
prohibit, or limit the providing of any employment benefit. In order to
promote improved quality of, and access to, health care services and
promote improved clinical outcomes, it is the policy of the state to
encourage cooperative, collaborative and integrative arrangements among
health care providers who might otherwise be competitors, under the
active supervision of the commissioner. It is the intent of the state to
supplant competition with such arrangements and regulation only to the
extent necessary to accomplish the purposes of this act, and to provide
state action immunity under the state and federal antitrust laws to
health care providers, particularly with respect to their relations with
the single-payer New York Health plan created by this act.

PRIOR LEGISLATIVE HISTORY:
1992: A.8912-A passed Assembly
1993: A.5900 reported to Ways and Means
1994: A.5900 referred to Health Committee
1995-96: A.6801 reported to Ways and Means
1997-98: A.6172 reported to Ways and Means
1999-00: A.3571 reported to Ways and Means
2001-02: A.6779 reported to Ways and Means
2003-04: A.6952 reported to Ways and Means
2005: A.6576 reported to Ways and Means
2006: A.6576 referred to Health Committee
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2007-08: A.7354 - reported to Ways and Means
2009-10: A.2356 - referred to Health Committee
2011-12: A.7860-A - referred to Ways and Means
2013: A5389 referred to Health Committee
2014: A5389 - reported to Ways and Means
2015: A5062 - Passed Assembly
2016: A5062 - passed Assembly
2017: A4738 - passed Assembly
2018: A4738 - passed Assembly

FISCAL IMPLICATIONS:
Full funding for New York Health would come from the revenue measures to
be proposed by the Governor under guidelines in the bill, plus available
federal funds. The revenue package would also replace: local share of
Medicaid, the state share of Medicaid, state and local payments for
public employee health coverage, and various other health care spending.
Numerous analyses document that a single-payer system would be most
effective for reducing and controlling costs, for taxpayers, employers
and individuals.

EFFECTIVE DATE:
Immediately. The program will actually begin functioning when the
Commissioner of Health declares the beginning of the implementation
period.
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States as Policy Laboratories: The Politics of
State-Based Single-Payer Proposals
Although the focus for most
single-payer advocates is in
Washington, DC, and on proposals for Medicare for all, there
are also efforts in a handful of
states to enact a state-based
single-payer program. Moreover,
the odds of legislative passage
are better in a state like New
York than at the federal level.
Even if enacted, however,
state-based single-payer proposals face a distinct set of obstacles, including (1) the need
to obtain federal permission
(via waivers) to repurpose federal dollars, (2) the federal Employee Retirement Income and
Security Act, and (3) the burden
of state-only action in an interconnected 50-state economy.
The most likely result of the
energized single-payer movement will be incremental public
insurance expansions at the
federal and state levels, including state programs to permit
the uninsured to buy into the
Medicaid program. Such an outcome is consistent with the most
plausible path (incrementalism)
to a US version of universal
coverage. (Am J Public Health.
2019;109:1511–1514. doi:10.
2105/AJPH.2019.305294)
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espite the gains generated
by the Affordable Care Act
(ACA), more than 30 million
Americans remain uninsured,
and millions more delay or defer
needed medical care because of
high deductibles and other outof-pocket costs. This ongoing
policy challenge prompts an
increasing cadre of progressive
Democrats to call for a comprehensive overhaul of the nation’s
health care system, dramatically
reducing (or perhaps completely
eliminating) the multipayer private
insurance health insurance industry
and replacing it with comprehensive publicly funded coverage
for all, referred to generally as a
“single-payer” insurance model.1
Although the focus for most
single-payer advocates is Washington, DC, where the rhetorical
movement for Medicare for all
animates the presidential campaigns of numerous Democratic
candidates, there are also efforts in a
handful of states to enact a statebased single-payer program that
could become a model for federal
policymakers.2
The political obstacles to the
single-payer movement are obvious.3 First, the interest group
opposition is ﬁerce, wealthy, and
inﬂuential. Opponents include
private insurers worried about
being forced into bankruptcy,
providers worried about lower
reimbursement, employers worried about higher taxes and lost
control over employee beneﬁts,
unions worried about losing
dollars generated by their health

beneﬁt programs, and of course a
variety of conservative and Republican advocacy groups. Interest group support for single
payer is far weaker, more fragmented, and less wealthy.
Single-payer proposals also
raise concerns about the appropriate role of government and the
division of labor between the
public and private sectors. These
concerns are especially powerful
here in the United States, where
an antigovernment ethos resonates
strongly with much of the population and where the view that
government is less competent
than the private sector is deeply
engrained. This context makes any
effort to dramatically raise taxes to
fund a single-payer system even
more difﬁcult, even when economists point to administrative
efﬁciencies, long-term system
savings, and the elimination of
insurance premiums.
The odds of overcoming these
obstacles are better at the state
level than in Washington, DC.
Although single-payer proposals at the national level have
only recently received their ﬁrst
congressional committee hearing,
there are several states in which
single-payer proposals have received serious consideration.

Vermont, for example, enacted
legislation in 2011 that put them
on the path to single payer (although that effort was eventually
dropped in 2014). Colorado voters
considered (but defeated) a singlepayer referendum in 2016, as did
voters in Oregon in 2002. More
recently, the California state senate
passed a single-payer bill in 2017
that garnered the support (at least
during the campaign) of that state’s
newly elected governor, Gavin
Newsom. And in New York,
single-payer supporters saw a window of opportunity after the November 2018 election results in
which the Democrats took control
of the state senate, following several
years in which a Republican senate
had blocked an assembly passed
single-payer bill.
There may indeed be a small
window of opportunity for policymakers in a couple of states to
enact legislation that would put
their state on a path to a singlepayer system—it is not likely, but
it is possible. Even if enacted,
however, state-based singlepayer proposals face a distinct
set of obstacles on the path to
implementation. These barriers
include (1) the need to obtain
federal permission (via waivers)
to repurpose the vast amounts of
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federal dollars that now underpin
the nation’s health system; (2) the
federal Employee Retirement
Income and Security Act
(ERISA), which signiﬁcantly
limits state jurisdiction over the
employers’ role in health insurance; and (3) the burden of
state-only action in an interconnected 50-state economy.
Perhaps ironically, the most
likely result of an energized
single-payer movement is a series
of incremental public insurance
expansions at both the federal and
state levels. Instead of Medicare
for all, Congress may enact
Medicare for more. Instead of the
New York Health Act, New
York may permit the uninsured
to buy into the state’s Medicaid
program. Such an outcome would
be consistent with the most
plausible path to an American
version of universal coverage, one
that emerges step by step through
incremental expansions that build
on the current system, as opposed
to proposals to fundamentally
change the way the system works.
More on this later. First, however,
I review the limits on state efforts
to enact their own version of a
single-payer program.

THE NEED FOR
FEDERAL WAIVERS
The federal government is the
largest single funder of health care
services, and state-based singlepayer proposals seek to use federal
dollars as a core ﬁscal component
of the new state program. To do
so, however, requires federal
permission to redirect funds from
Medicare, Medicaid, the ACA,
the Federal Employees Health
Beneﬁt Program, the Veteran’s
Health Administration, and perhaps other federal programs as
well. Federal ofﬁcials in the
Trump administration have
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already made clear that they will
oppose any such waiver requests.4
Even assuming an eventual
friendly Democratic administration, the details of such waiver
requests would be complicated
and controversial.
For more than 50 years, for
example, Medicare has served as a
single national program, with
federal rules governing eligibility,
beneﬁts, and provider reimbursement. There are, of
course, some exceptions to the
uniformity requirements, including the all-payer hospital
reimbursement program, which
allows Maryland (and previously
a few other states) to set the allowable hospital charges for all
payers, including Medicare.
Similarly, Medicare Advantage
plans have some ﬂexibility to add
beneﬁts and set reimbursement
rates. These exceptions pale,
however, in comparison with a
proposal that the program (and all
its dollars) be turned over to state
ofﬁcials, an idea that will raise
concerns not only among federal
policymakers but among politically inﬂuential Medicare beneﬁciaries and advocates on their
behalf as well. (The effort to redirect Veteran’s Health Administration funds to a state will likely
also generate ﬁerce resistance
from an even more potent political group, the nation’s military
veterans!)
State ofﬁcials have a somewhat easier path to redirecting
Medicaid and ACA funds.
Medicaid, for example, already
delegates broad authority to determine eligibility, beneﬁts, and
reimbursement rates to the states,
and there is a long history of
granting waivers from the federal
rules designed to limit such state
discretion. Moreover, conservatives have long proposed that
federal ofﬁcials give states a ﬁxed
amount of federal Medicaid
funding, and the block grant
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concept is very close to what
state-based single-payer advocates seek. The ACA also contains explicit authority (in section
1332 of the law) for state-based
experimentation along the lines
proposed by single-payer advocates. Here again, however, despite its rhetorical support for
state experimentation, the
Trump administration is unlikely
to be receptive to comprehensive
Medicaid or ACA waivers
designed to create a path to a
single-payer system. Nor would
the waiver process be simple and
straightforward even in a Democratic administration.
The single-payer proposal
now under consideration in New
York (the New York Health Act)
contains a backup plan in case the
state is unable to obtain the desired federal waivers, under
which the state would provide
supplemental wraparound coverage for Medicaid and Medicare
beneﬁciaries. In other words,
those programs would continue
as is, but the state would ensure
that those beneﬁciaries also receive the additional beneﬁts
covered by the new single-payer
program. Such a system would be
quite administratively complex,
undermining one of the guiding
principles of the reform. At the
same time, the cost of such supplemental coverage would be
signiﬁcant, thereby making it
even more difﬁcult to generate
political support for the initiative.

EMPLOYEE
RETIREMENT INCOME
AND SECURITY ACT
ERISA, enacted by Congress
in 1974, is concerned primarily
with employer pension programs
(requiring that such programs be
adequately capitalized, avoid inequitable vesting requirements,

and provide clear disclosure
about terms and conditions). But
ERISA also has two provisions
likely to generate court challenges to state-based single-payer
programs. First, the law prohibits
states from regulating, taxing or
otherwise interfering with companies that have self-insured
health plans in which the ﬁrm
itself holds the ﬁnancial risk of
employee medical costs.5 More
than 60% of the 173 million
Americans with group coverage
receive coverage through one of
these self-insured ERISA plans.
State legislation that imposed a
signiﬁcant payroll tax to fund a
single-payer plan would almost
certainly be challenged in court as
unlawful under ERISA. Second,
ERISA also prevents states from
enacting a so-called employer
mandate, or a requirement that
ﬁrms provide health coverage (or
pay for such coverage) for their
employees. Here again, any state
legislation that imposed a significant payroll tax to fund a
single-payer plan would likely be
challenged as an unlawful employer mandate, a claim that
could have special resonance
with small businesses that currently are exempt from the federal employer mandate contained
in the ACA.
Richard Gottfried, the legislative sponsor of the single-payer
proposal in New York, dismisses
the ERISA challenge as unlikely
to succeed, noting that (1) the
state has clear authority to impose
payroll taxes; (2) the proposed
law does not require any ﬁrm to
provide coverage but, in fact,
does just the opposite, relieving
ﬁrms of any such obligation; and
(3) ﬁrms could still maintain their
employer-based coverage, although it would be irrational for
them to do so because they also
would be contributing to the cost
of the single-payer program.6
There is no clear precedent
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suggesting how the courts would
rule in the inevitable ERISA
challenge to a state-based singlepayer initiative. It is quite likely,
however, that the litigation
would drag on for years, complicating at a minimum any effort
to implement such a program.

AN INTERCONNECTED
50-STATE ECONOMY
The implementation of a
state-based single-payer program
is complicated by the nation’s
interconnected 50-state economy. States need to decide, for
example, whether the new program will cover nonresidents
(and, if not, how businesses can
provide coverage to that population). Former Vermont governor Peter Shumlin, the guiding
force behind that state’s singlepayer proposal, decided to include the out-of-state commuters, but that decision both
raised the overall cost and added
to the potential implementation
challenge.7 There also are a host
of potential unintended consequences that are hard to predict
or plan for. Will businesses and
high-income individuals exit the
state to avoid paying the new
taxes needed to ﬁnance the system? Will physicians and other
health care providers exit the state
to maintain income generated
from commercial insurers? Will
severely ill individuals move to
the state to receive comprehensive coverage, and, if so, what
would be the ﬁscal result of such a
“health care magnet” effect?
What will be the impact on large
companies that operate in multiple states?
It is plausible that these concerns are overstated. For example, despite the longstanding
differences in state-based health
and welfare programs, there is
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little evidence of a signiﬁcant
health care magnet effect. Nor is
there evidence of a major exodus
of high-income individuals following the imposition of new
state income taxes or of a largescale physician exit because of
cuts in reimbursement. This is
especially true in New York City
and other destinations of choice
among the nation’s most wealthy
individuals. Nevertheless, in its
analysis of the proposed New
York Health Act, the RAND
Corporation projected that if
roughly 50 000 high-income
taxpayers changed their domicile,
the state would lose more than
$30 billion in revenue, or more
than 20% of the estimated $139
billion needed to fund the ﬁrst
year of the new single-payer
program.8
The ﬁscal (and political) capacity of a single state to generate
sufﬁcient tax revenue to ﬁnance a
single-payer system is also questionable. For example, when
Vermont’s Governor Shumlin
pulled the plug on that state’s
single-payer initiative, he cited
the “economic shock” of having
to impose dramatic tax increases
(11.5% on employers and 9.5%
on individuals) that would increase the state’s budget by almost
50%.7 New York assemblyman
Richard Gottfried argues that the
progressive tax scheme contained
in the New York Health Act
enables the state to more easily
withstand the economic shock of
the massive tax, but the potential
exit of at least some of the state’s
wealthiest citizens would undermine that assumption.
Finally, single-payer advocates
can also face unexpected resistance from presumed political
allies based on the idiosyncratic
provisions in state constitutions.
For example, both Planned Parenthood and NARAL ProChoice America opposed the
2016 single-payer referendum in

Colorado because the state’s
constitution banned public
funding for abortions, and reproductive rights advocates
feared the initiative would
eliminate access to abortions for
women now covered by private
health plans. The referendum’s
supporters challenged that assumption, arguing that the new
law would lead to the repeal of
the constitutional ban. But the
uncertainty about this issue undoubtedly contributed to the
overwhelming rejection of the
proposal.9

ADVANTAGES OF
INCREMENTALISM
Those who propose Medicare
for all and who tout the economic and moral virtues of a
single payer argue persuasively
that such an approach would
dramatically reduce the inequities
and disparities deeply rooted in
the nation’s complicated, fragmented, and decentralized system. Medicare is a national
program with uniform rules; it is
viewed by most Americans as an
“earned right,” and although it
now has a relatively limited
beneﬁt package, Senator Bernie
Sanders and other advocates
promise vastly expanded coverage. But the notion that the
United States (or any of its
political subdivisions) is going
to replace (nearly overnight)
the longstanding system of
employer-sponsored coverage
runs contrary to both US history
and US politics. The interest
group opposition is too strong,
the cultural concerns about
government are too deep, and
the opportunities for opponents
to stymie the policy process are
too plentiful. Moreover, state
ofﬁcials who hope to create the
policy laboratory that enacts and
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implements a single-payer program must overcome additional
obstacles, including ERISA, the
need for federal waivers, and the
complications generated by an
interconnected 50-state
economy.
In this context, the most likely
reform scenarios are incremental
rather than comprehensive. One
idea generating signiﬁcant momentum is to expand Medicare
enrollment (either by lowering
the eligibility age or by permitting additional populations to
buy into the program). But
Medicare for more is politically
plausible only if the Democrats
control both the White House
and Congress, a scenario that
cannot happen before 2021.
States, however, can act more
quickly, aiding their remaining
uninsured (and underinsured)
and providing a model for national reform (much as the 2006
coverage expansions in Massachusetts provided a model for the
ACA). Washington state, for
example, recently passed the
nation’s ﬁrst so-called public
option, Cascade Care, under
which buyers on the state’s insurance exchange will soon be
able to purchase a lower-cost plan
in which premiums (and deductibles) are kept low because of
state-mandated caps on provider
reimbursement. The private
carrier that operates this plan will
need to meet a host of additional
requirements not imposed on the
other plans in the insurance
market.10
Similarly, several states are
currently considering different
versions of a Medicaid buy-in,
which could lead to a policy
menu for future reformers. Such
buy-in programs could differ on
1. whether to offer the buy-in
product on or off the ACA
insurance exchange,
2. the beneﬁt package,
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3. out-of-pocket costs,
4. provider reimbursement, and
5. how to ﬁnance the initiative.11
Under the proposal now under
consideration in New Mexico,
for example, the state would establish a buy-in plan available to
all those not otherwise eligible for
public or private coverage, with
out-of-pocket costs based on
household income and beneﬁts
delivered by plans currently operating in the state’s Medicaid
managed care market.12
The argument for relying on
Medicaid as a path to universal
coverage is strengthened as well
by the program’s 30-year history
of incremental expansion, under
both Democratic and Republican
administrations. Medicaid now
has more than 70 million enrollees, its cost is shared by the federal
government and the states, and its
political resilience was an important factor in the failure of the
Republicans to repeal and replace
the ACA. The program has surprisingly strong interest group
support, it is administered by the
states (thus shielding it from claims
that it is a big government
monolith), and it provides an insurance safety net for public health
crises (from AIDS to the Flint, MI,
water crisis). Finally, Medicaid
buy-in strategies are not precluded
by ERISA, can proceed without
federal waivers (although such
waivers could help), and can
proceed without raising concerns
about nonresidents or neighboring states.
At the same time, Medicaid
politics also shows the potential
risk of relying on states to provide
a path to universal coverage.
After all, there are still more than
a dozen “red” states that have not
adopted the ACA Medicaid expansion. There is increased
pressure in many red states to
expand coverage, as illustrated by
the recent voter referendums in
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Idaho, Nebraska, and Utah requiring state ofﬁcials to expand
Medicaid.13 But the political
pressure in these states to expand
coverage competes with equally
strong (if not stronger) pressure to
cut back, suggesting that universal coverage in the United
States will not happen without
federal legislation. The question,
however, is whether the best path
to universal coverage is through a
single-payer path or through
incremental expansions of current programs.
There is no doubt that many
progressive Democrats will continue to advocate the more ambitious single-payer approach,
and in some states there clearly
are going to be windows of opportunity for legislative success.
But single payer even in the most
liberal of states is still a political
long shot. In New York, for
example, Richard Gottfried and
his colleagues could not round up
the votes to pass the New York
Health Act in the most recent
legislative session, even with the
current Democratic control of
both the state legislative and
executive branches. And legislative enactment even if achieved
would lead to further battles
over waivers, ERISA, and
nonresidents.
The argument here is that the
single-payer debate at both the
national and state levels will ultimately generate consensus on a
more incremental proposal, one
that looks much more like a
Medicare or Medicaid expansion
or buy-in. Such an outcome
would be consistent with longstanding trends in US health
policy. It also would be a welcome step on the path toward a
US version of affordable universal
coverage.
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FEDERALISM, ERISA, AND STATE SINGLE-PAYER HEALTH CARE
Erin C. Fuse Brown & Elizabeth Y. McCuskey *
ABSTRACT
While federal health reform sputters, states have begun to pursue their
own transformative strategies for achieving universal coverage, the most
ambitious of which are state-based single-payer plans. Since the passage of
the Affordable Care Act in 2010, legislators in twenty-one states have
proposed sixty-six unique bills to establish single-payer health care systems.
This paper systematically surveys those state legislative efforts and exposes
the federalism trap that threatens to derail them: ERISA’s preemption of
state regulation relating to employer-sponsored health insurance. ERISA’s
expansive preemption provision creates a narrow, risky path for state
regulation to capture the employer health care expenditures crucial for
financing a single-payer system. While this paper illustrates how some state
proposals may survive ERISA, the threat of preemption drives states to
structure their plans in convoluted ways that may undermine other systemic
goals such as universality, solidarity, and streamlined administration.
This analysis demonstrates how ERISA’s uniquely broad preemption,
coupled with its lack of waiver authority, elevates the interests of private
employers above those of sovereign states and diminishes states’ abilities to
serve as laboratories of health reform. We argue that this moment in health
reform demands ERISA preemption reform. To restore balance to health
care federalism and pave the way for state reforms of all kinds, this paper
proposes federal legislative and jurisprudential solutions: amendments to
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ERISA’s preemption provisions, the addition of a statutory waiver, and/or a
reinterpretation of ERISA preemption consistent with Congressional intent
and the presumption against preemption.
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INTRODUCTION
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) marked a seismic shift in the U.S. health
care system. It dramatically increased coverage, enlarged the federal role in
the regulation of private health insurance, and altered the public’s
expectations and belief that everyone should have access to affordable
coverage that does not discriminate on health status. 1 Yet the ACA did not
produce universal coverage, and as a federal settlement of health system
regulation and design, it has proven unstable due to political and legal attacks
undermining its effectiveness at health care coverage and cost-control. 2 Still,
a feasible federal replacement for the ACA has proven elusive.
Rather than wait idly by for federal progress, states have picked up the
momentum on health reform, spurred both by necessity and an appetite for
policy innovation. Of necessity, states have turned to their own reforms in
response to federal governmental attempts to undermine the ACA’s coverage
and cost-containment policies since the Trump Administration took power in
2017. 3 States also are testing different models and serving as laboratories for

See, e.g., Lawrence O. Gostin, David Hyman, Peter D. Jacobson, The Affordable Care
Act: Moving Forward in the Coming Years, 317 JAMA 19 (2017); Timothy Jost, “Taking
Stock of Health Reform: Where We’ve Been, Where We’re Going,” HEALTH AFF. BLOG
(Dec. 6, 2016), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20161206.057800/full/
[https://perma.cc/688V-HRVC].
1

See, e.g., John A. Graves, Sayeh S. Nikpay, The Changing Dynamics of US Health
Insurance And Implications for The Future of The Affordable Care Act, 36 HEALTH AFF.
297 (2017); Jonathan Oberlander, The End of Obamacare, 376 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1 (2017);
Sara Rosenbaum, The (Almost) Great Unraveling, 43 J. HEALTH POLITICS POL’Y & L.
679580 (2018); Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Big Waiver under Statutory Sabotage, 45 OH. N. L.
REV. 213_ (forthcoming 2019).
2

See Andrew M. Bindman et al., Beyond the ACA: Paths to Universal Coverage in
California, 37 HEALTH AFF. 1367, 1367 (2018) (“The passage of the ACA temporarily
relieved states of the need to take the lead in expanding health care coverage. However, many
states have returned to the issue in the wake of the threat by the administration of President
3
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alternative ways to pay for health care, including some ambitious proposed
experiments in single-payer plans. While federal single-payer reform under
“Medicare-for-All” 4 gains support and attention, 5 state legislators quietly
have drafted and introduced dozens of single-payer bills.
This project surveys state efforts from 2010 through 2019 to establish
single-payer health care, which we define as legislative attempts to achieve
universal health care coverage for all residents in a state by combining
financing for all health care services into a single, state-administered payer.6
State legislative proposals to establish single-payer plans have been
surprisingly robust both in volume and variation, with sixty-six unique
single-payer bills introduced across twenty-one states since 2010. 7 Though
state single-payer proposals also face steep political, practical, legal, and
financial challenges, 8 the volume and detail of state bills suggest many of
Donald Trump to repeal the ACA.”).
See Bernie Sanders, Healthcare for All, https://berniesanders.com/topics/health-carefor-all/ [https://perma.cc/Q396-VD66]. See also Nicole Gaudiano & Maureen Groppe,
“Democrats back Medicare for all in about half of House races they're contesting,” USA
TODAY
(Oct.
23,
2018),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/10/23/democrats-backmedicare-all-half-contested-house-races/1732966002/ [https://perma.cc/K6EM-FRAB].
4

Cf. Kaiser Family Foundation, Public Opinion on Single Payer, National Health Plans,
and
Expanding
Access
to
Medicare
Coverage,
(2018),
https://www.kff.org/slideshow/public-opinion-on-single-payer-national-health-plans-andexpanding-access-to-medicare-coverage/ [https://perma.cc/M4PT-ZDQX]; Liz Hamel,
Bryan Wu, Mollyann Brodie, Data Note: Modestly Strong but Malleable Support for SinglePayer Health Care (Jul 5, 2017), https://www.kff.org/health-reform/poll-finding/data-notemodestly-strong-but-malleable-support-for-single-payer-health-care/
[https://perma.cc/3AT8-WYHP].
5

Our methodology for identifying state single-payer bills is set forth in Part I.A. and
Appendix B, infra.
6

7

See Part I.A., infra.

A full discussion of these other challenges is beyond the scope of this Article. The most
significant of these include: (a) the difficulty and necessity of securing waivers from the
federal government to include Medicare, Medicaid, and Affordable Care Act marketplaces
in the single payer plan; (b) the need for states to raise taxes significantly to make up for the
massive federal subsidy of employer-based health plans through the preferred tax treatment
of these plans, which would be lost if these plans are shifted to the state single-payer plan;
8
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these are serious, non-symbolic efforts. Our research particularly focuses on
how these states seek to capture the employer-sponsored health insurance that
currently covers 49% of Americans—a critical market for the solvency and
viability of any single-payer plan. 9
Even if individual states can muster the political will and popular support
to pass single-payer bills, a federalism trap threatens to thwart their
transformative experiments: The Employee Retirement Income Security Act
of 1974 (ERISA), 10 a federal statute governing employer-based benefit plans.
When state laws conflict with federal ones, preemption doctrine generally
displaces the state law in favor of the federal. 11 But the express statement of
preemption in ERISA sweeps even further, purporting to invalidate “any and
all” state laws that “relate to” an employee benefit plan, not merely those
which unavoidably conflict. 12
This indeterminately broad preemption language in ERISA, combined
with an obscure “savings” clause for state regulation of insurers and an
equally obscure “deemer” clause interpreted to prohibit states from regulating
employer benefit arrangements that mimic insurance has spawned
voluminous litigation and derailed state health reforms for decades. 13 States,
for example, may not impose their own “employer mandate” to provide
health benefits due to ERISA preemption and therefore mostly had to wait
for federal legislation (the ACA) to impose one. As another example, state
and (c) the fact that states, unlike the federal government, cannot deficit-spend and thus
would struggle to finance single-payer programs in a recession when revenues decline. See,
e.g., Lindsay Wiley, Medicaid for All? State-Level Single-Payer Health Care, 79 OHIO ST.
L. J. 843 (2018); Nicholas Bagley, Federalism and the End of Obamacare, 127 YALE L. J. F.
1 (2017).
Kaiser Family Foundation, Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population, (2017),
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22s
ort%22:%22asc%22%7D.
9

10

29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.

11

See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 n.3 (2000).

12

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (included as § 514 in the Act).

See, e.g., Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform:
Opportunities and Limits, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 86, 89-90 (2009).
13
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laws establishing mandatory minimum health benefits “relate to” employerprovided health benefits; the “savings” clause avoids preemption when states
enforce these minimum benefits laws against insurance companies selling
insuance to employers, yet the “deemer” clause preempts their application to
employers who self-insure their own health benefits. 14 ERISA preemption
thus raises a daunting legal challenge and uncertainty for states trying to
capture critical employer-based health spending and draw those with
employer-based coverage into the single-payer system.
States are tying themselves in knots to avoid ERISA preemption in their
health reforms. The state single-payer bills we studied feature several
innovations to accomplish indirectly what ERISA prohibits them from doing
directly, namely to mandate employers participate in and cover all their
employees through the state’s single-payer plan. 15 State single-payer bills
contain at least three types of provisions to capture employer health
expenditures and move enrollees into the system: (A) funding plans that use
payroll and/or income taxes to raise revenue to pay for the single-payer plan
and to encourage employers and employees to shift from employer-based
coverage to the state single-payer plan; 16 (B) provider regulations that restrict
participating providers from billing any third party other than the single-payer
plan at single-payer rates; 17 and (C) assignment/subrogation/secondary payer
provisions that allow the single-payer plan to pay for services for enrollees
with dual coverage, and then seek reimbursement from the collateral source
of coverage. 18
This article comprehensively catalogues state single-payer proposals and
analyzes whether ERISA would preempt state efforts to capture the employer
expenditures. There are strong arguments why each of these three types of
14

E.g., id. at 90.

A state mandate that employers must provide health benefits to employees or, if the
employer opts to provide benefits, it has to cover employees under the state’s single-payer
plan would be preempted by ERISA because such a mandate would “relate to” an employee
benefit plan, altering the structure of the employer’s plan. See note 114, infra.
15
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16

See Part I.B.1., infra.

17

See Part I.B.2., infra.

18

See Part I.B.3., infra.

provisions (A–Funding Plan; B–Provider Restriction; or C–
Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer) should survive ERISA
preemption. But courts’ unpredictable, tortured, and at times, contradictory
application of ERISA casts a pall of uncertainty over their durability and
invites litigation. 19 Legal uncertainty amplifies the political challenges of
establishing a state single-payer system because policymakers may struggle
to pass such a sweeping legislative reform if key parts may be preempted. 20
ERISA preemption targets the primary funding provisions in these bills,
further threatening the economic modeling and revenue stream upon which
single-payer plans depend. Legal uncertainty over ERISA preemption thus
narrows the eye of the political and economic needle a state must thread to
establish single-payer health care.
ERISA is also an interloper in federal health insurance regulation – an
employee-benefits statute not originally intended to govern health care, but
which now exerts a powerful influence over it. Unlike most major federal
health care statutes including Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA, ERISA does
not provide for waiver, state experimentation, or federal funding. 21 The
Department of Labor, which administers ERISA, lacks the statutory authority
to waive its preemption, even if the Department finds it would be beneficial. 22
19

See Part II.A.2., infra.

Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1783
(2011) (“A state has a greater incentive to confirm the preferences of its own citizens or serve
as a ‘“laboratory of benefits’” if its regulatory decisions will not be reduced into nothingness
by ERISA preemption”).
20

See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur & Health Reform Preemption, 78
OHIO ST. L. J. 1099, 1102-03 (2017); see also text accompanying notes 338-342, infra. Cf.
Karl Polzer & Patricia A. Butler, Employee Health Plan Protections Under ERISA, 16
HEALTH AFF. 93, 93-94 (1997) (explaning that “ERISA was designed to establish uniform
federal standards,” while “substantially deregulat[ing] employee health plans” due in part to
its “lack of substantive requirements”).Other federal programs like the Veterans
Administration, TRICARE, and federal employee health benefits, as well as statutes that
exert profound but indirect influence on health insurance, like the Internal Revenue Code,
do not have waivers, either.
21

22

See Part III.B.2. and text accompanying notes 338-342, infra. See also Manatt
Health, “Understanding the Rules: Federal Legal Considerations for State-Based Approaches
to Expand Coverage in California,” 5, 10 (Feb. 2018) (noting that ERISA’s “provisions are
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Nor will the agency’s enforcement discretion save a state’s single-payer
provision from preemption because employers or third-party administrators
can raise ERISA preemption through litigation, enforced by courts.
The combined effect of ERISA’s extremely broad preemption provision
and its lack of a waiver thwarts all manner of state autonomy and flexibility
in health reform. ERISA’s obstruction stands at odds with other federal
statutes that distribute authority and control between the national and state
governments to allow state flexibility against a backdrop of federal standards
and agency expertise in health care regulation.
ERISA’s broad preemption springs from a concern in 1974 that multistate employers would refuse to provide health benefits to their employees if
subjected to state regulatory variations. 23 The conditions underlying this
assumption, however, have shifted since the ACA significantly supplanted
state health insurance regulation with federal standards and imposed a federal
mandate for larger employers to offer health coverage. 24 While multi-state
employers’ need for regulatory uniformity to continue offering coverage
arguably has receded, 25 ERISA’s continued insistence on national uniformity
prevents states from effectuating major health system reforms that their
citizens desire and still leaves self-funded employer plans largely
unregulated. The breadth of ERISA preemption thus elevates the interests of
private businesses above the interests and police powers of sovereign states.
In this article, we do not argue that any state ought to establish singlepayer health care or that state-based single payer is preferable to a national
effort or to other more incremental reforms toward universal coverage and

not waivable by administrative action” and that suspension of the statutory preemption
“would likely need federal legislation to receive an exemption”.
See Phyllis C. Borzi, There’s “Private” and Then There’s “Private”: ERISA, Its
Impact, and Options for Reform, 36 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 660, 663 (2008).
23

29 U.S.C. § 1185d; 26 U.S.C. § 9815 (applying many of the ACA’s health insurance
requirements, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300gg et seq., to group health plans governed by
ERISA); 26 U.S.C. § 45R (containing the employer mandate).
24

Mallory Jensen, Is ERISA Preemption Superfluous in the New Age of Health Care
Reform?, 2011 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 464, 516 (2011).
25
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cost-control. 26 Instead, our research reveals that even if a state’s citizens want
single payer, the state faces a nearly insurmountable structural challenge from
ERISA. Because ERISA thwarts state experimentation with single-payer
models, it also denies an opportunity to gather evidence on whether singlepayer systems have advantages or disadvantages over other reforms. State
single-payer legislation provides a stark illustration of the federalism trap
created by ERISA that has stymied states’ health reform efforts—big and
small—for decades.
We propose four solutions to clear the way for state health reforms and
reduce ERISA’s obstruction – three legislative and one jurisprudential. First,
Congress could amend ERISA’s preemption provisions with respect to health
benefit plans, replacing its broad “any and all” preemption with “floor
preemption,” used in other federal health care statutes. Floor preemption,
which displaces only those state laws that are less stringent than the federal
standard (the “floor”), preserves uniformity in federal baseline regulations,
balanced with state flexibility to enact laws consistent with and no less
protective than the federal floor. Second, Congress could eliminate ERISA’s
“deemer clause” 27 for health benefits to correct Supreme Court interpretation
that has built an impenetrable barrier of preemption around self-funded
employer-based plans. Third, Congress could instead add a statutory waiver
provision to ERISA, which would allow states to ask the federal government
to suspend ERISA preemption for their proposed health reforms. As seen in
other federal health care statutes, an ERISA waiver would allow the federal
government to manage the degrees of uniformity and variation, while still
permitting state experimentation in health policy. Floor preemption and

See, e.g., Katie Gudiksen, Single-Payer vs. Public Option: Can Either System Address
Rising Health Care Prices? THE SOURCE BLOG (Mar. 29, 2018),
http://sourceonhealthcare.org/single-payer-vs-public-option-can-either-system-addressrising-health-care-prices/ [https://perma.cc/N8RZ-EATX].
26

ERISA’s broad preemption provision contains an exception, the “savings clause” that
saves from preemption state insurance regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A). But the savings
clause contains a further exception, the “deemer clause” that has been interpreted by courts
to deem self-funded group health plans as not in the business of insurance, and therefore not
subject to state insurance regulation. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985).
27
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deemer clause revisions to ERISA would produce the most direct and
enduring reforms, but a waiver provision might offer the most politically
expedient option, though far more limited in its effect.
Fourth, because the scope of ERISA preemption depends largely on
jurisprudential interpretation of the statute, courts could curtail the scope of
ERISA preemption and reinvigorate the “presumption against preemption”
for health care regulation in a way that more accurately reflects Congress’s
original legislative intent for ERISA. 28 While we recognize this as a potential
avenue for ERISA reform, we have little faith in its efficacy because of its
fragmentary implementation and because the courts who broke ERISA
interpretation are unlikely to effectuate its repair. If neither Congress nor the
courts will address ERISA’s obstruction, we recommend ways state
legislators may build an ERISA-resistant single-payer plan using overlapping
provisions to protect the system’s viability in the event a court finds any
single provision preempted. 29
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I presents the findings of a
survey of state-single payer bills introduced from 2010 through 2019 and
their key features, identifying three types of provisions that state single-payer
proposals use to capture employer health expenditures and the 49% of
Americans covered by employer plans: Type A (Funding Plan), Type B
(Provider Restrictions), and Type C (Assignment / Subrogation / Secondary
Payer) provisions. Part II details the application of ERISA preemption
analysis to each of these provisions and the degree to which each should
survive ERISA preemption. Part III then situates ERISA in the broader
context of federal health insurance statutes. Although Congress did not
intend ERISA to be a health care statute, ERISA’s extraordinarily broad
preemption, scant federal regulation, and lack of waiver flexibility create a
federalism trap, obstructing state experimentation and autonomy in ways that
undermine the health care federalism infrastructure of the ACA, Medicaid,
and Medicare statutes. We offer four proposals to remove ERISA’s
obstructions to state health reform, infusing the federal regulatory scheme
with greater flexibility and recalibrating its role in health care federalism.
Ultimately, we urge that the time has come to amend ERISA preemption
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28

See Part III.B., infra.

29

See Part II.C., infra.

in order to unshackle meaningful state health reforms from its outdated
prohibitions.
I. STATE SINGLE-PAYER PLANS
State health reform momentum has only picked up steam after the ACA.
State reform efforts range from patches for the individual market, 30 laws
targeting surprise medical bills 31 and prescription drug prices, 32 proposals to
allow any state resident to buy a public plan, such as Medicaid, 33 all the way
to full transformation of the health care finance system in state single-payer
proposals. This Part takes a deep dive into the ambitious end of state health
reforms: state single-payer plans.
A. The Recent Proliferation of State Single-Payer Proposals
The volume of state interest and activity in single-payer health care, as
measured by proposed legislation, has been substantial. Since the ACA was
passed in 2010 through 2019, legislators in twenty-one states have proposed
sixty-six unique single-payer bills. 34 Although our research turned up over
100 bills that can be characterized as proposing a state-based single-payer
plan, removal of duplicates (i.e., substantially similar bills introduced in
different chambers in the same legislative session or bills assigned different

See Kaiser Family Found., “Tracking Section 1332 State Innovation Waivers,” (Aug
23,
2018)
https://www.kff.org/health-reform/fact-sheet/tracking-section-1332-stateinnovation-waivers/ [https://perma.cc/EQ99-FHWZ].
30

See Christina Cousart, “State Legislators Take Action to Protect Consumers from
Surprise Billing,” NASHP.org (Sept. 18, 2018), https://nashp.org/state-legislators-takeaction-to-protect-consumers-from-surprise-billing/ [https://perma.cc/8MWM-UJL5].
31

See Robert Pear, “States Rush to Rein In Prescription Costs, and Drug Companies
Fight
Back,”
NY
Times
(Aug.
18,
2018),
https://nyti.ms/2OMyV0T
[https://perma.cc/8E2W-4WXY].
32

See Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Can States Fix the Disaster of American Health Care?,” NY
TIMES (Jan. 16, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/16/opinion/california-stateshealth-care.html [https://perma.cc/N8PD-8YR6].
33

See Appendix A for a table listing all the bills by state and year and Appendix B for
search terms and methodology for identifying state single-payer proposals.
34
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numbers as they move through the legislative process) resulted in sixty- six
bills. Although many bills explicitly stated that their purpose was to establish
a single-payer health system, not all did. 35 We characterized bills as state
single-payer proposals if they sought to establish universal health care
coverage for all residents in a state by combining financing for all health care
services into a single, state-administered payer. We excluded bills that did
not meet this definition and thus did not purport to establish a single-payer
plan, such as those that called for a study of single-payer, expressed support
for a national single-payer plan, or attempted less-than comprehensive health
reforms (e.g., universal primary care). 36 None except Vermont’s ill-fated
single-payer plan 37 was passed, and no state has implemented a single-payer
system.
The defining characteristics of state single-payer proposals are the
combination of universal eligibility for state residents 38 and reliance on
statutory waivers from Medicare, Medicaid, and the ACA to consolidate
these sources of federal funding and their covered populations into the state
single-payer plan. 39 Other common elements include: expansive provider

Compare H.B. 1516, 438th Sess. Gen. Assemb., (Md. 2018) (“It is the intent of the
General Assembly that: (1) There be a comprehensive universal single-payer health care
coverage program and a health care cost control system for the benefit of all residents of the
state.”) with H.B. 2436, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017) (providing, in
synopsis, “that all individuals residing in the State are covered under the Illinois Health
Services Program for health insurance.”).
35

36

See Appendix B for search terms and exclusion criteria.

Act of May 26, 2011, 2011 Vt. Acts & Resolves 48 (enacting H.B. 202, providing for
universal coverage in Vermont); see also, John E. McDonough, The Demise of Vermont’s
Single-Payer Plan, 372 N. ENGL. J. MED. 1584, 1584 (2015).
37

See, e.g., S.B. 562, 2017-2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017), § 100620(a) (“Every resident
of the state shall be eligible and entitled to enroll as a member under the program”); H.B.
440, 132nd Gen. Assemb., 2017-2018 Sess. (Ohio 2017) § 3920.07(A), “All Ohio residents
and individuals employed in Ohio, including the homeless and migrant workers, are eligible
for coverage under the Ohio health care plan.”). Cf. id. at §§ 3920.07(F), (G) (extending
eligibility to nonresidents who work in the state or college students who attend university in
the state).
38

Waiver reliance to include federal payers is nearly universal among the single-payer
plans. See, e.g., S.B. 2237, 2018 Leg. Session (R.I. 2018),§ 23-95-12(d) (providing, “The
39
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eligibility; 40 administratively set or negotiated rates for providers and health
care goods, such as prescription drugs; 41 low or no cost-sharing for patients;42
comprehensive coverage of services; 43 and mechanisms for carecoordination. 44
The volume, variation, and detail of these state single-payer proposals is
surprising. Although many of the states with single-payer proposals are
controlled by Democrats, the single-payer bills are not exclusively from
“blue” states. Most of the states with single payer proposals expanded
Medicaid under the ACA, reducing the percentage so only a small fraction of
the population that remains uninsured. So, there seems to be something else
beyond universal coverage driving many of these single-payer bills. That
something else appears to be an effort to control health care costs through
expansive rate-setting authority for health care services and prescription
director shall seek and obtain waivers and other approvals relating to Medicaid, the
Children's Health Insurance Program, Medicare, the ACA, and any other relevant federal
programs” to preserve and maximize federal funds available, while moving them into the
state single-payer fund). Further, most state single-payer proposals would require a waiver
from the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services of the Affordable Care Act’s
employer mandate, pursuant to the ACA’s Section 1332 waiver provision. See Wiley, supra
note 8.
See, e.g., S.B. 1872, 120th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2018) (“Any health care provider
who is licensed to practice in this state and is otherwise in good standing is qualified to
participate in the program as long as the health care provider's services are performed within
this state.”).
40

See, e.g., A. 4738-A, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2018), § 4. Provider rates are
commonly set through negotiation representatives of providers and the single-payer plan,
along with formularies and negotiated prices for prescription drugs.
41

See, e.g., S.B. 1014, 202nd Gen. Assemb., 2017-2018 Sess. (Pa. 2018), § 503(c)
(“Participants are not subject to copayments, deductibles, point-of-service charges or any
other fee or charge for a service within the package and shall not be directly billed nor
balance billed by participating providers for covered benefits provided to the participant.”)
42

See, e.g., S.B. 5957, 65th Leg., 2017 2d Spec. Sess. (Wash. 2017), § 16. The bills
include, and go beyond, the ACA’s essential health benefits, and typically include services
covered by Medicare and Medicaid.
43

See, e.g., H.F. 2352, 87th Gen. Assemb., 2017-2019 Sess. § 16 (Iowa 2018). Some
require eligible beneficiaries to enroll in a care coordinator, which can be their primary care
physician, a “medical home,” or an organization, such as an ACO or HMO.
44
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drugs, 45 a reduction of administrative costs for the state and the health care
industry by streamlining the multi-payer system into one, 46 and relieving
citizens of their growing cost-sharing burdens from high deductibles, out-ofnetwork bills, and co-insurance rates. 47 Figure 1 depicts the twenty-one states
with at least one single-payer bill proposed between 2010 and 2019.

See, e.g., A. 5248, 2019 Leg., 2019-2020 Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019) § 2, (“To address
the fiscal crisis facing the health care system and the state and to assure New Yorkers can
exercise their right to health care, affordable and comprehensive health coverage must be
provided. . . [T]his legislation is an enactment of state concern for the purpose of establishing
a comprehensive universal guaranteed health care coverage program and a health care cost
control system for the benefit of all residents of the state of New York.”); S.B. 786, 2015
Leg., 121st Sess. (S.C. 2015), §§ 44-18-910 to -930 (providing for the authority to establish
rates for both health care providers that participate in the state program and those that do
not).
45

See, e.g., H.B. 2987, 190th Gen. Ct., 2017-2018 Sess. (Mass. 2017), § 1(b) (“Today’s
numerous private and public health insurance plans, with differing benefits and patient
payment requirements, impose massive administrative burdens on doctors, hospitals, other
health care organizations, as well as on patients, employers and other payers. Purchasing
power is fragmented.”).
46

See, e.g., S.B. 2237, 2018 Leg. Sess. (R.I. 2018), § 23-95-1(e) (stating in its
Legislative Findings, “Rhode Island must act because there are currently no effective state
or federal laws that can adequately control rising premiums, co-pays, deductibles and
medical costs, or prevent private insurance companies from continuing to limit available
providers and coverage.”).
47
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Figure 1. States with Single Payer Bills, by Medicaid Expansion Status

Although many, if not most, of these bills are political long-shots in their state
legislatures, collectively they do not appear to be purely symbolic or
precatory. 48 Many of the single-payer proposals are highly detailed,
seemingly the products of a great deal of thought, analysis, political tradeoffs,
and resources. 49 The impression of viewing these state single-payer bills in
Of course, some bills may be totally symbolic or just manifest one legislator’s policy
position, while others have more support from multiple co-sponsors or coalitions and have
advanced further along the legislative process. We did not assess the bills for their
“seriousness” in terms of breadth of political support.
48

For example, some states have held hearings or commissioned in-depth economic
assessments of their single-payer plans, demonstrating both the specificity of proposals and
a commitment of significant resources to understand their economic impact. See, e.g.,
ANDREW BINDMAN, MARIAN MULKEY, RICHARD KRONICK, A PATH TO UNIVERSAL
COVERAGE AND UNIVERSAL HEALTH CARE FINANCING IN CALIFORNIA (Mar. 12, 2018),
https://healthcare.assembly.ca.gov/sites/healthcare.assembly.ca.gov/files/Report%20Final
%203_13_18.pdf; JODI LIU ET AL., RAND CORPORATION, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE NEW
YORK HEALTH ACT: A SINGLE-PAYER OPTION FOR NEW YORK STATE 14 (2018),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2424.html; CHAPIN WHITE ET AL., RAND
CORPORATION, A COMPREHENSIVE ASSESSMENT OF FOUR OPTIONS FOR FINANCING HEALTH
CARE
DELIVERY
IN
OREGON
(2018),
https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR1662.html; JOHN SHEILS & MEGAN COLE,
49
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totality is that there is a nontrivial possibility that some state or states could
thread the political, administrative, financial, and legal needles necessary to
pass a single-payer plan in the coming years.
B. How State Single-Payer Plans Capture Employer Health Expenditures
The billion-dollar question, both in terms of dollars-at-stake and legal
hurdles from ERISA, is how the state single-payer plan addresses employersponsored health coverage. 50 In the U.S., 49% of the population is covered
by employer-sponsored coverage, which amounts to 20% of our total national
health care expenditures. 51 Once the single-payer system starts covering this
population, it must capture the vast employer and employee expenditures that
pays for such coverage. 52 State legislation faces a big obstacle in achieving
this critical task: ERISA preempts state law that “relates to” employer-

THE LEWIN GROUP, COST AND ECONOMIC IMPACT ANALYSIS OF A SINGLE-PAYER PLAN IN
MINNESOTA
(2012),
https://growthandjustice.org/images/uploads/LEWIN.Final_Report_FINAL_DRAFT.pdf.
The other critical question is whether HHS will grant states waivers to capture federal
Medicaid (1115 waiver), Medicare (demonstration waivers), and ACA (1332 waiver) funds
for the state’s single-payer plan. These statutory waivers lie beyond the scope of this Article,
but other scholars have provided analysis. See Wiley, supra note 8.
50

Kaiser Family Foundation, “Health Insurance Coverage of the Total Population,”
(timeframe:
2017),
https://www.kff.org/other/state-indicator/totalpopulation/?currentTimeframe=0&sortModel=%7B%22colId%22:%22Location%22,%22s
ort%22:%22asc%22%7D GARY CLAXTON ET AL., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, 2018
EMPLOYER
HEALTH
BENEFITS
SURVEY,
Section
10:
Plan
Funding,
https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018-employer-health-benefits-survey/; Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health Expenditures 2016 Highlights 2,
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/highlights.pdf.
51

In addition to these direct expenditures, the federal government further subsidizes
employer spending on health benefits by not taxing such expenditure as wages. See
generally, U.S. Internal Revenue Service, Employee Benefits (updated Nov. 2, 2018),
https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/employee-benefits.
Although policy debates on the tax-treatment of employee health benefits is beyond the scope
of this article, the larger point is that capturing what the system currently spends on employer
health expenditures is critical for the financial viability of any single-payer plan.
52
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sponsored benefits, as detailed in Part II below. Additionally, the population
covered by employer-sponsored health benefits tends to be healthier than
those covered by public programs, which is critical to balancing the risk pool
for the single-payer plan. 53 Of those with employer-based coverage, more
than 60% are covered by self-funded plans (also called self-insured plans),
where the employer pays for the health benefits with its own funds, retaining
financial or insurance risk. 54 As discussed in Part II, ERISA’s “deemer”
clause has placed self-funded plans entirely beyond the reach of state
regulation. 55
To assess the distorting effect of ERISA preemption on states’ health
reform efforts, this project focuses on the analyzing how states can capture
employers’ expenditures and transition the 49% of the population covered by
employer-sponsored health plans into the state single-payer program. 56 We
reviewed the sixty-six single-payer bills to identify their methods of capturing
employer expenditures, as discussed below. 57 Eight of the sixty-six proposals
purported to establish a single-payer program for the state, but did not contain
an explicit mechanism to capture employer expenditures or move those with
employer coverage into the single payer, for example by creating a statebased “Medicare-for-All” program, enrolling everyone in the state in an
See Victor R. Fuchs, How to Make US Health Care More Equitable and Less Costly:
Begin By Replacing Employment-Based Insurance, 320 JAMA 2071, 2071 (2018); Brief for
the Harvard Law School Center for Health Law & Policy et al., as Amici Curiae in support
of Petitioner, Gobeille v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 577 U.S. ___; 136 S. Ct. 936 (2016) (No.
14-181), at 19-20.
53

GARY CLAXTON ET AL., Kaiser Family Foundation, 2018 Employer Health Benefits
Survey, Section 10: Plan Funding, at 167, https://www.kff.org/health-costs/report/2018employer-health-benefits-survey/supra note , at Section 10 167. See, e.g., Advantages and
Myths of Self-Funding for Employers with Fewer than 250 Employees, Cigna Health & Life
Ins.
Co.
(Feb.
2014),
http://www.cigna.com/assets/docs/business/smallemployers/841956_b_self_funding_whitepaper_v8.pdf (“Traditional self-funding is defined
as when an employer pays for their own medical claims directly, while a third-party
administrator administers the health plan by processing the claims, issuing ID cards, handling
customer questions and performing other tasks.”).
54
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See Part II.A., infra.
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GARY CLAXTON ET ALKaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51, at Section 10.

57

See Part I.B., infra.

expanded version of Medicare. 58 Thus, we focused our analysis on the
remaining fifty-eight state single-payer proposals for their methods of
capturing employer expenditures and moving those covered by employee
health plans into the single-payer program.
Due to ERISA preemption, discussed in Part II, states cannot simply
mandate that employers adopt the single-payer plan as their employee health
plan. However, states must capture employers’ expenditures and shift those
covered by employer-based health plans into the single-payer system, or else
its single-payer plan is not truly a single-payer, and the economics will not
work.
Unable to mandate that self-funded employers drop their benefit plans
and participate in the single-payer plan under ERISA, state single-payer
proposals mix and match the following tools to capture employer
expenditures: (A) imposing a payroll tax on employers and/or an income tax
on individuals to fund the single-payer plan; (B) requiring or creating
incentives for all provider payments to be made through the single payer
entity at single-payer rates; and/or (C) subrogation, assignment, or secondary
payer provisions allowing the single-payer entity to pay for services and seek
reimbursement from employer plans or other collateral sources.
In addition, most proposals contain nonduplication provisions prohibiting
insurers from offering health benefits that duplicate those covered by the
single-payer plan. 59 The idea behind nonduplication is that if insurers cannot
sell plans that cover any of the services or benefits covered by the singlepayer plan, then there are no competing private plans to choose from. Insurers
may only sell so-called wraparound services that supplement the single-payer
coverage. On its face, a nonduplication provision appears to do much of the
work of shifting those with employer-based coverage to the single-payer
plan, because employers would not have any health plan options to offer their
employees in the single-payer state. However, as discussed in Part II, ERISA
58

See, e.g., S.B. 2598, 218th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2018).

See, e.g., H.F. 2352, 87th Gen. Assemb., 2018 Sess. (Iowa 2017), § 7(3) (“An insurer,
carrier, or health maintenance organization that is issued a certificate of authority by the
commissioner of insurance may offer only the following: . . . Benefits that do not duplicate
the health care services covered by the healthy Iowa program.”).
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70

preemption likely would make the nonduplication provisions unenforceable
against self-funded employer-based health plans. 60 Thus, state single-payer
proposals must use other provisions to draw the self-funded employers’
expenditures and their enrollees into the single-payer plan.
Appendix A contains a list of the single-payer bills proposed bewtween
2010 - 2019 and their mechanisms to capture employer-sponsored health
spending. Appendix B details our methodology for collecting and analyzing
these state single-payer bills.
1. Type A—Funding Plan
The Type A—Funding Plan model captures employer expenditures and
participation through a payroll tax and/or an individual income tax. Payroll
taxes are levied on employers and are calculated as a percentage of the wages
that the employer pays its employees. 61 The fact that the payroll tax is based
on wages and not the employer’s spending on employee health benefits is
significant for the ERISA preemption analysis below. 62 As tallied in Figure
3, forty- five bills across sixteen states contain a Type-A funding plan. 63 State
proposals may impose a flat 64 or graduated payroll tax rate, 65 which also may
apply to self-employed income. 66 Some states divide the payroll tax among
employers and employees, with the employer paying a larger proportion of
the tax, similar to the current division of premiums for employer-based
60

See Part II.B.4, infra.

See, e.g., John A. Brittain, The Incidence of Social Security Payroll Taxes, 61 AM.
ECON. REV. 110, 110 (1971) (noting that while payroll taxes may be imposed on the
employer, they are typically paid by the employee in the form of reduced wages).
61

62

See Part II.B.1, infra.

63

See Fig. 2, infra.

See, e.g., Pa. S.B. 1014, § 904 ( “[A] tax of 10% is imposed on payroll amounts
generated as a result of an employer conducting business activity within this
Commonwealth.”). Vermont’s plan would have imposed a flat 11.5% payroll tax as well as
a graduated income tax. See PETER SHUMLIN, GOVERNOR OF THE STATE OF VERMONT,
GREEN MOUNTAIN CARE: A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL FOR BUILDING VERMONT’S
UNIVERSAL
HEALTH
CARE
SYSTEM
5
(2014),
http://hcr.vermont.gov/sites/hcr/files/pdfs/GMC%20FINAL%20REPORT%20123014.pdf.
64

71
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See NY A. 4738-A, § 4-2a; LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2.

66

See R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-12(i).

coverage. 67 Other states would impose an income tax on employees to
capture the employee-share of spending on health coverage. 68 Income taxes
may apply to unearned income to capture non-wage earnings, such as interest,
capital gains, or dividends, 69 and can be progressively scaled to income
levels. Sales and excise taxes are possible, but potentially more regressive
than taxes scaled to individual income.
A payroll tax would lead many employers to drop their own coverage if
they must pay the tax regardless of whether they offer their own employerbased plan. 70 The individual share of a payroll tax or an income tax is a way
to replicate the employee’s contribution to health care premiums and capture
unearned income or income of state residents are employed by out-of-state
employers. If employees are required to pay a tax to fund the state singlepayer program, many will elect to drop their employer-based plans so as to
avoid double-paying for redundant coverage. 71

See Id.; LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 14. The New York Health Act would divide the
payroll tax, such that employers pay 80 percent, and employees pays 20 percent.
67

See SHUMLIN, supra note 64, at 5 (“[T]he highest-income Vermonters would pay 9.5
percent of income through a public premium, up to a maximum of $27,500, while lowerincome Vermonters would pay based on a sliding scale tied to a lower percentage of income
ranging from 0 up to 9.5 percent”).
68

See R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-12(ji) (“There shall be a progressive contribution based
on unearned income, i.e., capital gains, dividends, interest, profits, and rents. Initially, the
unearned income RICHIP contributions shall be equal to ten percent (10%) of such unearned
income. The ten percent (10%) initial rate may be adjusted by the director to allow for a
graduated progressive exemption or credit for individuals with lower unearned income
levels.”) See also, LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2 (“Individuals would not pay premiums for
NYHA. Instead, the program would be financed by new graduated state taxes on payroll and
nonpayroll income (such as interest, dividends, and capital gains) and redirected federal
funding through waivers and state funding for current health care programs.”).
69

See LIU ET AL., supra note 49, at 2, 50 (explaining that, “[w]hile the NYHA does not
prohibit employers from offering health insurance, it does include a mandatory employer
payroll tax contribution to help fund NYH,” and noting the assumption that the payroll tax
will replace employer spending on employer-sponsored insurance, with overall employerspending unchanged).
70

As discussed in Part II, a funding plan based on a payroll tax should avoid preemption
by ERISA, but it is far from certain whether courts will agree. Income taxes generally would
71

72

The simplest form of Type A plan would rely solely on a payroll tax
and/or income tax to capture employer expenditures and move enrollees to
drop their employer coverage. These “Funding Only” proposals capture
employers’ health care expenditures directly via a payroll tax and assume that
few employers would continue to offer their own coverage for employees
subject to the payroll tax assessment, and even if they do, few employees will
continue to take up employer coverage once they are covered by the state
single-payer plan. An example of a Funding Only model is Washington’s
2017 single-payer bill, which would fund its single-payer plan using a payroll
tax for employers, with no exceptions. 72 Most of the state single-payer bills
that contain a funding plan combine the financing mechanism with other
tools, discussed below, to entice individuals into the single-payer plan and
capture employer health expenditures.
The Type A—Funding Plan can be analogized to public school financing.
All households must pay property taxes to fund public schools that all
children are eligible to attend. 73 If certain households wish to pay for private
school, they are free to do so, but it does not excuse them from their property
tax. The public school analogy also reveals a nuance of the Funding Plan
approach: unless the quality or choice of providers were the same or superior
in the single-payer plan, there may be employers and employees who
continue to maintain their employer-based plans, even when subject to the
taxes to fund the single-payer plan.
2. Type B—Provider Restriction
A second variation, the Type B—the Provider Restriction model, uses a
form of provider regulation to draw individuals away from employer-based
plans into the single-payer plan. Thirty-four of the single-payer bills across
fourteen states contain a Type-B provider restriction. 74 Because provider
regulation tends to fall beyond the reach of ERISA preemption, 75 state singlepayer proposals use provider regulation to move individuals to drop their
not implicate ERISA. See Part II.A.2, infra.
72

S.B. 5747, 65th Leg., 2017 Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2017).

See SHUMLIN, supra note 64, at 11 (explaining the analogous relationship between
public school financing and Green Mountain Care).
73
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See Figure 3, infra.

75

See Part II.A, infra.

employer coverage. These provisions restrict the ability of participating
providers from billing anyone other than the single-payer plan, whether the
patient or any third-party payer, for services rendered to a patient with singlepayer coverage. In addition, the provisions limit providers’ payment rates to
the single-payer rates. For example, California’s S.B. 562 says that
participating providers may not “charge any rate in excess of the payment
established under this title for any health care service provided to a member
under the program and shall not solicit or accept payment from any member
or third party for any health care service, except as provided under a federal
program.” 76 The proposals may automatically enroll all residents in the state
single-payer plan, or they may deem all residents presumptively eligible, but
require an affirmative step to enroll. 77 Under either model, most plans assume
all residents would be covered by the single-payer plan.
The Provider Restriction model creates incentives for patients to drop
their employer-based coverage because if providers want to participate in the
single-payer plan, they are barred from billing employer-based plans and
would thus cease participating in those plans. If providers are unable to be
paid from any other source, they will no longer see patients who have other
coverage. The limitation on providers’ charges to the single-payer rate also
reduces incentives to continue to participate in other plan networks, such as
employer-based plans, because they will not be able to earn more from those
payers than from the single-payer. Thus, the provider networks for the
employer plans would shrink considerably, perhaps to the point where
Cal. S.B. 562, § 100639(e) (emphasis added). The proposed statute further states that
“[t]his section does not preclude the program from acting as a primary or secondary payer in
conjunction with another third-party payer when permitted by a federal program.” Id. In other
words, for programs like TRICARE and the federal employee health benefits programs,
which do not provide waivers, presumably the provider would be permitted to bill these
federal programs directly, and the state single payer could be the secondary payer.
76

Compare R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-5(a)(1) (requiring the plan director to “identify [and]
automatically enroll [...] qualified Rhode Island residents”) and H.B. 74, 147th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2013), § 1611 (declaring “[a]ll Delaware citizens” entitled to
benefits but establishing no enrollment procedure) with H.B. 1793, Gen. Ct., 2018 Sess.
(N.H. 2018), § 404-J:4 (extending presumptive eligibility to “[a]ll individuals legally
residing in New Hampshire” but requiring completion of an application for payment of
benefits).
77

74

employer-based coverage is all but worthless to employees. Employees will
drop employer coverage if it lacks a functioning provider network.
In some instances, we characterized single-payer proposals as a Type B
model even when they lacked an explicit limit on providers’ ability to be paid
from non-single payer sources. For example, Provider Restrictions could
exist where the plan contained strong incentives for providers to participate
exclusively in the program short of a mandate to do so, such as requirements
that providers participate on an all-or-nothing basis 78 or onerous notification
requirements. 79 Another example is South Carolina’s bill, which would pay
providers a higher rate if they participate in the single-payer plan’s network
than if they do not. 80
Standing alone, the Provider Restriction model may move individuals
into the single payer plan and out of employer-based plans, but it does not
capture the employers’ expenditures on health coverage. Thus, a Provider
Restriction would almost certainly need to be paired with a payroll tax or
other funding mechanism to capture employers’ financial contribution. In
effect, the provider restrictions in this model are designed to simulate the
effects of a nonduplication provision through provider regulation: they limit
the market for employer-based coverage by shrinking the provider networks
for that coverage, but without triggering ERISA preemption.
3. Type C—Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary Payer
A third variation, the Type C model, includes an explicit subrogation,
assignment, or secondary payer provision to facilitate the single-payer plan’s
ability to recover paid claims from collateral sources of coverage, including

See, e.g., H.B. 2436, 100th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2017), § 40(g)
(“Providers who accept payment from the Program for services rendered may not bill any
patient for covered services. Providers may elect either to participate fully, or not at all, in
the Program.”). See also, R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-9(d), § 23-95-7(a)(2) (using nearly identical
languagesame).
78

See, e.g., Pa. S.B. 1014, § 507 (requiring nonparticipating providers to notify patients
of their provider’s nonparticipation and to have the patient sign a form acknowledging he or
she is solely responsible for amounts charged in excess of the approved single-payer rates,
or else face penalties for noncompliance up to 200% of the amount they billed the patient).
79

80

75

S.B. 786, 121st Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2015), §§ 44-18-920; 44-18-940.

employer-based plans. 81 Twenty-five bills across nine states employed a
Type-C subrogation, assignment or secondary payer provision. 82
Subrogation is the action, typically by an insurance carrier, to assert the
rights of the insured to reimbursement or payment against a third party. 83 In
the single-payer context, the single-payer plan could pay for the health care
services of a member, and then assert a subrogation claim to recover those
costs against a third party that is responsible for paying for the member’s
care, including collateral sources of health coverage. Oregon’s most recent
single payer bill provides an example of a subrogation provision:
(2) The Oregon Health Authority is subrogated to the rights
of any participant that has a claim against an insurer,
tortfeasor, employer, third party administrator, pension
manager, public or private corporation, government entity or
any other person that may be liable for the cost of health
services provided to the participant and paid for by the Health
Care for All Oregon Plan. (3) The authority may enter into an
agreement with any person for the prepayment of claims
anticipated to arise under subsection (2) of this section during
a biennium. At the end of each biennium, the authority shall
appropriately charge or refund to the payer the difference
between the amount prepaid and the amount due. 84
An assignment of benefits is a legal agreement where the individual
agrees to transfer the right to reimbursement for his or her health care services

Other collateral sources may include out-of-state coverage, government payers where
a waiver is not secured, TRICARE, federal employee health benefit plans, tortfeasors,
workers compensation plans, accident or auto insurance policies, or other plans that are not
included in the single-payer plan.
81

82

See Figure 3, infra.

Subrogation, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The principle under which
an insurer that has paid a loss under an insurance policy is entitled to all the rights and
remedies belonging to the insured against a third party with respect to any loss covered by
the policy.”).
83

S.B. 631, 78th Leg. Assemb., 2015 Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015), § 15(2), (3) (emphasis
added).
84

76

to another party, typically to a provider. 85 In the single-payer context, an
assignment provision would transfer to the single-payer plan the individual’s
right to reimbursement from another third-party payer, such as a health
plan. 86
Similarly, secondary payer provisions make the single-payer plan the
secondary payer to any other coverage the patient may have, including
employer-based coverage. 87 This means that the collateral source of coverage
has the first obligation to pay for the patient’s services, and the single-payer
plan will only pay for services not otherwise covered by the primary payer.
The secondary payer provision may be paired with a subrogation provision
that authorizes the state single-payer plan to recover amounts that it paid that
were the responsibility of the primary payer. 88
To illustrate the mechanics of these provisions, assume an an employee
gets an MRI and a bill for $800 for the service. Her employer’s plan agrees
to pay up to $1,000 for an MRI. Under a subrogation provision, the state
single-payer plan would pay the provider’s bill of $800, then charge the
employer $800. 89 Under an assignment provision, similarly, the state single46A C.J.S. Insurance § 2001 (“A form authorizing a [health care provider] to receive
payment of a patient’s insurance benefits is sufficient to effect an assignment of the patient’s
claim against the insurance company to the [health care provider].”
85

86

See, e.g., R.I. S.B. 2237, § 23-95-12(g), providing:

Receipt of health care services under the plan shall be deemed an assignment by the
[Rhode Island Single Payer Plan] participant of any right to payment for services
from a policy of insurance, a health benefit plan or other source. The other source
of health care benefits shall pay to the fund all amounts it is obligated to pay to, or
on behalf of, the [Rhode Island Single Payer Plan] participant for covered health
care services. The director may commence any action necessary to recover the
amounts due.
See, e.g., H.P. 887, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017), § 7506 (providing that
“Healthy Maine serves as a secondary payor” and the total of primary and secondary
payments “may not exceed the amount that Healthy Maine would pay if it were the only
payor”).
87

Id. (“Healthy Maine may recover health care payments from any other collateral
source, such as a health insurance plan, health benefit plan or other payor that is primary to
Healthy Maine.”).
88

89
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E.g. S.B. 631, 78th Leg. Assemb., 2015 Reg. Sess (Or. 2015), § 15(3) (providing that

payer play would assume the employee’s right to receive $800 from the
employer plan and would pay the provider on the employee’s behalf, then
assess an $800 charge on the employer to pay back the state fund. 90 Under a
secondary payer provision, the employer plan must pay the $800 bill and the
state single-payer plan is relieved of its obligation to pay. 91
In proposals using a Type C—Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer
model, if a patient has dual coverage in both the single-payer plan and another
plan, such as employer-sponsored coverage, the single payer plan is able to
seek reimbursement from the other plan (the collateral source of coverage)
for any services provided. In states where the providers are permitted to bill
collateral sources , the single-payer plan would just be responsible for patient
cost-sharing and services not covered by the collateral source. Using the MRI
example from above, the MRI provider could bill the patient’s employer plan
$800 for the MRI. If the patient had a $500 deductible under her employer
plan, the patient would ordinarily owe $500 to the MRI provider. However,
the state single-payer plan, which does not permit patient cost-sharing, would
then function as supplemental coverage and pay the patient’s $500 costsharing, and the employer would pay $300. 92 Thus, the assignment,
subrogation, or secondary payer provision saves the single-payer plan money
by turning first to collateral sources of coverage, 93 which may reduce the
amount of payroll or other taxes required to fund the single-payer program.
these charges shall be amassed each “biennium”).
E.g., R.I. S.B. 2237 § 23-95-12(g) (authorizing the state single-payer plan’s director
to take “any action necessary” to recover these funds).
90

E.g., H.P. 887, 128th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017), § 7506 (providing that if the
employer plan should have paid and did not, the state single-payer plan can pay and recoup
the bill from the employer plan).
91

E.g., P.A. S.B. 1014, §§ 503(c) (prohibiting patient cost sharing), 505 (subrogation),
507 (provider participation) (providing that the state plan is subrogated to and deemed an
assignee of a participant’s duplicate coverage, prohibiting the provider from charging
participants cost-sharing, and not prohibiting the provider from billing a participant’s
duplicate coverage).
92

93

E.g., S.F. 1125, 2019 Leg., 91st Sess., § 3, subd. 3(a) (Minn. 2019) (providing, “The
Minnesota Health Plan shall seek reimbursement from the collateral source for services
provided to the individual . . . Upon demand, the collateral source shall pay to the Minnesota
Health Fund the sums it would have paid or expended on behalf of the individual for the
health care services provided by the Minnesota Health Plan.”)
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It also contains an implied acknowledgement that employers may continue to
offer coverage if they so choose. The circuitous inefficiency of these Type C
pay-and-recoup provisions illustrate the contortions that ERISA forces states
into. These provisions would be unnecessary if the state could simply
mandate that employers offer coverage to employees through the state singlepayer plan or cease providing employer-based coverage altogether because
the possibility of dual coverage would be eliminated.
For administrative ease, however, providers may simply want to bill the
single-payer plan for all services provided to dually covered patients, and the
Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer provisions allow the single-payer
to pay the provider and then recover payment from the collateral source. This
would allow the single-payer plan to recapture some of the employer
expenditures, not what it spends on premiums, but the amount it pays in
claims. The Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer model may be
particularly useful to capture expenditures of out-of-state employers, who
may not be subject to the state’s payroll tax requirements.
A few states—Ohio, Rhode Island, and Maine—combine Types B and
C. Ohio’s single payer bills contain provisions that require providers to
seek payment only from the state single-payer plan, a provision subrogating
the rights of the single-payer plan to all rights of a participant against a
collateral source of payment, and a provision assigning from the participant
to the single payer plan any rights to receive payment for services from any
other source. 95 Combining Types B and C creates an mechanism to pull both
employees and the employer expenditures into the single-payer plan: (1)
require participating providers to seek payment only from the single payer;
(2) all services provided to state residents will be paid by the single payer at
the established rates; and (3) if the patient is dually covered by an employer
plan or other coverage, then the single-payer entity will seek reimbursement
from the collateral source. In this way, the single-payer system can capture
some of the employer expenditures on claims paid. For patients with dual
coverage, it effectively transforms the single-payer plan into the billing agent
of the provider. The employer can still pay claims to the single-payer plan if
94

See, e.g., Ohio H.B. 440; H. 5611, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Jan. Sess. (R.I. 2019); H.P.
962, 126th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2013).
94

95
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Ohio H.B. 440 § 3920.09(C)-(D), § 3920.13, § 3920.04(B)(15)(g).

it elects to keep its private plan, but it may be easier and cheaper to simply
stop covering the employees in that state and pay a payroll tax per employee
instead. This model still relies upon a payroll tax or other way to capture the
employer funds saved if it stops providing coverage to its employees, but it
allows the single-payer to capture health expenditures from third-party payers
that continue to exist outside the single-payer system. 96
A handful of bills only contained a Type C subrogation/ assignment/ or
secondary payer provision and no Funding Plan or Provider Restriction. 97 A
standalone Type C will do little to capture employer expenditures or move
individuals into the single-payer plan and suggests that the state may
anticipate the persistence of a multi-payer system. Most of these plans
provide for future development of the funding provisions, and such payroll
or income taxes would do most of the work of moving people and funds into
the state’s plan. A standalone Type-C provision, particularly secondary
payer, may even keep people in dual-coverage longer than if they were paying
for employer coverage that they rarely used (because the state plan would pay
their claims). In some cases, other features suggest a standalone secondary
payer bill may not actually establish a single-payer, but rather establish a
public option to compete with private plans without displacing private
coverage altogether. 98
A summary of the different types of mechanisms that state single-payer
bills use to capture employer expenditures is listed in Figure 2. The number
of state proposals that contain each of the features, A, B, and C, are listed in
Figure 3. Note that proposals that feature more than one type of provision are

As noted below in Part II.A.3, however, application of these provisions to self-insured
employer plans would be preempted.
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H.P. 887, 127th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Me. 2017); H.P. 316, 129th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Me. 2019); H.B. 6285, (Mich. 2018); Or. S.B. 631; S.B. 5222, 66th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wa.
2019).
97

For example Wash. S.B. 5222 (2019) would allow employers that provide minimum
essential coverage to employees to apply for an exemption from the payroll taxes to pay for
the state plan. See § 114(3). Moreover, the bill does not contain a nonduplication provision
and allows providers to continue to bill other payers. Mich. H.B. 6285 (2018) creates a state
plan that would be secondary to other coverage. Providers remain free to contract with and
bill third-party payers, but only at rates less than the state plan’s rates. Employers may
participate voluntarily.
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counted more than once.
Figure 2. Types of State Single-Payer Provisions

Figure 3. Number of State Single Payer Proposals by Type

81

4. Summarizing the Models to Capture Employer Spending
The necessity of a payroll tax or other funding mechanism to capture
employer expenditures means that most proposals combine a Funding Plan
with either a Provider Restriction or Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary
Payer provision. 99 Other states have single payer bills that lack a specific
Funding Plan but contain a Provider Restriction or an
Assignment/Subrogation/Secondary Payer provision. 100 All Type B and C
plans will eventually require a funding mechanism, even if the bills leave the
details to be determined later. A proposal’s lack of a specific revenue plan
may reflect the political or technical difficulty of determining the precise
levels of each type of tax needed to pay for the system. Thus, while it may be
possible to design a single-payer plan without either a Provider Restriction or
a Subrogation/Assignment/Secondary Payer provision, it is not possible to
imagine a viable single payer plan that lacks a financing mechanism. The
taxes in Type A proposals draw employees and employer expenditures into
the single-payer plan, while the Type B and C proposals use provider
regulation or assignment/subrogation/secondary payer provisions to bolster
the movement of people and funds into the single-payer plan.
All these models, particularly Types B and C, implicitly contemplate that
some employers may continue to offer employer-based coverage, at least
during a transition period before the system settles into equilibrium. As such,
these models may also improve the ERISA-resistance of the single-payer
proposal as a whole.
In response to ERISA, the emerging models for state single-payer plans
use a combination of nudges and incentives operating on all the various actors
in the health care transaction. Employers are encouraged, but not required, by
the payroll tax to drop their employee coverage in the single-payer state.
Providers are given incentives to participate in the single-payer plan and thus
relinquish the ability to charge any other party for their services, including

See e.g., N.Y. A. 4738-A (combining a payroll tax, unearned income tax, and a
provider restriction); Penn. S.B. 1014 § 904, § 905, § 505 (combining a payroll tax, income
tax, and subrogation and assignment provisions). See also, Appendix A.
99

See, e.g., H.B. 1516, 438th Sess. Gen. Assemb., (Md. 2018) (providing for the
revenue plan to be developed and a provider restriction); Or. S.B. 631 (providing for a
revenue plan to be developed and a subrogation provision).
100
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the individual patient or employer plans. Employees likely will choose the
state-single payer plan and drop their employer plan, because the single-payer
plan’s broad provider network, lower cost-sharing, and comprehensive
coverage will make it more attractive. Even if employees keep their
employer-sponsored plan, the state single-payer plan may pay the providers
and seek reimbursement from this collateral source. The legal question we
turn to in the next Part is whether ERISA preempts these nudges and
incentives designed to pull employees and employer health spending through
the state’s single-payer plan.
II. ERISA’S OBSTACLES TO STATE SINGLE-PAYER PLANS
States’ powers to regulate their health care systems are historic and
expansive, but bounded by federal laws that limit state regulatory power
through preemption. One federal law has erected a notorious obstacle to state
regulation of health insurance: ERISA. 101 Congress enacted ERISA in 1974
to regulate pensions (hence the “Retirement Income Security” in its title),102
but the statute’s broad preemption language has wrought unintended
consequences, blocking numerous state health reform laws over the past 40
years as impermissibly “relat[ing] to” employer-sponsored health insurance.
ERISA’s formidable preemption barrier is not, however, impassible. The
ERISA preemption scheme allows states to regulate some aspects of the
insurance industry, provider payments, and general revenues. State laws that
manage to wriggle through the narrow space between permitted targets of
regulation and impermissible burdens on employer-sponsored plans may
survive preemption.
Whether state-based single-payer plans survive ERISA preemption is the
billion-dollar question posed in Part I. The logical answer is that ERISA
preemption poses a substantial obstacle to these state efforts, but the plans
should survive if carefully drafted. The practical answer is that ERISA

Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (1974) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–
1461 (2012))
101

See, e.g., James A. Wooten, A Legislative and Political History of ERISA Preemption,
Part 1, 14 J. PENSION BENEFITS 31, 31-35 (2006).
102
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preemption doctrine and precedent have become so harsh and unstable that
they cast a pall of uncertainty, jurisdiction by jurisdiction, and invite litigation
challenging these state efforts no matter where they arise.
A. The ERISA Preemption Labyrinth
Preemption generally describes the displacement of one legal authority
by another legal authority in an established hierarchy. 103 The U.S.
Constitution’s Supremacy Clause makes duly enacted federal law the
“supreme law of the land,” and subordinates state laws “to the contrary.”104
Preemption doctrine thus plays a crucial role in maintaining order in a federal
system and policing the boundaries of authority. 105
These boundaries, however, are porous, poorly defined, and disorderly at
many important junctures. 106 Preemption doctrine has evolved a taxonomy
of forms to determine which conflicts of authority have preemptive effect. 107
The taxonomy relies on divination of Congressional intent behind the federal
law, 108 identification of its points of friction with state laws, and selection of

See generally Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 225 n.3 (2000)
(defining “preemption” as “the displacement of state law by federal statutes (or by courts
seeking to fill gaps in federal statutes”); Preemption, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1368–69
(10th ed. 2014) (“The principle (derived from the Supremacy Clause) that a federal law can
supersede or supplant any inconsistent state law or regulation.”).
103

U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See also, e.g., Lauren E. Phillips, Note, Impeding
Innovation: State Preemption of Progressive Local Regulations, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2225
(2018).
104

See generally WILLIAM W. BUZBEE ED., PREEMPTION CHOICE (2009); RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN & MICHAEL S. GREVE, EDS., FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL
INTERESTS 309 (2007).
105

See Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, Body of Preemption: Health Law Traditions and the
Presumption against Preemption, 89 TEMPLE L. REV. 89, 95-97 (2016).
106

See generally David S. Rubenstein, Delegating Supremacy?, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1125,
1136-37 (2012) (explaining the Supreme Court’s preemption taxonomy).
107

Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (“The question
whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law is one of congressional intent.
The purpose of Congress is the ultimate touchstone.”) (internal quotation marks and brackets
omitted).
108
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the degree to which they may coexist. 109 Congress may explicitly express its
intention to preempt state law, or that intent may be implied. 110 Even when
Congress expresses its wishes for preemption, those provisions invite plenty
of ambiguity and room for interpretation. 111
ERISA exemplifies the phenomenon of expressed but ambiguous
preemption provisions because the statute’s preemption is both forcefullyworded and inscrutable. Although passed primarily with pension benefits in
mind, 112 ERISA applies to all employer-sponsored benefits, and expressly
extends to plans that provide “medical, surgical, or hospital care or benefits .
. . through the purchase of insurance or otherwise.” 113 ERISA’s original
purposes were to safeguard employees’ pensions and to encourage
employers’ provision of pension benefits by establishing a uniform system of
federal regulation and limiting employees’ remedies. 114 ERISA, however,
109

See McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 95-97.

E.g., Max Helveston, Preemption Without Borders, 48 GA. L. REV. 1085, 1088
(2014) (“Federal preemption occurs either when federal law explicitly states that it was
intended to override state law (express preemption) or when continued enforcement of state
law would conflict with federal law (implied, obstacle, or impossibility preemption).”);
Daniel J. Meltzer, Preemption and Textualism, 112 MICH. L. REV. 1, 8 (2013) (describing
implied preemption as resulting from an interpretation of the statute rather than its direct
text).
110

See, e.g., Geier v. Am. Honda, 529 U.S. 861, 866, 873 (2000) (holding that implied
preemption may apply even when the statute has express preemption provisions); Jamelle C.
Sharpe, Legislating Preemption, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 163, 179, 216 (2011) (“Although
an express preemption or saving clause can be clear evidence of Congress’s preemptive
intent, it may not be definitive evidence.”); Meltzer, supra note 110, at 30-31 (noting the
variety of interpretive methods applied to express preemption provisions). See also Brendan
S. Maher, The Affordable Care Act, Remedy, and Litigation Reform, 63 AM. U. L. REV. 649,
702 (2014) (observing that, “[t]he doctrine of preemption—and obstacle preemption in
particular—is quite muddled”)
111

See generally ERIC M. PATASHNIK, REFORMS AT RISK: WHAT HAPPENS AFTER
MAJOR POLICY CHANGES ARE ENACTED 74-77 (2008); Wooten, supra note 102.
112

29 U.S.C. § 1002(1) (originally § 3(1)). See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650-51. But
cf. PATASHNIK, supra note 112, at 83 (noting scholarly disagreement about how far Congress
intended ERISA to intrude on health insurance regulation, but agreement on “the importance
of the preemption provision for health politics and policy”).
113

114
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See, e.g., 29 § 1001 (2012) (declaring ERISA’s policy as, “to protect interstate

“does not go about protecting plan participants . . . by requiring employers to
provide any given set of minimum benefits, but instead controls the
administration of benefit plans” 115 if employers choose to provide them.
To promote uniformity116 and encourage multi-state employers to provide
benefits, Congress wrote into ERISA a “terse but comprehensive”117
provision expressly preempting “any and all” state laws 118 that “relate to” any
“benefit plan[s]” 119 covered by the Act. 120 Even state laws friendly to
ERISA’s goals have run afoul of its preemption. 121
The “relates to” provision “may be the most expansive express preemption provision in any federal statute.” 122 But ERISA contains a “savings

commerce and the interests of participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries,
by requiring the disclosure and reporting to participants and beneficiaries of financial and
other information with respect thereto, by establishing standards of conduct, responsibility,
and obligation for fiduciaries of employee benefit plans, and by providing for appropriate
remedies, sanctions, and ready access to the Federal courts.”); 29 § 1001a (declaring
“multiemployer pension” plans to be targets of ERISA’s policies); 29 § 1001b (declaring
“single-employer defined benefit pension plans” to be targets of ERISA’s policies).
115

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 651.

See Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 208 (2004) (“The purpose of ERISA
is to provide a uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”).
116

Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 136 S. Ct. 936, 943 (2016). See generally Wooten,
supra note 102.
117

ERISA defines state “laws” as “all laws, decisions, rules, regulations, or other state
actions having the effect of law,” §514(c)(1), and includes both states and “any political
subdivision thereof, or any agency or instrumentality of either which purports to regulate,
directly or indirectly, the terms and conditions of employee benefit plans covered by
ERISA,” § 514(c)(2).
118

119

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2012) (included as § 514 in the Act).

The preemption provision took effect on January 1, 1975. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). Cf.
§ 1144(b)(1) (stating that ERISA does not apply retroactively from that date).
120

E.g., Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv., Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830 (1988)
(“Legislative ‘good intentions’ do not save a state law within the broad pre-emptive scope
of § 514(a).”).
121

Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 947 (Thomas, J., concurring). See Meltzer, supra note 110, at
20 (noting that other statutes like the Interstate Commerce Commission Termination Act of
1995 use “related to” preemption language, but that ERISA’s is the “most frequently
122
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clause,” which exempts state regulation of “insurance” from preemption
under the statute. 123 States may not, however, “deem” an employee benefit
plan or trust “to be an insurance company . . . or to be engaged in the business
of insurance” in order to regulate it under the savings clause. 124 In the health
benefits context, courts have interpreted this to exempt employers’ selffunded health plans from state “insurance” laws. 125 The preemption clause,
savings clause, and “deemer” clause structure illustrate the whipsaw of
ERISA preemption: the broadest preemption statement, followed by a broad
exception to that preemption, finished with an exception to the exception,
restoring preemption. 126
The Court’s ERISA preemption jurisprudence has, over the past four
decades, attempted to navigate a workable course between the “broad scope
Congress intended” and the “susceptibility to limitless application” its chosen
words engender. 127 The quest for workable standards in light of the clause’s
“indeterminacy” has resulted in an ERISA preemption doctrine that rejects

litigated”).
Noting in ERISA “shall be construed to exempt or relieve any person from any law
of any state which regulates insurance, banking, or securities.” § 514(b)(2)(A) This clause
preserves states’ ability to directly regulate the “business of insurance.” See, e.g., Ky. Ass’n
of Health Plans v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 339, 341-42 (2003) (holding that “any willing
provider” laws were not preempted); Pharm. Care Mgm’t. Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301
(1st Cir. 2005) (holding that pharmacy benefit manager legislation was saved from
preemption). But see PCMA v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722, 732 (8th Cir. 2018) (holding that
ERISA preempted Iowa’s regulation of PBMs that provided services to ERISA plans).
ERISA also contains a provision that expressly preserves other federal laws, stating that they
are not preempted if ERISA’s application would “alter, amend, modify, invalidate, impair,
or supersede” them. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(d); see Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 96-97
(1983).
123
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29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B).

125

See Part II.A.2.b., infra.

See also Mary Ann Chirba-Martin & Troyen A. Brennan, The critical role of ERISA
in state health reform, 13 HEALTH AFF. 142, 142-156 (1994) (explaining the “intricate threestep dance of the ‘relate to,’ ‘savings,’ and ‘deemer’ clauses”).
126

Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 943. See also id. at 948 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting how
“uncomfortable” the Court became with the volume of state law preempted by a literal
reading).
127
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“uncritical literalism,” 128 but replaces it with a complex analytical framework
whose outcomes can be difficult to predict. It is a mess.
The Supreme Court has interpreted “relates to” broadly, while crafting
limiting principles to deal with the “unhelpful” phrasing, 129 so that not every
relationship to employee benefit plans invalidates a state law. Per the Court’s
interpretation, state laws impermissibly “relate to” employee benefit plans by
making “reference to” those plans, 130 by “act[ing] immediately and
exclusively upon ERISA plans” or by making “the existence of ERISA plans
. . . essential to the law’s operation.” 131
State laws also may “relate to” ERISA plans by having too strong a
“connection with” them, such as when a state law “governs the payment of
benefits, a central matter of plan administration,” or “interferes with
nationally uniform plan administration,” 132 or indirectly produces “economic
effects” which would “force an ERISA plan to adopt a certain scheme of
substantive coverage or effectively restrict its choice of insurers.” 133 Thus,
ERISA would preempt state laws that require employers to offer health
benefits or impose requirements on the benefits offered as impermissibly
relating to an employee benefit plan. 134 The concept of a forced choice or

NY State Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S.
645, 656. See also California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Constr.,
519 U.S. 316, 336 (Scalia, J., concurring) (opining that the preemption clause’s furthest
literal interpretations produce infinite preemption that “no sensible person could have
intended”).
128

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 655-56 (calling the preemption language “unhelpful” and
rejecting a literal reading of the phrase). Accord Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.
Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985) (“not a model of legislative drafting”).
129

130

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.

131

Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325.

132

Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148.

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668. See Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 943 (collecting cases). See
also Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146-47; Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85, 97–100 (1983)
(finding that laws effectively requiring employers to “pay employees specific benefits” are
preempted).
133

E.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (noting that a “substantive mandate” on health
benefits would be preempted); Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism: Barriers to
134
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“Hobson’s choice” plays an important role in distinguishing preempted state
laws from permitted ones. 135 State laws that nudge too hard may leave
employers with only the illusion of choice in whether to offer benefits and
what to cover. 136 Those laws are preempted as impermissibly relating to
ERISA plans. 137 But state laws that merely make certain choices more
attractive than others may survive; 138 their connection is “too tenuous,
remote, or peripheral” for preemption. 139
Additionally, beyond ERISA’s capacious express preemption provisions,
the regular doctrine of conflict preemption would invalidate those state
efforts that impermissibly conflict with or create obstacles to ERISA rules.140
Even good arguments for why novel state efforts should slip through are
doubtful, due to the breadth of the preemption, courts’ singular focus on
uniformity, and the statute’s unfortunate wording. In the realm of ERISA,
courts usually resolve indeterminacy to favor preemption.
In a health reform landscape already fraught with uncertainty and
Increasing Health Care Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255, 292 (1990)
(stating that “state level employer mandates” are preempted).
See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (noting that a Hobson's choice “would be treated
as imposing a substantive mandate”). Retail Indus. Leaders Ass'n v. Fielder, 435 F. Supp.
2d 481, 497 (D. Md. 2006), (“The ‘choice’ here is a Hobson's choice” and therefore
preempted); Retail Indus. Leaders Ass' v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 202 (4th Cir. 2007)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Paying the assessment would [] not be a financial burden that
leaves Wal–Mart with a Hobson's choice, that is, no real choice but to increase health
insurance benefits.”).
135

136

See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664.

137

See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass' v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 192-93 (4th Cir. 2007).

E.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (“[N]o showing has been made here that the
surcharges are so prohibitive as to force all health insurance consumers to contract with the
Blues. As they currently stand, the surcharges do not require plans to deal with only one
insurer, or to insure against an entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to
leave without coverage.”).
138

139

Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. 85, 100 (1983).

See John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 510 U.S.
86, 99 (1993) (finding that Congress did not intend to “fundamentally . . . alter traditional
preemption analysis” when it wrote ERISA’s express preemption language). See also Boggs
v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833, 833 (1997) (applying conflict preemption to ERISA).
140
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indeterminacy, 141 ERISA has wreaked havoc on state health regulation and
reform efforts. 142 The expansive “relates to” provision has preempted
everything from direct mandates for employer benefits to statutory rules of
general applicability that indirectly burden employers’ decisions about their
plans and how much those plans will cost. In its most recent ERISA opinion
in Gobeille, for example, the Supreme Court held that ERISA preempted state
all-payer claims data reporting requirements, even where the plans already
collected the data at issue and self-funded plans contracted with an insurance
company affiliate to do so. 143
Yet explicit references to employer plans are not always fatal to state
laws, 144 nor are the dividing lines for coercive versus permitted economic
effects clearly drawn. 145 State and local health insurance reforms prior to the
ACA met a multitude of fates when challenged in court. These reforms
include regulations targeting providers (hospitals and doctors), employer
contribution provisions (a/k/a pay-or-play laws), and regulation of insurance

See generally, McCuskey, Body of Preemption, supra note 106, at 103-105; Scott L.
Greer & Peter D. Jacobson, Health Care Reform and Federalism, 35 J. HEALTH POL., POL’Y
& L. 203, 220 (2010) (noting that political opportunism in health policy can be
counterproductive).
141

See, e.g., Brendan S. Maher & Peter K. Stris, ERISA & Uncertainty, 88 WASH. U. L.
REV. 433, 464–65 (2010) (noting that ERISA’s provisions regularly capture the Supreme
Court’s attention); Gregory Acs, et al., Self-Insured Employer Health Plans: Prevalence,
Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AFF. 266, 267 (1996) (“ERISA preemption
is very controversial.”).
142

143

Gobeille v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 577 U.S. ___, 136 S. Ct. 936, 947 (2016).

Compare Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) (holding state law specifically
referring to employee benefit plans preempted “on that basis alone”) with Dillingham, 519
U.S. at 328 (holding that state law which can function irrespective of ERISA plans does not
impermissibly “reference” ERISA plans).
144

State legislative purpose is “relevant only as it may relate to the ‘scope of the state
law the Congress understood would survive,’” preemption or ‘the nature of the effect of the
state law on ERISA plans.’” Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 946 (quoting Travelers, 514 U.S. at 65859 and Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325). See also Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency & Serv.,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 830, (1988) (“Legislative ‘“good intentions’” do not save a state law
within the broad pre-emptive scope of” ERISA preemption).
145
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coverage and administration. 146
1. Provider regulation
State regulation of health care providers typically falls outside ERISA’s
reach, despite substantial indirect economic effects on employee-benefit
plans. Regulation of provider rates, taxation of health care facilities, medical
quality-control regulations, and general health care delivery regulations are
not preempted. 147 As with most other applications of ERISA, however, the
analysis is not always so straightforward when insurance reimbursement gets
involved.
In New York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Insurance Co., the Supreme Court established both the modern
understanding of the “connection with” preemption standard, and the modern
analysis of how provider regulation may indirectly impact employersponsored health benefits. 148 The New York law challenged in Travelers
imposed a 24% surcharge on hospital bills for patients covered by
commercial insurance other than Blue Cross or Blue Shield (“Blue plans”) to

See generally, Peter D. Jacobson, The Role of ERISA Preemption in Health Reform:
Opportunities and Limits, 37 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 86 (2009). States have endeavored to
reform other aspects of their health care systems, especially cost structures, which are not as
obviously related to the single-payer insurance reforms discussed here. E.g., Pharm. Care
Mgm’t. Ass’n v. District of Columbia, 613 F.3d 179, 190 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (district law
regulating pharmaceutical benefits managers partially preempted); Pharm. Care Mgm’t.
Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 301 (1st Cir. 2005) (similar legislation not preempted); Erin
C. Fuse Brown & Jaime S. King, ERISA as a Barrier for State Health Care Transparency
Efforts, in TRANSPARENCY IN HEALTH & HEALTH CARE (eds. I. Glenn Cohen, Holly
Fernandez Lynch, and Barbara Evans, Cambridge U. Press 2019).
146

See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65 (arguing that surcharges are non-preempted
economic influences because they do not require plans to deal with only one insurer);
Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 840 (noting that traditional areas of state action such as medical
care quality standards and hospital workplace regulations are too remote to affect choices
made by ERISA plans); De Buono, 117 S.Ct. at 1747 (holding that state tax on gross receipts
of health care facilities is not preempted by ERISA).
147

See, e.g., Amy B. Monahan, Pay or Play Laws, ERISA Preemption, and Potential
Lessons from Massachusetts, 55. U. KAN. L. REV. 1203, 1208 (2007). This decision came
after multiple states attempted to include employers in health care reform without triggering
ERISA preemption.
148
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cover the externalized costs – borne by Medicaid, Blue plans, and community
hospitals – that enabled commercial insurers and HMOs to charge lower rates
and enroll healthier populations. 149 Although the surcharge was based on
providers’ bills and was collected by the providers, it was designed to impact
the cost-structure for third-party payers of those bills and in particular to
make Blue plans more attractive. 150 Thus, the surcharge had an “indirect
economic effect on choices made by insurance buyers, including ERISA
plans.” 151 Travelers held that this indirect economic incentive to buy Blue
plans did not trigger ERISA preemption because it did not “bind plan
administrators to any particular choice” of plan and did not “force” employers
to contract with Blue plans. 152
Travelers established that general health care regulations’ indirect
economic influence over employer health insurance choices may survive
preemption, but only to a degree. While the 24% surcharge on hospital
services was not “so prohibitive as to force all health insurance consumers to
contract with” Blue plans, the Court posed that “there might be a point at
which an exorbitant tax leaving consumers with a Hobson’s choice would be
treated as imposing a substantive mandate” on employers’ insurance choices
and therefore preempted. 153

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 650. The law included an additional assessment on HMOs
directly, varying with the number of Medicaid enrollees in the HMO, which was paid by the
HMO to the state’s general fund. Id. At the time, New Jersey enacted a similar rate-setting
statute that had survived preemption analysis in the Third Circuit. See Travelers, 514 U.S.
at 654 (arguing that purposefully interfering with ERISA plan choices constitutes a
“connection” that triggers preemption).
149

Id. The law included an additional assessment on HMOs directly, varying with the
number of Medicaid enrollees in the HMO, which was paid by the HMO to the state’s general
fund. Id. at 650. See Monahan, supra note 148, at 1208 (finding that state laws with
connections to ERISA plans may relate to such plans even if ERISA is not explicitely
referenced).
150

151

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659.

Id. at 661, 664 (“[T]he surcharges do not require plans to deal with only one insurer,
or to insure against an entire category of illnesses they might otherwise choose to leave
without coverage.”).
152

153
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Id. at 664.

After Travelers, analysis of connection between state laws and ERISA
plans has focused on the practical degree of choice left to the employer. A
state tax on hospital gross receipts, for example, was among the “‘myriad
state laws’ of general applicability that impose some burdens on the
administration of ERISA plans but nevertheless do not ‘relate to’ them within
the meaning of the governing statute.” 154
2. Employer contributions
State and local governments’ efforts to nudge employers to contribute to
their employees’ health care costs have not fared as well as provider
regulation under ERISA preemption. 155 Prior to the ACA’s federal employer
mandate, several state and local governments enacted “fair share” 156 or “payor-play” requiring that employers offer a certain level of health benefits
(play) or pay an assessment to the state for the difference (pay). 157 These
laws’ fates under ERISA preemption thus far have turned on the nature and
strength of the pay incentives, and on employers’ political support. 158
Massachusetts’s 2006 comprehensive health reform statute, 159 for
example, included a requirement that employers with more than ten

De Buono v. NYSA-ILA Med. & Clinical Servs. Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 815 (1997)
(citing Travelers, 514 U.S., at 668) (concluding that, while the tax would have some
influence on the ERISA fund’s decision to provide benefits by operating clinics, its influence
would not be so strong as to force a particular decision).
154

See generally Mary Ann Chirba-Martin, ERISA Preemption of State “Pay of Play”
Mandates: How PPACA Clouds an Already Confusing Picture, J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y.
393, 404-17 (finding that most state legislative attempts to bypass ERISA by encouraging
employers to offer employee health coverage were either voted down immediately or faced
continuous §514 challenges).
155

See generally Julia Contreras & Orly Lobel, Wal-Martization and the Fair Share
Health Care Acts, 19 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 105 (2006) (evaluating Maryland’s Fair Share
Health Care Act which was turned down in court for being incompatible with federal uniform
treatment laws under ERISA).
156

See Monahan, supra note 148, at 1205-06 (arguing that state laws with relatively
weak “pay” provisions are more likely to surivie ERISA preemption challenges when not
viewed as disgused mandates).
157
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158

See id. at 1211-20.

159

“Massachusetts Health Care Reform Act”

employees make “fair and reasonable contributions” to employees’ health
insurance coverage, or else pay an assessment of $295 per employee into a
state fund. 160 A few years after Massachusetts enacted its reforms, the
Affordable Care Act enacted a federal “pay-or-play” provision modeled on
the Massachusetts statute, 161 now colloquially referred to as the “employer
mandate.” 162
The Massachusetts employer mandate, “somewhat
surprisingly,” went unchallenged under ERISA, 163 perhaps because the
health reform bill enjoyed widespread political support from employers. 164
Elsewhere, employer trade groups have readily challenged pay-or-play
legislation in court, leading to divergent approaches in the Circuit Courts
starting in 2007. Maryland’s Fair Share Health Care Act, 165 aimed at

MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 149, § 188(a) (2006). Employers who do not arrange pretax payroll deductions for their employees’ health benefits face an additional assessment if
their employees use the state-funded Health Safety Net program. Id. ch. 149 § 44.
160

See, e.g., KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, MASSACHUSETTS HEALTH CARE REFORM:
SIX YEARS LATER, at 1 (May 2012), https://www.kff.org/health-costs/issuebrief/massachusetts-health-care-reform-six-years-later/
[https://perma.cc/HTX2-MZHL]
(evaluating former Governor Mitt Romney’s health reform effort to provide near-universial
health coverage to state residents and the standard it set for similar national efforts).
161

See, e.g., Internal Revenue Service, Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions,
https://www.irs.gov/affordable-care-act/employers/employer-shared-responsibilityprovisions [https://perma.cc/KCA6-XD3E] (“The employer shared responsibility provisions
are sometimes referred to as ‘the employer mandate’ or ‘the pay or play provisions.’”).
162

Jacobson, supra note 146, at 93-94. There exists ample speculation, however, about
how such a challenge would be resolved, if litigated. See, e.g., Chirba-Martin, supra note
155, at 410-11 (arguing that the law is vulnerable to ERISA preemption because it explicitly
targets almost all employers and requires some level of health benefit payment); Edward A.
Zelinsky, The New Massachusetts Health Law: Preemption and Experimentation, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 229, 232 (2007) (reaching a “regrettable conclusion” that ERISA preempts
the Massachusetts law).
163

See Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 410. Vermont enacted a provision similar to
the Massachusetts employer mandate in 2006 and similarly met no litigation challenges to
it. See id. at 412.
164

MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH-GEN. § 15-142 (2007) (“Fair Share Health Care Fund
Act”). See Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180, 198 (4th Cir. 2007)
(Michael, J., dissenting) (“Maryland enacted the Fair Share Health Care Fund Act [] in 2006
to require very large employers, such as Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., to assume greater
165

94

Walmart, required employers with more than 10,000 employees to spend a
minimum of 8% of their payroll on health care, or else pay the difference
between the employer’s actual health care expenditures and the 8% threshold
into a state Medicaid fund. 166 Walmart’s trade association sued.
The Fourth Circuit in Retail Industry Leaders Association v. Fielder held
that ERISA preempted Maryland’s pay-or-play law. 167 The Fielder majority
concentrated on the extent to which Maryland’s law impacted Walmart’s
ability to uniformly administer its benefits nationwide. 168 Fielder framed the
inquiry in terms of choice: A state law that “directly regulates or effectively
mandates some element” of employer plans is preempted, while a law that
“creates only indirect economic incentives that affect but do not bind the
choices of employers” is not. 169 Maryland’s law gave Walmart the choice of
offering 8% payroll in health benefits to its employees, or paying that amount
into the state Medicaid fund. 170
The Fourth Circuit found that “playing” by increasing benefits was, “[i]n
effect, the only rational choice.” 171 Offering the required level of health
benefits would make Walmart a more attractive employer and help it recruit
and retain employees. 172 But “paying” that money to the state instead would
not produce any benefit for Walmart, and might actually harm its employee
morale and public opinion. 173 Because the “pay” option was so undesirable
for the employer, the Fourth Circuit held that the Act “effectively mandates
that employers structure their employee healthcare plans to provide a certain
responsibility for employee health insurance costs that are now shunted to Medicaid.”).
Suffolk County, NY enacted a similar “Wal-Mart” law. See Jacobson, supra note 146, at 94
(Suffolk County’s provision applied only to non-unionized retailers).
MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 15–142(d), (f), (g). See Contreras & Lobel, supra
note 156, at 105-06.
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167

475 F.3d 180, 183 (4th Cir. 2007).

168

Id. at 193.

169

Id.

170

Id.

171

Id.

172

Id.

173

Id.

level of benefits,” and therefore formed an impermissible connection with
ERISA plans. 174
The Maryland Act “directly” targeted an employer, and nudged too hard
on Walmart’s benefits decisions by failing to offer “meaningful alternatives”
for compliance. 175 Further, the majority in Fielder expressed concern that
permitting Maryland to enforce its law would invite other states to regulate
similarly and “force Wal-Mart … to monitor these varying laws and
manipulate its healthcare spending to comply with them.” 176
State pay-or-play laws now must navigate around Fielder to survive
preemption challenge. Shortly after Fielder in 2007, a New York district
court held that “[a]lthough … not bound by the decision of the Fourth Circuit
in Fielder,” a county-level play-or-pay regulation targeting Walmart was
“substantially similar to the Maryland Act” and therefore preempted. 177 But
in 2008, San Francisco’s Health Care Security Ordinance successfully
avoided preemption before the Ninth Circuit in Golden Gate Restaurant
Association v. San Francisco. 178 San Francisco’s 2006 version of pay-orplay survived largely due to its inclusion of the “meaningful alternatives”
missing in Fielder. 179 If Fielder represents the preempted Hobson’s choice
Id. at 193-94 (“The Act thus falls squarely under Shaw’s prohibition of state mandates
on how employers structure their ERISA plans.”) (citing Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96–97). But see
id. at 201-03 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“The Act expresses no preference for one method of
…. . . or the other. . . . ... The Act does not compel an employer to establish or maintain an
ERISA plan . . .… [or] impede an employer’s ability to administer its ERISA plans under
nationally uniform provisions,” or “mandate a certain level of ERISA benefits.”).
174

Id. at 196-97. See Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’nRILA v. Suffolk Cty., 497 F. Supp. 2d
403, 417 (E.D.N.Y. 2007) (“Although the Act provides employers with various alternative
options to comply…, ‘the only rational choice employers have under [the Act] is to structure
their ERISA healthcare benefit plans so as to meet the minimum spending threshold.’). But
see Fielder, 475 F.3d. at 202-203 (Michael, J., dissenting) (“The choice is real” because the
“pay” amount is not “exorbitant.”).
175

176

Id. at 197.

177

See, e.g., Suffolk Cty., 497 F. Supp. 2d at 416.

178

546 F.3d 639, 639 (9th Cir. 2008).

See Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and County of San Francisco, 546 F.3d
639, 660 (9th Cir. 2008) (“In stark contrast to the Maryland law in Fielder, the City-payment
option under the San Francisco Ordinance offers employers a meaningful alternative that
179

96

or forced choice for employer contributions, Golden Gate represents the nonpreempted “meaningful” or true choice.
The San Francisco Health Care Security Ordinance established a city-run
health care program for low-to-moderate income residents. 180 To help capture
and maintain employer health care contributions in funding the program, the
ordinance requires that employers make “required health care expenditures
to or on behalf of” employees at regular intervals. 181 The ordinance set the
“health care expenditure rate” 182 based on the number of hours worked, but
left up to the employers what type of expenditures to make. 183 Employers
had “discretion” in choosing among all possible commercial and private
options. 184 Employers also could choose a mix of different expenditures, as
long as they met the required rate in total spend. 185
The Ninth Circuit observed that the ordinance did not force “creation” of
ERISA plan, require employers to start offering health plans or change any
existing health plans, or demand they provide specific benefits in any
particular way. 186 Rather, the ordinance prescribed only the dollar amount
employers must spend and did not scrutinize much about how they spend the
money or the “benefits derived from those dollars.” 187 Combining a required
expenditure rate with such broad discretion in how to spend it constituted an
“even less direct … influence” on employer benefit decision than the one the
Supreme Court upheld in Travelers. 188
The nature of the choices facing San Francisco employers distinguished
the ordinance from Maryland’s preempted law. The two laws differed litte

allows them to preserve the existing structure of their ERISA plans.”).
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S.F. ADMIN. CODE §§ 14.1-14.8 (2007)

181

S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.3(a). Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 642.

182

S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(68).

183

Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 644.

184

Id.. at 644-45 (citing S.F. ADMIN. CODE § 14.1(b)(7) and ESR Reg. 4.2(A)).

185

Id. at 645-646.

186

Id. at 646, 649-52.

187

Id. at 647.

188

Id. at 656 (citing Travelers, 514 U.S. at 658-59).

in the ultimate expenditure required from employers, with Maryland’s
calculated as a percentage of payroll and San Francisco’s calculated as a flat
dollar amount per hour worked. The Maryland law, however, offered nothing
new for the employer who chose the “pay” option, effectively rendering it a
penalty for not offering suitable health insurance benefits. 189 By contrast, the
ordinance establishing San Francisco’s city-run benefits program “offers
employers a meaningful alternative” to an ERISA plan, and “provides
tangible benefits to employees when their employers choose to pay” the
city. 190 Employers who already offered health care benefits could keep their
ERISA plan, and employers who did not could simply pay the tax and their
employees could rely on the City program. 191 Employers who rely on the
City program would have a way to keep their employees healthy without the
burden and complexity of selecting and administering their own ERISA
plans.
Pay-or-play laws thus survive or fail ERISA preemption based on the
nature of the employer choices they establish and courts’ characterizations of
them. 192 Two years after the Golden Gate opinion, Congress enacted a
federal-level employer mandate in the Affordable Care Act, likely obviating
the urgency for many more states to pursue pay-or-play regulations. 193
Massachusetts repealed its state employer mandate during the initial years of
Affordable Care Act implementation. 194 Some cities and counties,
meanwhile, have continued to pursue expanded health care programs with
some pay-or-play features likely designed with the Fielder-Golden Gate split

189

Id. at 659-60 (quoting Fielder, 475 F.3d at 193, 196).

190

Id. at 660.

191

See id. at 6061.Id.

192

See Monahan, supra note 148 at 1205.

193

See Wiley, supra note 8, at 859 (stating that, “[t]he [pay-or-play preemption] issue
became moot when the ACA federalized the employer mandate, so the question remains
unresolved”).
See Benjamin D. Sommers, Mark Shepard, & Katherine Hempstead, Why Did
Employer Coverage Fall in Massachusetts After the ACA? Potential Consequences of a
Changing Employer Mandate, 37 HEALTH AFF. (2018) (examining employer-sponsored
coverage rates before and after Massachusetts repealed its state-level mandate in 2014).
194
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in mind. For example in 2016, the City of Seattle enacted a Golden Gatestyle ordinance aimed at employer health care contributions for hotel
workers. 195 The ERISA Industry Committee has sued the City, relying on
Fielder to argue that ERISA preempts the ordinance; the litigation remains
ongoing. 196 Massachusetts revived its pay-or-play mandate in 2018,
suggesting that the preemption of pay-or-play provisions remains a relevant
concern despite the ACA’s federal employer mandate. 197
The Supreme Court has not considered ERISA preemption in the pay-orplay context, and litigation outcomes remain unpredictable when navigating
the distinctions between diverging circuit court opinions in Fielder and
Golden Gate. 198 The pair of cases has reverberated beyond the Fourth and
Ninth Circuits. Other courts rely on Fielder and Golden Gate in a variety of
ERISA contexts as exemplars of preempted and permitted employer
incentive impacts, respectively. 199

See Carmen Castro-Pagan, “Seattle Faces Legal Test Over Hotel Worker Insurance
Mandate,” BLOOMBERGLAW.COM (Aug. 14, 2018).
195

196

Id.; ERISA Indus. Cmte. v. City of Seattle, 2:18-CV-01188 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2018).

See Katie Lannan, “Mass. Employers Face New Health Care Assessments in 2018,”
WBUR.ORG (Dec. 29, 2017), https://www.wbur.org/commonhealth/2017/12/29/massemployers-face-new-health-care-assessments-in-2018.
197

See, e.g., Fielder, 475 F.3d at 201 (Michael, J., dissenting) (lamenting the
inconsistency of ERISA preemption holdings); Golden Gate Restaurant Ass’n v. City and
County of San Francisco, 558 F.3d 1000, 1004 (2009) (Smith, J., dissenting from denial of
rehearing en banc); id. at 1001 (Fletcher, J., concurring in panel opinion); The ERISA Indus.
Cmte. v. City of Seattle, 2:18-CV-01188 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 2018) (pending litigation
challenging Seattle pay-or-play ordinance for hotels). See generally, Catherine L. Fisk &
Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over Wal–Mart, 92
MINN. L. REV. 1502, 1514–20 (2008) (arguing that the Fourth Circuit’s majority analysis in
Fielder is inconsistent with recent Supreme Court holdings in other ERISA preemption
cases); Chirba-Martin, supra note 155, at 411 (observing “the unfortunate reality that when
it comes to ERISA preemption litigation, anything can happen”).
198

199

See, e.g., Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 761 F.3d 631, 637 (6th Cir. 2014)
(distinguishing Fielder in a hospital receipts tax context), cert. granted, judgment
vacated, 136 S. Ct. 1355 (2016), aff’d, 827 F.3d 549 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. denied, 137 S.Ct.
660 (2017); Merit Const. All. v. City of Quincy, 759 F.3d 122, 130 (1st Cir. 2014) (citing the
pair of cases in assessing whether compliance with a city public-bidding ordinance “by
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3. Insurance regulation versus self-funded plans
ERISA’s express preemption provision contains an exception: a
“savings” clause that saves from preemption state laws that regulate
insurance. 200 However, the savings clause contains an exception-to-theexception, the “deemer” clause, which has been interpreted to exempt selffunded employer plans from the state insurance regulations saved by the
savings clause. 201 The upshot of the convoluted interplay between ERISA’s
savings and deemer clauses is that states may regulate so-called “fully
insured” employee health plans, but self-funded plans are completely beyond
the reach of state law.
ERISA’s savings clause preserves significant spheres of state regulatory
authority over health insurance. The statute does not define “insurance,”202
but under current ERISA precedent, it saves state laws that are “specifically
directed toward entities engaged in insurance” and “substantially affect the
risk pooling arrangement between the insurer and the insured.” 203
Thus, employers who provide health benefits by buying insurance
policies for their employees must abide by state health insurance regulations
that govern those policies. This method of providing employee health
benefits is known as a “fully-insured” plan because the employer purchases
insurance policies for its employees from an insurance company, who takes
on the contracted risks in exchange for premiums. 204 For these fully-insured
plans, states retain broad authority to regulate. For example, state insurance
rules prohibiting subrogation by health insurance plans affect employer

means of a non-ERISA plan” avoids preemption).
200

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A).

29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S.
724, 747 (1985).
201

Compare 29 § 1144(b)(2)(A) (“nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance”) with 29
§ 1002 (definitions section, no entry for insurance).
202

Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 341–42 (2003) (making
“a clean break from the [three] McCarran-Ferguson factors” in favor of two factors).
203

See, e.g., Kaiser Family Foundation, Employer Health Benefits: 2018 Annual Survey,
175 (2018).
204
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plans’ calculation of benefits but nonetheless avoid preemption under the
savings clause. 205 States also can regulate the insurance policies available for
purchase by employers. States may require that insurers cover certain
services, 206 set rules for underwriting and administration 207 (such as
mandatory open enrollment, community rating, and risk-pooling), 208 and
require that insurers accept all providers willing to meet the plan’s terms
(“any willing provider” laws). 209
Many employers, particularly larger employers, now offer health benefits
a different way: they agree to pay for some portion of their employees’ health
care needs directly from an employer fund, instead of purchasing insurance
policies for them. 210 This form of employer-sponsored health benefit is
known as “self-funded” 211 or “self-insured,” 212 with the “self” referring to the
205

See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 59-61 (1990).

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 731, 746-47
(1985)(holding that states may require specified mental-health-care benefits be provided to
residents in certain employee health-care plans).
206

See, e.g., Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002) (holding
state law requiring external appeals process was enforceable against HMO providing
employer-sponsored coverage).
207

See, e.g., NYS Health Maintenance Org. Conference v. Curiale, 64 F.3d 794, 803 (2d
Cir. 1995) (holding that NY community rating and open enrollment laws were not preempted
because their only connection to employer plans was an "indirect effect on rate
diversification among insurers"); Safeco Life Ins. Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir.
1995) (holding Wisconsin high-risk pool regulations were not preempted by ERISA).
208

See Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 335-37 (2003)
(upholding state “any willing provider” law as within the “business of insurance” under
ERISA). Cf. Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tufte, 297 F. Supp. 3d 964, 982 (D.N.D. 2017)
(holding that ERISA does not preempt state regulation of pharmacy benefit managers –
insurance intermediaries). But cf. PCMA v. Gerhart, 852 F.3d 722 (8th Cir. 2018).
209

See SELF-INSURANCE INSTITUTE OF AMERICA, SELF-INSURED GROUP HEALTH
PLANS, (2018), available at https://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/index.cfm?pageID=4546
[https://perma.cc/96RL-XQCY].
210

GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at Section 10. Employers often safeguard their
funds by purchasing “stop loss” insurance, to protect them if their employees’ health care
claims exceed the fund amount.
211

See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers
Under the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
212
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employer. In 2018, 61% of Americans with employer-sponsored health care
coverage were covered by self-funded plans. 213 By contrast, in the 1970s
when ERISA was passed, only 7% of those with employer-sponsored health
coverage were in self-funded plans. 214 Although the deemer clause does not
mention self-funded plans, the Supreme Court has held that the self-funding
mechanism does not sufficiently replicate the “business of insurance” for the
purpose of regulation, and thus states may not “deem” self-funded plans to
be providing insurance for the purpose of regulating them. 215
This interpretation of ERISA’s savings and deemer clauses means states
may enforce their insurance regulations against fully-insured but not selffunded employer-sponsored health plans. 216 In essence, ERISA preemption
catalyzed the growth of self-funded plans by opening a loophole through
which employers could provide their employees with health benefits and
avoid state insurance regulation. 217 Further, courts have allowed employer
plans to be “self-insured in name only, with the [employer] bearing minimal
risk and most of the risk borne by the insurer” providing stop-loss coverage

SURV. AM. L. 539, 554-56 (2013) (noting no definition of “self-insured” in ERISA, but
tracing definitions through the Internal Revenue Code and Affordable Care Act).
GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at Section 10.

213

Phyllis C. Borzi, There's "Private" and Then There's "Private": ERISA, Its Impact,
and Options for Reform, 36 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 660, 661 (2008).
214

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (holding
that self-insured plans are exempt from state insurance regulation under the “deemer”
clause).
215

See FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 61 (“We read the deemer clause to exempt
self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘regulat[e] insurance’ within the meaning of
the saving clause,” thus preemption state anti-subrogation law applied to self-funded plans).
216

See Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Mark A. Hall, Self-Insurance for Small Employers
Under the Affordable Care Act: Federal and State Regulatory Options, 68 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 539, 552-54 (2013); Chirba-Martin & Brennan supra note 126, at 146; Russell
Korobkin, The Battle over Self-Insured Health Plans, or “One Good Loophole Deserves
Another”, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L., & ETHICS 90 (2005). But see FMC Corp., 498 U.S.
at 68 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that, “The number of self-insured employee benefit
plans grew dramatically in the 1960's and early 1970's.”).
217
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to the employer. 218
ERISA’s savings clause thus allows states to regulate 40% of the
employer-sponsored insurance market that is fully insured, but the deemer
clause preempts the same state regulation as applied to the remaining 60% of
employer self-funded plans. 219 The diminishing practical distinction between
fully insured and self-insured plans strains credulity. 220 Yet this technical
distinction triggers ERISA preemption for self-funded plans and thereby
frustrates state efforts to enact uniform health care reforms, 221 as self-funded
plans have swallowed the savings clause.
ERISA thus painfully illustrates how indeterminate an express
preemption provision can be, spawning a dense, shifting body of precedent
with relatively little predictive value.
B. State Single-Payer Plans under ERISA
The intricate threat of ERISA preemption appears to have informed state
legislative drafting in the most recent waves of single-payer legislation. 222

218

Jost & Hall, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined., at 554.

219

See Korobkin, supra note 217, at 136.

See FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 65 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court's construction
of the statute draws a broad and illogical distinction between benefit plans that are funded
by the employer (self-insured plans) and those that are insured by regulated insurance
companies (insured plans).”)
220

See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 134, at 294. See also Gregory Acs, et al., Self-Insured
Employer Health Plans: Prevalence, Profile, Provisions, and Premiums, 15 HEALTH AFF.
266, 267 (1996) (ERISA “limits many of the health care financing and cost containment
initiatives that states have considered” and “[b]ecause self-insured plans do not have to
comply with state mandated benefits, ERISA prevents states from legislating a minimum
benefit package for all of their residents.”).
221

As detailed in part I, supra, state single-payer plans establish broad eligibility and
coverage rules, then employ one or more types of provisions to fund the plans and draw
enrollees from private coverage into the plan. These provisions typically involve payroll and
income taxes (Type A – Funding Plans), restrictions on provider reimbursement outside the
state plan (Type B – Provider Restrictions), and some means of recouping state-plan
payments for those who continue to maintain employer coverage (Type C – Assignment,
Subrogation, Secondary-Payer). See Figure 2, supra.
222
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Many provisions in the single-payer plans outlined in Part I fall well beyond
ERISA’s preemptive reach because they address the state’s operation of its
own plan and do not “relate to” employer-sponsored health plans, including
the resident eligibility, cost-sharing, comprehensive coverage, and care
coordination provisions. 223 Similarly, the provider eligibility and rate-setting
provisions, as well as rate setting for medical goods like prescription drugs,
target core features of the health care market without regard to employer
plans, and with permissibly tangential effects on them. 224 They have a strong
foundation in Supreme Court precedent 225 and should easily survive litigation
challenge.
The crucial provisions for capturing employer health care spending and
moving employees onto the state single-payer plan, however, face a difficult
path through the ERISA preemption labyrinth. As the analysis below
concludes, the Type A, B, and C provisions should survive preemption under
current ERISA doctrine and precedent. Yet the opaque nature of ERISA
doctrine, courts’ unpredictable application of it, and employer trade
associations’ propensity to sue also mean that litigation is virtually
guaranteed, while the result in any particular litigation is not.
1. Type A—Funding Plans
State individual income taxes, meant to capture employees’ contributions
to premiums and cost-sharing, do not trigger ERISA preemption because they
do not target or impact employers. Employer payroll taxes also should easily
survive preemption under Travelers. Payroll taxes keyed to employers’
health care expenditures, however, may need to navigate through the
See Part I.A, infra (listing examples of these common provisions). Cf. Rush
Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002) (holding state law dictating
plan administration was enforceable against HMO providing employer-sponsored coverage);
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747 (1985) (state-mandated
coverage of particular services, as applied to employer plans, not preempted as regulating
insurance).
223

224

See Part I.A, infra (providing examples).

E.g., Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 336 (2003)
(upholding state “any willing provider” law as within the “business of insurance” under
ERISA); Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65; Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 840; De Buono, 117 S.Ct.
at 1747.
225
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impenetrable hash of appellate precedent on pay-or-play laws, which
obscures prediction.
Although states enjoy fairly wide latitude on how they raise revenues,
Type A’s payroll taxes ultimately could influence employers’ benefit
decisions and therefore may run afoul of ERISA preemption. Assessments
targeting particular employers and offering the employer nothing in return,
as in Fielder, 226 and/or setting the tax rate exorbitantly high 227 may exert a
preempted level of influence on the employer’s benefit plan decisions. On
the other hand, laws that preserve discretion for employers on how to meet a
required health care expenditure rate and that offer tangible options for
employers that choose pay instead of play, as in Golden Gate, create the kind
of “legitimate alternatives that survive preemption. 228
The payroll taxes in Funding Plans have several structural advantages
over the pay-or-play assessments in Fielder and Golden Gate. First, payroll
tax provisions do not depend on the existence or amount of employers’ health
benefits and need not make any mention of them. Payroll taxes are calculated
as a percentage of the wages paid to employees. 229 The lack of an explicit
reference to employer plans, and the fact that the tax is assessed without
regard to existing ERISA plans or plan choices helps legislation of Type A
pass through ERISA preemption’s first “relates to” hurdle. 230
Second, a payroll tax is far less likely than pay-or-play assessments to
have an impermissible “connection” to ERISA plans via its indirect economic
effects on employers’ decisions whether to offer health benefits. 231 In
Travelers, the Supreme Court posited that ERISA would preempt a
226

See Fielder, 475 F.3d at 196.

See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (speculating that “an exorbitant tax” might leave
employers “with a Hobson’s choice,” but holding that the tax at issue was not exorbitant).
227

228

See Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 660-61.

229

See Brittain, supra note 61, at 110.

See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656 (using “reference to” as one definition of “relates to”);
Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 325 (warning that laws may “relate to” ERISA plans by “act[ing]
immediately and exclusively upon ERISA plans” or by making “the existence of ERISA
plans essential to the law’s operation.”).
230

231
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Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668; Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 146-48.

hypothetical state law that did not directly regulate ERISA plans, but still
“produce[d] such acute, albeit indirect, economic effects … as to force an
ERISA plan[‘]s” choice of substantive coverage or source of insurance. 232
This hypothesis may guide states’ calculation of the amount of a payroll tax.
Set the payroll tax too low, and employers might may still want to provide
health benefits to attract employees. This could preserve a “meaningful
choice” for employers, as in Golden Gate, but may compete with the state’s
plan and erode the goals of single-payer. 233 A higher payroll tax should make
it less rational for employers to continue to offer its own health benefits and
pay the tax, though still not run afoul of ERISA preemption by its indirect
economic effects. At some point, a payroll tax could become so “exorbitant”
as to leave only a “Hobson’s choice.” 234 But the Supreme Court has yet to
define that point and the state single-payer laws surveyed here do not appear
to approach it.
For courts still tempted toward preemption by the indirect incentives of a
payroll tax, Type A’s establishment of a state health insurance program
should help it survive preemption under the reasoning of Golden Gate and
Fielder. While Maryland’s pay-or-play law created only one “rational”
choice for employers because the “pay” option still left their employees
without insurance, 235 the establishment of a public insurance program in
Golden Gate created the “meaningful alternative” essential to the pay-or-play
law’s survival. 236
The Type A payroll tax has a third advantage over pay-or-play laws,
which is that it is not tied to any particular benefit levels or coverage decisions

The Supreme Court in Travelers speculated that an “exorbitant” tax would force a
Hobson’s choice, but upheld a less-than-exorbitant one. Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.
232

Payroll taxes are all pay – the choice is either pay or pay-and-play. The employer
pays the state fund either way.
233

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 664 (upholding a state surcharge of up to 24% on commercial
insurance claims paid to hospitals).
234

Fielder, 475 F.3d at 196. The Fourth Circuit apparently ignored the fact that many
Walmart employees would be eligible for Medicaid.
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Golden Gate, 546 F.3d at 661.

by employers. 237 Circuit courts have upheld taxes of general applicability
with indirect impacts on employer choices. 238 And the ordinance in Golden
Gate dictated that employers spend a certain amount on employee health care,
allowed them to satisfy their expenditure by offering benefits, and gave them
wide discretion about how to do so if they chose. The Type A payroll tax
does even less nudging than the Golden Gate ordinance because it does not
dictate that employers spend funds on employees at all. The payroll tax
would thus have little or no impact on decisions about covered services,
funding levels, or plan administration.
Last, the payroll tax enjoys some advantage in that it because it does not
impose additional administrative or compliance burdens on employers or
their ERISA plans. Instead, it might actually relieve some existing burdens.
If an employer chooses to offer benefits and pay the tax, its benefits plan
would not be subject to any additional compliance requirements in the singlepayer state. If an employer chooses to pay the tax and drop coverage, it sheds
some existing compliance burdens under both ERISA and state laws.
Reliance on a state-program in one state creates “disuniformity” for
multistate employers’ benefit plans, it does so in a way that would ease the
employers’ burdens in the single-payer state, furthering a “primary objective”
of ERISA to minimize administrative burden. 239 Concerns for nationwide

State taxes specifically targeting employee benefit plans or based on the value of
benefits provided by a plan have been invalidated. See Birdsong v. Olson, 708 F.Supp. 792,
798-99 (W.D. Tex.1989) (state tax on the insurance company administrative fees for ERISA
plans was preempted); National Carriers v. Heffernan, 454 F.Supp. 914, 915 (D. Conn.1978)
(preempting state law imposing tax on employers maintaining employee benefit plans, based
on the amount of benefits paid annually). But see General Motors Corp. v. California Bd. of
Equalization, 815 F.2d 1305, 1309-10 (9th Cir.1987) (premium tax on insurance companies,
which included ERISA plans, not preempted under the savings clause).
237

E.g., Self-Ins. Inst. of Am., Inc. v. Snyder, 827 F.3d 549, 553, 557-558 (6th Cir.
2016), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 660 (2017) (holding that Michigan’s one–percent tax on all
“paid claims” by “carriers” or “third party administrators” for services rendered was not
preempted because the tax “does not directly regulate any integral aspects of ERISA.”).
238

Compare FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60 (1990) (“To require plan providers
to design their programs in an environment of differing state regulations would complicate
the administration of nationwide plans, producing inefficiencies that employers might offset
with decreased benefits.”) with Retail Indus. Leaders Ass’n RILA v. Fielder, 475 F.3d 180,
239
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uniformity and multi-state compliance burdens helped doom the pay-or-play
law in Fielder, the anti-subrogation laws in FMC Corp., and the all-payer
claims database in Gobeille, while Golden Gate found that some light
recordkeeping and reporting did not rise to the level of concern. 240
As the Supreme Court has recognized, “[a]ny state tax, or other law, that
increases the cost of providing benefits to covered employees will have some
effect on the administration of ERISA plans, but that simply cannot mean that
every state law with such an effect is preempted by the federal statute.”241
Despite strong arguments that a general payroll tax preserves employer
discretion and decreases the burdens of providing benefits, its underlying
intent to nudge employers to drop coverage in favor of the state’s single-payer
plan has a whiff of employer choice to it such that states should expect
litigation challenges. The actual outcome of those challenges, especially in
circuits other than the Fourth and Ninth, 242 remains difficult to predict.
2. Type B—Provider Restriction
State laws that channel all payments to providers through the single-payer
entity likewise should survive preemption, though their operation still raises
some ERISA preemption concerns. Type B legislation restricts providers
from accepting payment from any third parties other than the state
program. 243 These provider restrictions avoid explicit “reference to”
employer insurance 244 and by targeting providers, rather than employers,
191 (2007) (describing uniformity and minimizing administrative burden as ERISA’s
“primary objective”).
See Golden Gate, 546 F.3d. at 645, 657 (noting that employers providing self-funded
health plans could use an average expenditure and not track actual per-employee spend, and
that the ordinance’s recordkeeping and inspection requirements did not create conflicting
directives that would burden employers or their plans because those recordkeeping
requirements exist regardless of the ordinance). But cf. Gobeille, 136 S. Ct. at 943 (holding
claims data reporting requirements preempted despite that self-funded plan administrators
already collected the required data).
240
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De Buono, 117 S.Ct. at 1753.520 U.S. at 816.
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And probably the Sixth, too. Self-Ins. Inst., 827 F.3d at 553.

See Part I.V.2, supra. The Type B proposals commonly contain an exception for
federal programs that lack an approved waiver.
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Travelers, 514 U.S. at 656.

situate themselves in the realm of provider regulation that typically avoids
ERISA preemption. 245
The provider restriction would, by design, have indirect influence on
ERISA plans because those plans would no longer be able to find a network
of providers who could accept their reimbursement. Whether this influence
crosses the preemptive coercion line from Travelers and DeBuono 246 will
determine the preemption question. Prohibiting providers from accepting
reimbursement from commercial payers, including employer plans, should
effectively force employers to drop coverage, 247 or at least to make major
modifications in how they administer their plans. 248 The shift wrought by the
provider restriction could invite litigation based on the murky precedent on
what constitutes an impermissible “connection with” ERISA plans. The most
logical reading of provider restrictions, however, is that they avoid ERISA
preemption by targeting providers.
3. Type C—Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary Payer
The addition of a subrogation, assignment, or secondary payer provision,
typically included in Type C legislation, mitigates the state law’s coercive
impact by giving the employer plan a way to exist, funneling the plan’s
reimbursements through the state single-payer entity. Although mostly
similar in function, subrogation may prove slightly more suspect than
assignment or secondary payer provisions due to some tricky precedent. 249
See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65; Dillingham, 117 S.Ct. at 840; De Buono,
117 S.Ct. at 1747. Cf. Mass. Med. Soc’y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 790, 791–92 (1st Cir.
1987) (holding that the Medicare Act did not preempt a state law prohibiting balance billing
because provider regulation is traditionally a state concern).
245
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See, e.g., Travelers, 514 U.S. at 659-65; De Buono, 117 S.Ct. at 1747.

247

See Travelers, 514 U.S. at 668.

See Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 148 (preemption laws that “govern[] a central matter of
plan administration,” or “interfere[] with nationally uniform plan administration”).
248

See id. at 147 (The “payment of benefits [is] a central matter of plan administration,”
and at state law requiring plan administrators to go beyond the plan documents to determine
beneficiaries is a preempted burden); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 60-61 (1990)
(holding that a state law prohibiting insurer subrogation from a tort claimant’s recovery was
“related to” employer plans because it would interfere with the plan’s usual financial
calculations in that state and “frustrate plan administrators’ continuing obligation to calculate
249
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None of the Type C provisions change the amount the employer plan will
spend on claims – by design, they maintain employer plans’ existing
calculation of benefits. 250 Secondary payer provisions also do not alter the
process of payment, while subrogation and assignment provisions merely
redirect the existing payments from providers to the state single-payer entity.
Type C provisions thus minimize the impact on claims payment, though they
pose some preemption risk because claim payment is a sacred and “central
matter of plan administration.” 251
In Egelhoff, for example, the Supreme Court held ERISA preempted a
state probate statute automatically assigning a beneficiary after divorce
because the law created too much of an administrative burden on multistate
employers. 252 The majority in Egelhoff was particularly concerned that
because of the state law, “[p]lan administrators cannot make payments simply
by [reading] the plan documents” and “[i]nstead [] must familiarize
themselves with state statutes” to determine whether state law has revoked
the plan’s named beneficiary. 253
The secondary payer provisions in Type C preserve the status quo of
claim payment for employers who choose to continue offering benefits and
therefore do not implicate ERISA. The subrogation and assignment
provisions in the Type C category in some circumstances redirect payments
from an ERISA plan and therefore could invite litigation, though they, too,
ought to survive preemption challenge under the logic of Supreme Court
uniform benefit levels nationwide,” and that ERISA’s savings clause saved the state antisubrogation law only with respect to fully-insured plans because it “directly control[led] the
terms of insurance contracts”).
250

See, e.g., id., at 61.

Cf. Gobeille, 136 S.Ct. at 945 (reporting claim information “intrudes upon ‘a central
matter of plan administration’” and therefore is preempted) (quoting Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at
148); Fort Halifax Packing Co. Inc., v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9, (1987) (“making
disbursements” is central to plan administration). But cf. OR SB 631 (2017), § 15(2), (3)
(explicitly referencing employer plans in subrogating the state entity “to the rights of any
participant that has a claim against an . . . employer, third party administrator, … or any other
person that may be liable for the cost of health services provided to the participant.”).
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Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 150.

253

Id. at 148-49.

precedent. Type C provisions do not intrude on any provisions in ERISA
plan documents as between the plan and its beneficiaries – they primarily
govern the relationship between the single-payer plan and the individual,
allowing the single-payer to assert the individual’s right to payment for
covered services. 254 They do not, therefore, “bind[] plan adminsitrators to a
particular choice of rules for determining beneficiary status,” as Egelhoff had
preempted. 255 If, however, an ERISA plan contains a provision prohibiting
the beneficiary from assigning rights, several Circuit Courts of Appeal
recently held that these clauses enforceable, despite that ERISA itself “does
not provide clear guidance” on the issue. 256
Further obscuring the arguments, the Supreme Court has opined that
ERISA does not premept “trivial” burdens imposed on plan administration
by the need to review different state law requirements. 257 But it has not
clarified principles for triviality, which invites litigation. Type C’s
assignment and subrogation provisions will redirect ERISA plan payments,
but whether they may do so without significantly burdening plan
administration in the eyes of a court remains unclear.
Ultimately, the combination of the features of Types A, B, and C, like in
Ohio’s bill, creates an even more “meaningful alternative” or “legitimate
choice” for employers in the single-payer system. The existence of the
subrogation mechanism in the unified provider payment system opens an
avenue for employers to maintain their plans’ relationships with providers, as
well as to make use of the state plan infrastructure supported by the payroll
tax revenue. Further, combining the tax in Type A with a Type B provider
254

Travelers, 514 U.S. at 661, 664.

255

Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 147-42.

E.g., Univ. Spine Ctr. v. Aetna, Inc., Dkt. 18-2842 (slip op. at 6) (3d Cir. May 16,
2019) (citing Am. Orthopedic & Sports Med. V. Independence Blue Cross Blue Shield, 890
F.3d 445, 451 (3d Cir. 2018)). Note also that subrogation does not create a preempted state
remedy under § 502. ERISA does not address the assignment of beneficiaries’ claims and
the use of a state subrogation provision in these circumstances does not create inconsistencies
with ERISA’s underlying policies., See, e.g., Brown v. American Intern. Life Assur. Co. of
New York, 778 F. Supp. 912, 917 (S.D. Miss. 1991) (courts should develop federal common
law of ERISA with the aid of state law, as long as state law is consistent with ERISA’s goals).
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E.g. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. at 151.

payment system enables a state to achieve the desired results with at a lower
tax rate. The lower the tax rate, the less likely it will be held to be
“exorbitant” and therefore preemptively coercive of employer benefits
decisions. 258 At a lower tax rate, an employer could rationally choose to both
pay the tax and continue offering its ERISA plan.
While the arguments against preemption for subrogation, assignment, and
secondary payer provisions are the stronger ones, the impenetrable pile of
ERISA precedents and courts’ difficulty applying them frustrate
predictability, while fueling litigation.
4. Non-Duplication Provisions
Many of the bills of all three Types contain nonduplication provisions
prohibiting insurers from offering state-plan-covered health benefits. These
backstop provisions are intended to remove commercial competitors to the
single-payer plan benefits and permit insurers only to offer “wraparound”
services that supplement the single payer coverage. Nonduplication
provisions directly target insurers, rather than employers, but have the
intended effect of eliminating employer-based coverage and shifting covered
employees to the single-payer plan. Employers still could choose to self-fund
health insurance for their employees, or to rely on the state plan and offer
wraparound insurance as a benefit. Like other types of insurance regulation,
the preemption analysis of states’ nonduplication provisions would diverge
for fully insured and self-funded plans.
Assuming a court would find nonduplication provisions have an
impermissible connection to employer-sponsored insurance, ERISA’s
savings clause would restore the nonduplication provision for those
employers offering fully insured health benefits. To avoid preemption, a state
law must (1) be specifically directed toward entities engaged in insurance,
and (2) substantially affect the risk-pooling arrangement between insurer and
insured. 259 The nonduplication provisions impose prohibitions on insurers,
satisfying the first requirement. The prohibition on covering state-plan
services and benefits substantially affects the risk-pooling arrangement by
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Travelers 514 U.S. at 664-65; De Buono, 520 U.S. at 815.
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Kentucky Ass'n of Health Plans, Inc. v. Miller, 538 U.S. 329, 334-38 (2003).

removing the state-plan services from coverable risks. The only risks an
insurer may cover under nonduplication are those wraparound services not
covered by the state plan. While nonduplication provisions prohibit
coverage, the savings clause logic saves them in precisely the same way that
laws requiring coverage or underwriting have been saved. 260 As long as state
regulation of the insurance industry affects risk-pooling, it does not matter
whether the law expands or contracts risks in the pool.
As to self-funded plans, however, the nonduplication provision would
remain preempted and therefore ineffective. For example, California’s S.B.
562 contained a nonduplication provision that prohibited “carriers” from
offering coverage for services that are covered under the state’s single payer
plan. 261 The bill’s definition of “carrier” included insurers licensed by the
state’s insurance department and “health care service plans” as defined under
the state’s managed care law, the Knox-Keene Act. 262 Prior cases have held
that the Knox-Keene Act’s regulation of “health care service plans” is
preempted by ERISA with respect to self-funded employer plans. 263 With
existing precedent carving self-funded employee health benefit plans from
California’s definition of a “health care service plan,” SB 562’s
nonduplication provision for health care service plans would also be
inapplicable to self-funded ERISA plans.
The application of the deemer clause means that employers could offer
self-funded benefit plans that duplicate the state single-payer plan, as well as
covering additional services. If employers chose to continue self-funding
under the state single-payer system, preemption would keep this significant
segment of lower-risk people out of the state plan’s risk pool, threatening its

See id. at 336 n.1; Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747
(1985); Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 370-87 (2002); Safeco Life Ins.
Co. v. Musser, 65 F.3d 647, 648 (7th Cir. 1995); Pharm. Care Mgmt. Ass'n v. Tufte, 297 F.
Supp. 3d 964, 982 (D.N.D. 2017).
260
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CA SB 562 (1006.12)(g) (nonduplication).

CA SB 562 (100602(f)), (definition of ‘carrier’ and Knox-Keene definition of health
care service plan).
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Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Barnes, 425 F. Supp. 1294, 1300 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 571
F.2d 502 (9th Cir. 1978).
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sustainability. 264 Because of ERISA preemption, nonduplication provisions
will not work to move self-funded employers to the single-payer plan. Thus,
states must turn to other tools, such as the payroll tax in Type A or the
provider restrictions in Type B to make the choice to self-fund benefits
offered by the state plan considerably less attractive to employers, yet this
meaningful choice would remain available in both theory and reality.
___
Types A, B, and C logically should survive preemption, and
nonduplication provisions may be preempted only as to self-funded plans.
But the muddle of ERISA jurisprudence renders actual outcomes uncertain.
The only certainty in ERISA preemption is that there will be litigation.
C. Drafting ERISA-Resistant Single-Payer Legislation
A state single-payer proposal’s ability to survive an ERISA preemption
challenge is an important consideration for financing the single-payer plan as
well as for achieving the solidarity aims of single-payer coverage. The most
ERISA-resistant single-payer program would contain all three elements
described above: (A) a funding plan; (B) a provider restriction; and (C) an
assignment, subrogation, and/or secondary payer provision. The more
diversified or redundant the state’s portfolio of policy tools to achieve singlepayer, the more resistant it may be to challenges to any one of the provisions.
States would be well-served to exclude any explicit references to
employers’ benefit plans in their employer contribution provisions, 265 but
courts ultimately will judge state efforts on how they impact ERISA plans.266

Cf. Amy B. Monahan & Daniel Schwarcz, Will Employers Undermine Health Care
Reform by Dumping Sick Employees?, 97 VA. L. REV. 125, 146-53 (2011) (explaining that
even employers with large-group plans engage in risk selection among employees). See
generally MARILYN J. FIELD & HAROLD T. SHAPIRO, EDS., EMPLOYMENT AND HEALTH
BENEFITS: A CONNECTION AT RISK 167 (1993). (“In general, because large employers almost
universally provide health benefits and have more predictable costs, large groups present
fewer problems with risk selection than either individuals or small groups.”).
264

E.g., Board of Trade, 506 U.S. 125, 130 (1992) (holding state law specifically
referring to employee benefit plans preempted “on that basis alone”).
265

E.g., Dillingham, 519 U.S. at 328 (holding that state law which can function
irrespective of ERISA plans does not impermissibly “reference” ERISA plans).
266
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A funding plan combining payroll and income taxes captures employer
expenditures and individual spending, which provides incentives for both
employers and employees to drop their employer-based coverage in favor of
single-payer coverage. Payroll taxes should not be preempted by ERISA, but
courts have reached contradictory conclusions, which invite litigation. By
combining individual income taxes, which are never preempted, with payroll
taxes, state single-payer plans can set a lower payroll tax rate more likely to
survive challenge.
Provider restriction provisions create additional incentives for employees
to drop their employer-plans by shrinking the network of participating
providers in employer-based plans. ERISA generally does not preempt
provider regulation, even if it has indirect effects on employee benefit
plans. 267 Compared with nonduplication provisions prohibiting the sale or
offer of coverage that duplicates benefits covered by the single-payer, a
provider restriction is less likely be preempted with respect to self-funded
ERISA plans. If they survive, provider restrictions could fill an important gap
created by ERISA preemption of nonduplication provisions, shrinking
consumers’ demand for employer-based plans and creating incentives for
participation in the single-payer plan.
Provider restrictions become more powerful when paired with an
assignment/subrogation/secondary payer provision to allow the single payer
to capture additional employer and other third-party payers’ expenditures by
seeking reimbursement for claims paid by the single payer for patients with
dual coverage. 268 There are strong arguments that the way
assignment/subrogation/secondary payer provisions work in the single-payer
context would not be preempted by ERISA. 269 Thus, pairing a Type B
(provider restriction) with a Type C (assignment, subrogation, secondary
payer) provision would create additional mechanisms beyond tax incentives
to pull individuals into the single-payer plan and to capture third-party
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See text accompanying notes 147-154, supra.
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See supra notes 81-98 and text accompanying notes.

269

See supra notes 249-258 and text accompanying notes.

expenditures, both of which would be resistant to ERISA preemption. 270
A state may want to pursue an ABC, belt-and-suspenders approach to
increase the overall durability of the plan through diversification of policy
tools. For example, having elements B and C could preserve the single-payer
system even if the payroll tax is preempted by ERISA. 271 If a court
erroneously invalidated a payroll tax, a severability provision in the state
statute might permit conversion of the state’s mandatory single-payer payroll
tax into a pay-or-play option, like the San Francisco ordinance upheld in
Golden Gate. 272 Under those circumstances, a state with a pay-or-play payroll
tax would be better off if it also has a provider restriction and a
subrogation/assignment/secondary payer provision, because the latter
elements could take on more of the work of pulling enrollees and employer
expenditures into the single-payer system. In a pay-or-play system, many
more employers and employees would likely retain their employer-based
coverage, so the incentives created by the Type B and C elements would
become more critical to creating a broad and unified single-payer system.
Given the tenuousness of the politics of establishing a single-payer
system, a state legislature may be interested in building a redundant system,
utilizing an A-B-C approach, that can continue to stand even if preemption
erodes one mechanism to move money or enrollees into the system. The
legislature may be better able to patch or fix a system that continues to
function, even in a diminished form, rather than return to the voters and the
floor of the chamber to design a new single-payer system from scratch. It is
better to build a durable program that can withstand some degree of attack,
letting the endowment effect of newly acquired benefits take hold to protect
the system from political repeal in the face of a challenge. 273
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See text accompanying notes 94-95, supra.

We think this is the wrong result, as explained above, but ERISA jurisprudence is
nothing if not incoherent and unpredictable.
271

272

See text accompanying notes 178-191, supra.

See, e.g. Erin C. Fuse Brown, Developing a Durable Right to Health Care, 14 MINN.
J. L. SCI. TECH. 439, 481-85 (2013).
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III. ERISA REFORM AS HEALTH REFORM
The recent wave of state single-payer legislation painfully illustrates
how ERISA preemption – and the uncertainty that swirls around it –
undercuts states’ potential role in health reform. This project focuses on state
single-payer bills as emblematic of the kind of bold experimentation and
testing-ground often associated with state law in a federal system, 274 and on
ERISA preemption’s subversion of that role. Over the past 50 years, federal
health care statutes have established a regulatory infrastructure with baseline
protections and federal funding sources, inviting states to participate in
implementation and experimentation. 275 ERISA, meanwhile, prohibits state
experiments largely without substituting a comprehensive federal scheme for
employer-sponsored health benefits, leaving a regulatory void.
ERISA preemption sets a federalism trap that can derail ambitious state
reforms – particularly those state reforms focused on universal coverage and
cost control. After exposing the trap, we propose four potential federal
reforms to ERISA that would pave the way for meaningful state health reform
within the federal system.
A. The Federalism Trap
Volumes have been written about the role of federalism in health care. 276
The debates often conceive of a scale of power between states at one pole and
the federal government at the other and focus on either determining the
optimal balance point between the poles or what legal or policy structures
promote or inhibit federalism’s various goals. 277 This Article sidesteps those
See, e.g. Abbe Gluck & Nicole Huberfeld, What is Federalism in Health Care For?
70 STANFORD L. REV. 1689, 1689 (2018); Kristin M. Madison, Building a Better Laboratory:
The Federal Role in Promoting Health System Experimentation, 41 PEPPERDINE L. REV. 765,
766 (2014).
274
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See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 274.

See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 8; Bobinski, supra note 134; Gluck & Huberfeld, supra
note 274; Greer & Jacobson, supra note 141; Jerry L. Mashaw & Theodore R. Marmor, The
Case for Federalism and Health Care Reform, 28 CONN. L. REV. 115 (1995); Richard
Nathan, Federalism and Health Policy, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1458 (2005); Wendy E. Parmet,
Regulation and Federalism: Legal Impediments to State Health Care Reform, 19 AM. J.L. &
MED. 121 (1993).
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Compare Bagley, supra note 8, at 4 (“For health reform, the federal government

federalism questions, and instead starts with an assumption that some degree
of health care federalism—a division of power between the federal
government and the states—is desirable to achieve health policy goals,
whether they are increasing coverage, controlling costs, improving quality,
or broader equitable aims. 278 Federalism can improve policy by allowing
states to innovate, test, and learn from experimental models. 279 Federalism
also can enhance democratic goals of self-governance, divided power,
pluralism, and government responsiveness. 280
In health care, there are numerous political, economic, and historical
reasons to prefer federal reforms. Politically, state “health reform” cuts both
ways – some states aim for universal coverage and patient protections, others
pass health laws restricting access, perpetuating discrimination, and
responding to inaccurate assumptions. 281 Though federal legislation is not
inherently prone to protecting access, federal baseline protections can guard
against discrimination and codify evidence-based solutions, counteracting
local prejudices. 282 Economically, federal reforms enjoy the advantages of
economies of scale and deficit spending, as well as cost-control power in

really is the only game in town.”); with Mashaw & Marmor, supra note 276, at 117 (“What
is both practical and desirable varies enough to make federalist variation both normatively
attractive and politically wise as an alternative to national stalemate.”)
See Gluck & Huberfeld, supra note 274, at 1788 (noting that access, costs, and quality
are “some of many potential outcome metrics commonly used—and fought over—in health
policy circles.”).
278

New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J., dissenting)
(describing states as laboratories for experimentation).
279

Robert R.M. Verchick & Nina Mendelson, Preemption and Theories of Federalism,
in PREEMPTION CHOICE 32 13-14 (William W. Buzbee, ed., 2009).
280

See, e.g., J. Craig Wilson & Joseph Thompson, “Nation’s First Medicaid Work
Requirement Sheds Thousands from Rolls in Arkansas,” HEALTH AFFAIRS BLOG (Oct. 2,
2018).
281

See, e.g., Elizabeth Y. McCuskey, The Body Politic: Federalism as Feminism in
Health Reform, 11 ST. LOUIS U. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 303, 306 (2018); Valarie K. Blake,
An Opening for Civil Rights in Health Insurance After the Affordable Care Act, 36 B.C. J.L.
& SOC. JUST. 235, 275–76 (2016).
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interstate markets. 283 Historically, the decades before the ACA witnessed the
widespread failure of state regulation to rein in cost and expand access to
care, with the exception of Massachusetts’s bold universal coverage
experiment and a handful of other state reforms. 284 The ACA then built
comprehensive federal reforms on the results of Massachusetts’s
experiment. 285 The decade since the ACA’s enactment has also witnessed
some of federalism’s pitfalls, as a shift in the federal Executive has
undermined the ACA’s core protections and encouraged states to pursue
variations that contradict the purposes of federal laws, while receiving
funding provided by those laws. 286
So, without deciding where the balance between state and federal
authority should lie, we accept that some level of power-sharing between
states and the federal government is normatively desirable both as an
instrumental means to improve health of the population and as a democratic
ideal of diffusion of power and allowing diversity of policy solutions to
reflect a diversity of political preferences.
This project’s central federalism concern is that ERISA is an extremely
anti-federalist statute, 287 which contravenes nearly all federal health care
statutes by not allowing for state flexibility, variation, or indeed any state
regulation of self-funded ERISA plans. 288 In health care regulation, ERISA
283

See Greer & Jacobson, supra note 141 at 217.

E.g., Niraj Chokshi, “Historians take note: What America looked like before
Obamacare,” WASH. POST. (March 26, 2014). Some part of states’ historical struggles to
effectively manage health care costs and access stems from ERISA’s preemption
hamstringing system-wide reforms. See Part II.A, supra.
284

See Jonathan Oberlander, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: The Promise and
Limits of Health Care Reform, 41 J. HEALTH POLITICS, POL’Y & L. 803, 805 (2016).
285

See, e.g., Nicole Huberfeld, Can Work Be Required in the Medicaid Program?, 378
N. ENGL. J. MED. 788-791 (March 1, 2018); Timothy S. Jost, “Using the 1332 State Waiver
Program to Undermine the Affordable Care Act State by State,” COMMONWEALTH FUND
BLOG (Oct. 30, 2018).
286

Brendan S. Maher, The Benefits of Opt-In Federalism, 52 B.C. L. REV. 1733, 1765
(2011) (“ERISA, in effect, lashes much of the country’s benefit rules to a single federal mast
in a ship captained by judges. It is a classic piece of anti-federalism.”).
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See Part II.B., supra.

is an interloper. ERISA was not originally intended to target health care, but
the expansion of employer-sponsored health benefits to reach 49% of the U.S.
population has wrought unintended consequences. 289 Most federal statutes
that intentionally regulate health care coverage, like Medicare, Medicaid, and
the ACA, contain provisions that enable states to pursue policy experiments,
while ERISA does not. 290 For example, Medicare heavily favors federal
control without obstructing states’ interests. 291 By contrast, ERISA is both
heavily federal and largely deregulatory for health care benefits, 292 so the
balance is struck not in favor of federal regulation over state regulation, but
in favor of deregulation over state regulation.
Indeed, as interpreted by the courts, ERISA preemption places selffunded employer plans beyond the reach of all manner of state health
regulation, not just those that seek to mandate health benefits, but also
reforms that seek to increase health coverage, to control health care costs, or
even to seek information about health care prices. 293 While the rest of the
federal health law infrastructure invites some level of state regulation, ERISA
obstructs the potential benefits of state experimentation and diversity. States
See, e.g., Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights Despite ERISA: Will the
Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL. L. REV. 951, 952-53
(2000); Wooten, supra note 102, at 31-35.
289

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1103-05. Further, ERISA
significantly affects the U.S. health care financing system, yet it is administered by the
Department of Labor, rather than the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services.
290
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See Parmet, supra note 276, at 143.

Id. at 135-136, 140. ERISA preemption has a particularly deregulatory tilt for health
care benefits as opposed to pensions (which it heavily regulates), but federal preemption
generaly has a deregulatory effect. ERNEST A. YOUNG, FEDERAL PREEMPTION AND STATE
AUTONOMY, IN FEDERAL PREEMPTION: STATES’ POWERS, NATIONAL INTERESTS 263
(Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2007) (“[P]eemption will generally have a
deregulatory impact”). The ACA diluted ERISA’s deregulatory effect on employee health
benefits by extending several health plan benefit and administrative rules to employer-based
health plans as well as increasing state regulatory authority over non-group plans. See
Brendan S. Maher, Radha A. Pathak, Enough About the Constitution: How States Can
Regulate Health Insurance Under the ACA, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 275, 276-277 (2013).
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See Erin C. Fuse Brown & Ameet Sarpatwari, Removing ERISA’s Impediment to
State Health Reform, 378 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 6 (2018).
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that seek to enact reforms to expand access or rein in their health care costs
are needlessly hamstrung because ERISA preemption places a large portion
of the market entirely beyond their regulatory reach. 294 ERISA preempts
state reforms without regard to policy or party – if, for example, a state
wanted to pass a law prohibiting employers from offering contraceptive
coverage, ERISA would preempt that, too. But ERISA preemption’s effects
have a lopsided impact on state efforts aim at at expanding access to
insurance.
One risk of ERISA’s federalism trap is regulatory failure for health
care—particularly stasis and a system that fails to reflect the preferences of
the states’ citizens. 295 If the federal government fails to act, ERISA’s broad
preemption means the states cannot step in to solve the problem. Broad
federal preemption eliminates beneficial institutional diversity from
federalism: “[i]f one set of regulators fails to address the problem, another set
provides an alternative avenue for relief.” 296
Further, ERISA preemption’s 1974 concerns for multisatate employers
and interstate commerce have had the effect in health reform of elevating the
interests of private, employers above those of a sovereign state: in essence,
placing Walmart’s preferences above California’s and giving private
businesses the power to veto state laws in the absence of Congressional
See Borzi, supra note 214, at 661 (noting that even as of the 1990s the half of covered
workers who were in self-insured plans were “beyond the reach of state insurance
regulators.”); Parmet, supra note 276, at 135-36 (noting ERISA’s preference for interstate
uniformity and antiregulatory bias creates doubt as to the viability of state single-payer health
reform.). Note, however, that many other forces complicate states’ ability to achieve these
goals, such as the federal tax preference given to employer-sponsored health insurance and
many states’ inability to deficit spend in times of recession due to balanced-budget laws.
See, e.g., Bagley, supra note 8, at 4.
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See William W. Buzbee, Asymmetrical Regulation: Risk, Preemption, and the
Floor/Ceiling Distinction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1547, 1576 (2007)(noting that with regard to
“broad federal preemption . . . recent ceiling preemption assertions create heightened risks
of dysfunction and stasis.”)
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Robert A. Schapiro, From Dualism to Polyphony, in PREEMPTION CHOICE 344
(William W. Buzbee, ed., 2009). See also, Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1576 (critiquing broad
federal preemption for how it “displaces multilayered institutional arrangements offering
different actors, venues, and modalities for addressing a social problem.”)
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action. 297
The common policy justification for ERISA’s sweeping preemption is
that nationally uniform employee benefit rules enable multi-state employers
to offer health coverage. 298 But this emphasis on national uniformity is
overblown and outdated. As Justice Blackmun recognized in Metlife, stateby-state disuniformities “are the inevitable result of the congressional
decision to “save” local insurance regulation.” 299 ERISA’s legislative history
does not indicate that Congress intended total national uniformity for health
benefit plans, or for multi-state employers to defeat this traditional area of
state regulation for such a broad swath of the population. 300 To the extent
that Congress thought about health benefit plans at all when it drafted ERISA,
it would have assumed that the vast majority of employers would continue to
use fully-insured plans and be subject to varying state insurance laws under
the savings clause. 301 Over time, interpretations of the deemer clause have
left almost 30% of the population’s health coverage untouchable by state
laws, including state health reforms. 302

Broad schemes of federal preemption tend to benefit the deregulated industry while
sacrificing the preferences of states. See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1590-92. Congress
could, of course, remedy these failings by imposing federal regulations. Thus subsequent
Congresses should share some of the blame for this failure.
297

Rush Prudential HMO, Inc. v. Moran, 536 U.S. 355, 402(2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he Court would do well to remember that no employer is required to provide
any health benefit plan under ERISA . . . [The state law] independent review provisions
could create a disincentive to the formation of employee health benefit plans, a problem that
Congress addressed by making ERISA's remedial scheme exclusive and uniform.”).
298

299

Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 747(1985).

See, e.g., Borzi, supra note 214, at 663; Donald T. Bogan, Protecting Patient Rights
Despite ERISA: Will the Supreme Court Allow States to Regulate Managed Care?, 74 TUL.
L. REV. 951, 952-53, 964-65 (2000).
300

See Borzi, supra note 214, at 661 (“[E]ven if some in Congress had thought about
the effect on health plans, they probably would have believed that the insurance savings
clause in ERISA’s preemption provisions would have been sufficient to address any future
problems. ”)
301

Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 51 (noting that 49% of the population has
employer sponsored coverage); GARY CLAXTON ET AL., supra note 51, at Section 10 (noting
that 61% of those with employer-sponsored coverage are in self-funded plans). So 49% *
302
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Just as the 1974 Congress did not contemplate the exemption of selffunded employer health plans when it passed ERISA, it likewise responded
to very different employer incentives to provide health benefits in the first
place. In the past four decades, the ACA’s national employer mandate, the
creation of a sizeable tax-break for employers’ health benefits, and shifting
labor market demands cast doubt on the assumption that employers will
abandon health coverage in response to state regulations. 303 Further, many
single-state and small-size firms self-fund to take advantage of the regulatory
vacuum without any claim to the advantages of multi-state uniformity. 304
In sum, ERISA elevates the convenience of employers over state
sovereignty and sacrifices the federalism benefits of states as engines of
policy innovation. 305 The upshot of courts’ voluminous and tortured ERISA
preemption jurisprudence is that it is so concerned with shielding multi-state
employers from having to comply with 50 states’ employee benefit
regulations that it is willing to trade away the ability of a sovereign state to
shape the health care system for its millions of citizens.

61% = 29.89% of the U.S. population).
See, e.g., Michelle Long et al., Kaiser Family Foundation, Trends in EmployerSponsored Insurance Offer and Coverage Rates, 1999-2014, at 5, 8 (Mar. 2016),
http://www.nationaldisabilitynavigator.org/wp-content/uploads/news-items/KFF_trends-inemployer-sponsored-insurance_March-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7X7-AV2H].
303

See, e.g., Jay Greene, Even Small Employers Are Striking Out on Their Own,
Managed
Care
Magazine,
May
28,
2019,
https://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2019/6/even-small-employers-are-strikingout-their-own (last visited Sept. 12, 2019). Indeed, because of the ready availability of stoploss insurance, smaller employers can self-fund for an extremely narrow band of risk, in
order to take advantage of the deemer clause. Id.
304

There are critiques of the “state sovereignty” account of federalism. However, even
critics acknowledge that states’ play a key democratic role in today’s federalism. See, e.g.,
Heather Gerken, Federalism 3.0, 105 CAL. L. REV. 1695, 1722 (2017):
305

The state’s democratic role is just as important as its regulatory one. To be sure,
states aren’t independent mini-polities, resolving their own questions entirely as
they see fit. But they aren’t just convenient polling places for national debates,
either. Instead, states are the front lines for national debates, the key sites where
we work out our disagreements before taking them to a national stage. States
aren’t pushed aside by national politics; instead, they fuel it.
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B. Clearing a Path for State Health Reform
ERISA preemption is a federal problem that demands a federal solution
to clear the way for meaningful state health reforms. We explore four
possible solutions targeting health benefits – three legislative and one
jurisprudential. First, Congress could replace ERISA’s broad “any and all”
preemption with conventional “floor preemption,” congruent with other
federal health care statutes. Second, Congress could eliminate ERISA’s
deemer clause for health benefit plans to remove the impenetrable barrier of
preemption that currently shields self-funded employer-based plans from any
state health regulation. Third, Congress could add a statutory waiver
provision to ERISA that would allow states to apply to the federal
government for approval to deviate from federal requirements in provision of
health coverage. Fourth, as a fallback option if the first three legislative
solutions are unavailing, courts could curtail the scope of ERISA preemption
and reinvigorate the “presumption against preemption” for state authority
over health care regulation in a way that is closer to Congress’s original
legislative intent for ERISA. The first solution, ERISA floor preemption, is
the most elegant and would restore state flexibility and remove ERISA’s
barriers to state innovation and health reform. However, the third solution,
ERISA waiver, might be the most politically achievable.
1. Altering ERISA’s Preemption Provisions
Congress could address these problems by heeding the frequent calls to
amend ERISA’s regulatory preemption provision, § 1144 (also known as
§ 514) in a couple ways. These statutory fixes ultimately are elegant but
likely not politically feasible in the foreseeable future.
The first potential amendment would be for Congress to replace ERISA’s
broad “relates to” express preemption with traditional floor preemption. 306

To implement floor preemption in ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) could be amended as
follows:
306

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this
subchapter and subchapter III shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section
1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section
shall take effect on January 1, 1975.only to the extent that such State laws actually

124

Floor preemption allows the federal government to establish a national
standard that displaces less stringent state laws, but it permits more stringent
state regulation. 307 Floor preemption acts as a “one-way ratchet,” preserving
only those state laws more protective than the federal floor. 308 By contrast,
ERISA’s current express preemption provision displaces “any and all” state
laws that “relate to” employee benefit plans, 309 which means all state laws
that make reference or bear a connection to employer-based health plans are
preempted, whether or not they conflict with federal requirements. 310
Floor preemption would restore some power-sharing between the state
and national authorities and would be more consistent with other federal
health care statutes’ approaches to federalism and preemption. 311 It also
allows a degree of federal uniformity in the setting of the floor, but balances
this federal standard with state flexibility, so long as the state laws are
consistent with and no less protective than the federal floor. Floor preemption
offers a more desirable solution than broad federal preemption because
multiple levels of governments bring institutional diversity, more
opportunities for regulatory reexamination, and can serve as antidotes to
regulatory stasis or failure. 312 In the context of single-payer health care,
changing ERISA preemption to floor preemption would allow states with the
political will to reform their health care systems to do so, for other states and
conflict with the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III. State laws that
impose requirements in addition to the provisions of this subchapter and subchapter
III shall not be superseded.
See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1554 (“Federal floors preclude less stringent state and
local regulation, but allow for additional and more stringent regulation and typically are
accompanied by savings clauses and cooperative regulatory structures.”).
307

308

See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1566.
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29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

310

See Fuse Brown & Sarpatwari, supra note 293, at 6-77.

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1122-1123 (discussing the use
of conflict preemption—a type of floor preemption—in the ACA, HIPAA, and other federal
statutes).
311

See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1576 (suggesting that floor preemption, as an
alternative to ceiling preemption, utilizes institutional diversity and is less likely to risk
dysfunction)..
312
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the federal government to learn from these state experiments, and for
diversity in policy choices that may better reflect the desires of the people in
those states. Floor preemption also increases interaction between the federal
and state governments, which improves policymaking through joint
regulation, mutual learning, regulatory improvement, and regulatory
competition. 313
To be sure, there are critics of floor preemption, namely from the business
community. One critique is that floor preemption sacrifices the uniformity
and certainty of a single national standard. Broad federal preemption often
tilts toward deregulation, particularly if the federal law acts as a ceiling—a
regulatory maximum—rather than as a floor. 314 If the national standard
serves as a floor and not as a ceiling, then it eliminates the possibility that
states will engage in pro-business deregulatory competition. 315 Thus,
businesses may abandon their position in favor of states’ rights if the states
are only able to innovate in a pro-regulatory direction under the one-way
ratchet of floor preemption. Of course, the ordinary workings of conflict
preemption doctrine would still preempt state regulations that contradict
federal law in ERISA, and our floor preemption proposal could state so
explicitly. 316
Second, Congress could amend ERISA’s deemer clause to eliminate its
applicability to health benefit plans. 317 This could be accomplished by
simply deleting 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B), or by adding language to the
clause stating that it does not protect employers’ self-funded health benefit
plans. 318
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See Gerken, supra note 305, at 1720.

314

See Buzbee, supra note 295, at 1579.

See Michael S. Greve, Business, The States, and Federalism’s Political Economy, 25
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 895, 903 (2002).
315

See n.306, supra; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank,
510 U.S. 86, 99 (1993) (finding “traditional preemption analysis” applies even in context of
ERISA’s express preemption language).
316

317

See Bobinksi, supra note 134, at 342-343.

318

For example, 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(B) could be revised to read:

Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not
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Either revision would close the deemer clause’s loophole in the savings
clause, the-exception-within-an-exception that shields self-funded health
plans from state insurance regulation. Thus all health benefit plans, whether
self-funded or fully insured, would be subject to state insurance laws that are
saved by ERISA’s savings clause. The deemer clause, as interpreted by the
Court, deems self-funded health benefit plans to operate outside the business
of insurance, and exempts them from state insurance regulations. 319 As noted
above, when Congress wrote ERISA and the deemer clause in 1974, most
employer-based health plans were fully insured, not self-funded. 320
Moreover, the text of deemer clause is not a model of clarity and was only
interpreted to exempt self-funded plans from the state insurance regulation
by the Court more than a decade after ERISA was passed. 321
Eliminating the deemer clause would not automatically open up
employer-based plans to all state regulation—only to those state laws
regulating insurance. 322 In the context of state single-payer, eliminating the

exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the
purpose of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be
deemed to be an insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment
company or to be engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law
of any State purporting to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust
companies, or investment companies. This provision shall not apply to any “employee
welfare benefit plan” established or maintained by an employer that provides medical care
for participants or their dependents directly or through insurance, reimbursement, or
otherwise.
See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. at 747, 105 S. Ct. at 2393 (“[O]urWe are
aware that our decision results in a distinction between insured and uninsured plans, leaving
the former open to indirect regulation while the latter are not. By so doing we merely give
life to a distinction created by Congress in the “deemer clause,” a distinction Congress is
aware of and one it. . . has chosen not to alter.”); FMC Corp., 498 U.S. at 61 (“We read the
deemer clause to exempt self-funded ERISA plans from state laws that ‘“regulat[e]
insurance’” within the meaning of the saving clause.”)
319

320

See text accompanying note 301.

See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 739-40 (1985); FMC Corp., 498 U.S.
at 6152.
321

This is because the deemer clause is an exception from the savings clause, which
only saves state insurance regulation from preemption. See Part II.A.2.c, supra.
322

127

deemer clause’s distinction between self-funded and fully insured plans
would allow the non-duplication provision to avoid preemption and could put
the subrogation/assignment/secondary payer provisions on surer footing.323
However, it is less clear whether an employer mandate to participate in the
state single-payer plan or payroll taxes would be considered health insurance
regulation.
The main drawback of eliminating the deemer clause for health benefit
plans is the loss of regulatory uniformity, which could increase the costs of
these plans by exposing self-funded plans to state insurance laws, such as
benefit mandates (e.g., to cover fertility services) and state premium taxes.324
This conventional policy argument in favor of broad ERISA preemption for
self-funded plans is not clearly supported by the empirical literature. 325 State
benefit mandates’ effect on firms’ decision to self-fund their health benefits
is mixed, 326 and self-funded premiums are not necessarily cheaper than
premiums for purchased insurance. 327 Other factors beyond avoiding state
regulations also drive employers’ decisions whether to self-fund or purchase
insurance. 328 In short, it is unclear that exposing self-funded health plans to
state insurance laws would increase the costs of these plans. Without a
deemer clause, employers could still self-fund their health plans to take

323

See discussion in Parts II.B.3 and II.B.4, supra.

Roger Feldman, Why Do Employers Self-Insure? 37 GENEVA PAPERS 696, 697
(2012). According to industry self-report, the other incentive to self-fund is to retain the
“float” of interest on funds not paid as premiums to an insurer. Id.
324

325

See, e.g., id.

Christina M. Dalton & Sara B. Holland, Why Do Firms Use Insurance to Fund
Worker Health Benefits? The Role of Corporate Finance, 86 J. RISK & INSURANCE 183, 1875
(2017).
326

327

Feldman, supra note 324, at 708.

For example, firm size, the ability of employers to engage in risk-assessment to
negotiate fees with third-party administrators, and the availability of external capital to fund
firm investments may contribute to decisions to self-insure. See Dalton & Holland, supra
note 326, at 1853 (explaining that “when firms face costly external finance, they are more
likely to purchase insurance. Purchasing insurance reduces the risk that health benefit
payouts will tie up internal funds and force the firm to raise additional outside investment
capital.”); Feldman, supra note 324, at 709.
328
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advantage of nonregulatory financial incentives; they would just be subject
to state health insurance laws. There is no evidence that the employers would
drop coverage altogether given labor market demands, favorable taxtreatment of health benefits, and the ACA’s employer mandate. 329
Nevertheless, large, self-funded firms argue that their costs would increase if
their health plans were subject to state regulation. 330
A more practical concern is the political difficulty of convincing
Congress to eliminate the deemer clause’s applicability to self-funded health
plans. Large, multi-state employers would oppose any change to ERISA that
would expose them to additional state regulations. This group’s powerful
lobby would argue that any alteration to ERISA preemption that subjects
employers to multiple state regulations would increase their administrative
burden and stifle private market forces. 331
2. Adding an ERISA Waiver
Alternatively, Congress could preserve ERISA’s preemption baseline,
but add a statutory waiver mechanism authorizing the Secretary of Labor to
waive ERISA preemption provisions for states pursuing health care reforms.
A statutory waiver would not clear the path for all state reforms; it would lift
the gate for certain state efforts, based on review and approval by federal
agencies. And it would complement the waivers in other federal statutes
(notably Medicaid and the ACA) necessary to fully fund a state single-payer
plan. 332
Congress has used statutory waivers with increasing frequency over the
past few decades to infuse statutory structures with flexibility, 333 to mitigate

See Long et al., supra note 303, at 5 (noting that data from the National Health
Interview Survey does not indicate that employer coverage is “diminishing in its importance”
despite the changes that accompanied the Affordable Care Act)).
329

See Self-Insurance Institute of America, Self-Insured Group Health Plans,
https://www.siia.org/i4a/pages/Index.cfm?pageID=4546 [https://perma.cc/4VXF-4UAU].
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See Bagley, supra note 8, at 12. (“[B]ecause of the intensity of the business lobby's
resistance to limiting ERISA's preemptive scope, Congress is very unlikely to amend the law
to address the concern”).
331
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See, e.g., Wiley, supra note 50.

333

See David J. Barron & Todd D. Rakoff, In Defense of Big Waiver, 113 COLUM. L.

the federalism impacts of nationwide rules, 334 to encourage supervised state
experimentation, 335 and sometimes to suspend preemption. 336 Waivers may
support state experiments with federal funding, as well as access to the
nationwide perspective and substantive expertise of federal agencies, 337 a
model frequently employed in federal health care coverage statutes.
Amending ERISA to add a statutory waiver mechanism for its preemption
provisions in 29 U.S.C. § 1144 could accomplish all of these goals.
ERISA currently has no waiver provision and arguably delegates no
waiver authority to the Department of Labor over state regulations.338
Although ERISA allows the federal agency to coordinate with states on
enforcing the federal statute, 339 ERISA does not expressly delegate the power

REV. 265, 278 (2013) (identifying the phenomenon of “big” waivers that suspend the core
tenets of federal statutes).
See id.; Martin A. Kurzweil, Disciplined Devolution and the New Education
Federalism, 103 CAL. L. REV. 565, 567–68 (2015) (discussing waivers in federal education
law).
334

E.g., 42 U.S.C. §§1315, 1396n (2012) (Medicaid’s state experimentation waivers);
42 U.S.C. § 18052 (Affordable Care Act’s “State Innovation” waiver). See McCuskey,
Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1127-36 (describing the purposes and effects of the
ACA’s State Innovation waiver); Nicole Huberfeld et al., Plunging into Endless Difficulties:
Medicaid and Coercion in National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius, 93 B.U.
L. REV.1, 29 (2013) (discussing the role of waiver in Medicaid); Sidney D. Watson, Out of
the Black Box and into the Light: Using Section 1115 Medicaid Waivers To Implement the
Affordable Care Act's Medicaid Expansion, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y & ETHICS 213,
214(2015) (discussing the 1115 waiver’s role in Medicaid).
335

Cf. 49 U.S.C. § 5125(e) (Federal Highways Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d) (Energy Policy
and Conservation Act); 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b) (Clean Air Act).
336

337

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1151-56.

ERISA does not expressly provide authority for the federal agencies to waive
statutory requirements on behalf of states. ERISA does, however, authorize the Secretaries
of Labor and Treasury to waive certain substantive and administrative requirements on
behalf of employers, plans, and participants. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 1023(a)(3)(A), (4)(A);
§§ 1082(c) - 1084; § 1132(c)(10); § 1132(l)(3); § 1202(b); § 1203(a); § 1202a(a);
§ 1025(a)(2)(A) (Notes). And the statute expressly saves a few specific categories of state
laws on insurance and fraud. E.g., 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144a; § 1150; § 1191(a)(1), (b)(1) & (b)(2).
338
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29 U.S.C. § 1136(a) (2012).

to waive its preemptive effects, as many other statutes have done. 340 Absent
such an express delegation or waiver, an agency’s power to waive preemption
is hazy at best;, 341 despite that an agency’s views on the preemptive effect of
its substantive regulations may merit some deference. 342 The statute does
contain one exemption for Hawaii’s 1974 health reform law, which does not
operate as a waiver. On June 12, 1974 – three months before ERISA was
enacted 343 – Hawaii passed a law requiring employers in the state to provide
health coverage for employees, either by purchasing a state-approved plan or
funding their own. 344 In 1983, Congress amended ERISA to exempt
Hawaii’s 1974 law from the “relates to” preemption provision, but narrowed
the exemption with several corollary provisions. 345 No other state has a
Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (Medical Devices Amendments); 42 U.S.C. § 7543 (Clean Air
Act); 42 U.S.C. § 6297(d) (Energy Policy and Conservation Act); 49 U.S.C. § 5125(e)
(Federal Highways Act). Cf. 21 U.S.C. § 360k (Medical Devices Amendments).
340

Cf. Nicholas F. Bagley, “The Labor Department and Liberty Mutual v. Gobeille,”
THE
INCIDENTAL
ECONOMIST
BLOG
(Jan.
6,
2016),
https://theincidentaleconomist.com/wordpress/the-labor-department-and-liberty-mutual-vgobeille/ [https://perma.cc/E73U-VVRH] (arguing that Justice Breyer’s suggestion “that the
Labor Department should have a say in whether [state] law is preempted” is correct and “that
Scalia’s concerns about the Labor Department’s authority are misplaced”).
341

E.g., Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 577 (2009) (applying Mead and Skidmore to
conclude that “[t]he weight we accord the agency's explanation of state law's impact on the
federal scheme depends on its thoroughness, consistency, and persuasiveness”). See
Catherine Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 449, 471-72 (2008) (illustrating that Supreme Court decisions since 1992 on
products liability preemption have “aligned with the relevant underlying federal agency’s
take on preemption”).
342

343

President Ford signed ERISA into law on September 2, 1974 (Labor Day).

See Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-3(8), 393-11 (1974).
Hawaii employers must pay “at least one-half of the premium” and the employees’ remaining
share cannot exceed 1.5% of their wages. HAW. REV. STAT. § 393-13.
344

See 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (stating that the “relate to” preemption “shall not apply
to the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act”). First, the Hawaii exemption applies only to the
original 1974 state law and administrative updates to it. § 1144(b)(5)(B). Second, the Hawaii
exemption does not extend to “any State tax law relating to employee benefit plans.” §
1144(b)(5)(A). Third, the Hawaii exemption states that ERISA reporting requirements and
fiduciary responsibilities do supersede the Hawaii Act, but notes that the Department of
Labor may use its “cooperative arrangements” delegation to “assist” Hawaii “in effectuating
345
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statutory exemption from ERISA. Without a state waiver mechanism, the
issue of state flexibility mostly mostly gets hashed out in the chaotic and
reactive realm of preemption litigation. 346
An ERISA preemption waiver could mirror some of the substantial
flexibility in other federal health care statutes, including Medicare, Medicaid,
and the ACA, emphasizing the value of state policy innovation by allowing
states to apply to the federal government for approval to deviate from federal
standards. 347 These waivers delegate to an agency the power to suspend
certain core statutory rules by approving state applications for waivers. 348 To
receive a waiver, states typically must demonstrate the ways in which their
proposed variations would further federal goals. 349 An ERISA waiver could
create a process whereby states apply to the Department of Labor for a waiver
of any or all of § 1144’s preemption provisions to pursue state reforms. To
focus an ERISA waiver on health reform, 350 the provision could specifically
apply only to state laws impacting employee welfare benefit plans, excluding
pension plans. Our proposed statutory revision, adopted by the National
Council of Insurance Legislators and available at their web page, provides an
example of how to reform ERISA with a waiver. 351

the policies” of those state provisions still subjected to preemption. § 1144(b)(5)(C).
346

57.

See discussion in Part II.B., supra. See generally McCuskey, supra note 21, at 1153-

See 42 U.S.C. § 18052 (providing the ACA’s waivers for State Innovation) Barron
& Rakoff, supra note 333, at 278 (describing paradigm “big” waivers); 42 U.S.C. § 18052
(providing the ACA’s waivers for State Innovation); McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra
note 21, at 1127-37.
347

348

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1127-37.

See id. Cf. Christen Linke Young, Pay or Play Programs and ERISA Section 514:
Proposals for Amending the Statutory Scheme, 1 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 197,
235 (2010) (arguing that “any system of federal agency de-preemption would require
statutory criteria by which state or local programs could be evaluated”).
349

350

And potentially to diminish objections to the amendment based on pension concerns.

NCOIL Health Insurance and Long Term Care Issues Committee, “Health Reform
Waiver
Proposal”
(Dec.
7,
2018),
available
at
http://ncoil.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/12/ERISA-1144-Waiver-Proposal-12.7.18.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8VP9-YF3J]..
351
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From a federalism perspective, an ERISA waiver offers several
theoretical benefits. Federal baseline regulation with an option for state
waivers restores some of states’ autonomy and ability to experiment with
policy solutions to benefit their citizens. 352 From an institutional competence
perspective, an ERISA preemption waiver would shift some of the authority
over state health reform options from courts to agencies, relying on agencies’
substantive expertise rather than courts’ preemption precedents. 353 This shift
portends benefits not only in the availability of state health care reforms, but
also in the transparency, participation, and federalism dimensions of health
care regulation. 354 Because Congress initiates the statutory waiver, this
mechanism also has advantages over agency preemption clarifications or
rulemaking, 355 namely that it explicitly authorizes the agency action and
conclusively effectuates the suspension of preemption for approved
applications. 356
To maximize these benefits, the statutory waiver should provide for
coordination between the Departments of Labor, Treasury, and Health &
Human Services for purposes of both expertise and efficiency. A
coordination provision would enable Labor to draw on the health insurance
and market expertise of HHS in determining which waiver applications
satisfy the substantive criteria. 357 And, a provision for cross-referencing state
ERISA waiver applications with their ACA, Medicaid, and Medicare waiver
applications would enable states to pursue all the waivers needed for
352

See Part III.B, supra.

See, e.g., McCuskey, supra note 21, at 1153-56, Meltzer, supra note 110, at 39;
Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727 (2008).
McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note , at 1153-56.
353

354

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1162-64.

See, e.g., Michael Serota & Michelle Singer, Maintaining Healthy Laboratories of
Experimentation: Federalism, Health Care Reform, and ERISA, 99 CAL. L. REV. 557, 60004 (2011) (arguing for DOL clarification of preemption via guidance or rulemaking).
355

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1157-62 (detailing the
reviewability and review of the ACA’s 1332 waiver). Cf. Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555
(2009) (refusing deference to agency’s statement about the preemptive intent of its
authorizing statute and the preemptive effect of its own regulations).
356
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See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1155.

transformative health system changes, while giving the federal agencies a
comprehensive view of the state’s proposal. 358
Of course, the details of legislative drafting will matter enormously, and
the guardrails imposed on agency discretion to grant or deny state waiver
applications will determine the ultimate efficacy of any waiver
mechanism. 359 As the administration of Medicaid and ACA waivers have
illustrated, an agency’s discretion in granting waivers may prove exceedingly
political and threaten the statute’s core infrastructure. 360 Yet this may prove
less of a concern in the context of ERISA preemption waiver because the
provision being waived – preemption of additional state regulatory efforts –
arguably threatens only the uniformity of regulation large employers enjoy,
and does not threaten ERISA’s regulations protecting employee benefits.
Proposals to add a waiver to ERISA are neither new, nor entirely
academic. In the early 1990s, as states pursued reforms to deal with rising
health care costs and growing ranks of uninsured citizens, 361 several members
of Congress introduced proposals for ERISA waivers that would permit
specific universal coverage reforms in their own states, 362 reminiscent of the
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 18052(a)(5) (providing for combined Medicaid 1115 and ACA 1332
waiver applications to go to HHS). But see McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21,
at 1152-53 (warning about allowing the ACA 1332 waiver’s expansive outlook to “bleed
over” into consideration of the narrower Medicaid 1115 waiver); Marea B. Tumber, The
ACA's 2017 State Innovation Waiver: Is ERISA a Roadblock to Meaningful Healthcare
Reform, 10 U. MASS. L. REV. 388 (2015).
358

See McCuskey, Agency Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1151-53. E.g., NCOIL Health
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See, e.g., McCuskey, Statutory Sabotage, supra note 2; Rachel Sachs, “Medicaid
Expansion Through Section 1115 Waivers: Evaluating The Tradeoffs,” HEALTH AFFAIRS
BLOG
(Mar.
15,
2016)
https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20160315.053925/full/
[https://perma.cc/3XDX-SXT2]; Watson, supra note 335.
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See generally Lawrence D. Brown & Michael S. Sparer, Window Shopping: State
Health Reform Politics in the 1990s, 20 HEALTH AFF. 50 (2001) (articulating three phases of
state health reform from 1990 to 2000).
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See Devon P. Groves, ERISA Waivers and State Health Care Reform, 28 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 609, 635-44 (1995) (cataloging legislative proposals by Senators and
Representatives from Washington, Vermont, Kentucky, Minnesota, New York, and
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Hawaii exemption Congress had enacted in 1983. 363 Others introduced more
ambitious legislation that would catalyze and fund state universal health care
efforts, supported by administrative waivers of ERISA. 364 When those bills
stalled, House members from Hawaii, New York, Minnesota, and Maryland
tried to pass two-year ERISA waivers for their states’ reforms, 365 but those
stalled, too. 366 After the Clinton Administration’s efforts at federal health
reform failed in 1994, 367 a bipartisan group of senators introduced another
bill that would fund state reform efforts, supported by expansion of the
savings clause and specific preemption waivers for Hawaii, Oregon,
Minnesota, Washington, and Connecticut. 368 That bill also died in
Congress. 369
The Affordable Care Act era has seen some recent revival of ERISA
waiver legislation, couched in efforts to tweak the ACA’s Section 1332
waiver process. In 2018, a group of Democratic Representatives introduced
Maryland, which would have waived aspects of ERISA – all of which “failed miserably” to
pass in 1992-1993).
363

29 U.S.C. §S 1144(b)(5)(A)-(C).

E.g., State Care Act of 1992, S. 3180, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Senators
Patrick Leahy (VT) and Ron Wyden (OR)); The State-Based Comprehensive Care Act of
1992, H.R. 4218, 102d Cong. (1992) (introduced by Washington Rep. Jim McDermott)
[supported]. See Groves, supra note 362, at 640.
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See Jonathan Oberlander, Learning from Failure in Health Reform, 357 N. ENG. J.
MED. 1677 (Oct. 25, 2007) (describing the failure of the Clinton Health Security Act); Walter
A. Zelman, The Rationale Behind the Clinton Health Care Reform Plan, 13 HEALTH AFF. 9
(1994) (describing the plan before its failure).
367
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reprinted in 140 Cong. Rec. S13, 354-70 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1994) (discussed in Groves,
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the "State-Based Universal Health Care Act” (SBUHCA) which would,
among other provisions, add an ERISA preemption waiver within the ACA’s
1332 waiver infrastructure. 370 The ACA’s existing 1332 waiver provision
already permits the Department of Health & Human Services to waive the
ACA’s federal employer mandate under certain circumstances, 371 but the
proposed SBUHCA modification would give the Department of Labor some
authority to suspend ERISA preemption for states enacting ACAreplacement legislation. 372 Couching the ERISA preemption waiver within
the ACA 1332 infrastructure would slightly limit the scope of the preemption
waiver because the state’s application must be part of an effort to replace the
ACA, and the Department of Labor’s grant of any such waiver must stay
within the “guardrails” established by the ACA. 373 SBUHCA, too, died in
Congress without a vote. 374
Despite these efforts, ERISA preemption stands untouched as an
obstruction of health care federalism, and an obstacle to state health reform
efforts – even to those that further the aims of existing federal law. As our
research illustrates, the post-ACA wave of state single-payer proposals
interacts with ERISA preemption obstacles in some ingenious ways. 375 But
the indeterminacy of ERISA’s preemption language, the opacity of ERISA
preemption jurisprudence, and the centrality of employer-based health care
funding force state legislation to contort and wriggle through exceedingly
narrow pathways with the expectation of a potential challenge through
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370
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(2018),
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26 U.S.C. §4980H (enacting the federal employer mandate). See McCuskey, Agency
Imprimatur, supra note 21, at 1129, 1131-33 (explaining the ACA’s 1332 waiver authority
over to the insurance mandates, as well as limitations on that authority).
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litigation. 376 An ERISA preemption waiver would alleviate some of the
pressure of ERISA preemption for promising state experiments, while
maintaining a federal baseline of preemption. 377
As with any statutory revision, its implementation depends on political
will. 378 Recent Congresses with majorities politically opposed to the ACA
have shown increased appetite for statutory waiver and state experimentation,
at least rhetorically. 379 But the current administration has granted statutory
waivers in ways that erode statutory goals, arguably exceeding the delegated
authority. 380 Additionally, the ACA’s imposition of a nationwide employer
mandate and other insurance-related requirements draw from some of the
baseline arguments about ERISA’s deregulatory “uniformity” function for
the majority of fully-insured plans. 381 And the ACA’s creation of
opportunities for pass-through funding and other statutory waivers for states
signals that waiver and state experimentation are core features of ongoing
reform efforts. 382 Amending ERISA with a statutory waiver for preemption
seems even more urgent and more feasible at this moment in health reform.
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3. Shoring up ERISA Preemption Jurisprudence
Even without Congressional intervention, courts could strike a better
balance between federalism and national uniformity in ERISA preemption by
restoring some gestalt principles of ERISA preemption jurisprudence. As
described in Part II, courts could more precisely apply the Supreme Court’s
ERISA precedent from Travelers 383 by limiting “relates to” preemption only
for those state statutes that eliminate all meaningful choice of health benefits
for employers, 384 rather than extending preemption to state laws that merely
make one choice less economically desirable than another. 385
And courts could return to some jurisprudential principles which mitigate
in favor of state regulation, namely the presumption against preemption and
the broader intent behind the ERISA statute. Supreme Court ERISA
jurisprudence since Travelers has framed preemption analysis with the
longstanding presumption against preemption, which the Supreme Court has
acknowledged applies with even greater force to regulation in historical
spheres of state authority, such as insurance and health care. 386 While the
presumption against preemption does not itself save state laws, 387 it should
favor preservation of historically state authority – such as regulation of
insurance, health care providers, and raising general revenue – in close
cases. 388 Self-funded plans, however, remain nearly unreachable by state
laws under existing interpretations of deemer and savings clauses, despite the
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presumption against preemption. 389
On a more fundamental level, courts could interpret ERISA’s preemption
provisions with greater fidelity to the statute’s context and history, which
suggest that employee benefit protection and the preservation of state
insurance laws ought to feature more prominently than the current obsession
with uniformity. Congress’s primary concern in enacting ERISA was
“promot[ing] the interests of employees and their beneficiaries in employee
benefit plans” 390 To gain support from large employers toward that broader
goal, ERISA included the employer-friendly preemption clause designed “to
permit nationally uniform administration of employee benefit plans.” 391 The
inclusion of the savings clause, however, explicitly contemplated a regulatory
regime embracing state-by-state “disuniformities” in the law of health
insurance. 392 Courts analyzing preemption often focus on the goal of
employer-friendly uniformity and neglect both the savings clause and the
statute’s broader employee-protection goal. 393 Courts would do well to
recognize the import of ERISA’s savings clause and the statute’s broader
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employee-protection goal, as measured against the bounded uniformity in the
concession to employers.
In the end, we see little reason to expect that courts can fix the dysfunction
they have added to a dysfunctional statutory provision. While these
jurisprudential adjustments might help clear some way for state single-payer
reforms without legislative intervention, they lack the clarity and
predictability that statutory revisions can offer. 394 Most of the necessary
jurisprudential adjustments would need to come from new Supreme Court
opinions, 395 which is an unlikely prospect. 396 And jurisprudential changes
deal only with the symptoms of ERISA’s obstructionism, not the root cause:
the statute’s wording, which courts so frequently have lamented and called
on Congress to revise, 397 as we do now.
CONCLUSION
The Affordable Care Act has catalyzed a new era of health reform
momentum in state and local governments, as evidenced by the voluminous
and robust state single-payer legislation catalogued here. While states may
successfully contort their health reform efforts to avoid ERISA preemption,
they should not have to do so any longer. ERISA preemption has outlived its
utility as applied to health insurance and has elevated the preferences of
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private businesses above the interests of sovereign states in ways that subvert
federalism. The time has come to remove ERISA’s obstructions and to
unlock states’ capacities as laboratories of health reform.
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APPENDIX A – STATE SINGLE-PAYER PROPOSALS, 2010-2019

Legend: A=Funding Plan; B=Provider Restriction; C=Assignment, Subrogation, Secondary Payer
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APPENDIX B – SEARCH METHODOLOGY TO IDENTIFY STATE SINGLE-PAYER BILLS
State single-payer bills were identified through multiple searches, conducted between June
2018 and September 2019, of four Westlaw databases: (1) proposed legislation; (2) enacted
legislation; (3) historical proposed legislation; and, (4) historical enacted legislation. The first two
contain bills and sessions laws, respectively, from states’ current or most recent legislative
sessions, whatever those dates may be. The second two contain materials from prior sessions going
back to 2005 or before.
Within each database two sets of search terms were used: << advanced: (single-pay*r OR
(universal +7 (access OR coverage)) /p health-care) & DA(aft 03-24-2010) >> and << advanced:
(all /5 (residents +7 eligib!) AND health) & DA(aft 03-23-2010) >>. After the initial search in
June 2018, the "date after" term was updated to the date of the prior search, to capture new bills
on a rolling basis over the study period.
Applying the search terms to the four state legislative databases in June 2018 yielded 572
results. Because the databases are continually updated with recent legislation, repeating the search
today using the initial search strings today may return a different number of results..
From the set of results, we first removed duplicate entries that were found by both sets of
search terms. Then, we removed duplicate bills that either were given different designations as
they moved through the legislative process (but that were otherwise identical), or substantially
similar bills introduced in different chambers in the same state legislative session. Next, using
metadata, abstracts, and longer textual reviews where necessary, we then excluded those bills
captured by our search terms that did not purport to be a single-payer plan. The most common
alternative purposes of such bills were to (1) call for a study, commission, or some other clearlyprefatory inquiry into the form or feasibility of a single-payer plan; (2) propose a health care
reform initiative where the sponsors explicitly disavowed an intention to create a single-payer
system; (3) call for the state legislature to support some proposed national single-payer effort; (4)
attempt to thwart national reform efforts, which were often characterized as a “first-step” toward
a single-payer system; (5) attempt a less-than-comprehensive health system reform or to effect
universal access to some specific service (e.g., HIV prevention, primary care, mental health
services); or, (6) establish exchanges or otherwise implement aspects of the ACA, such as those
designating a single state agency for the coordination of care.
The above search, removal, and exclusion steps were performed each time a search was
conducted during the study period.
After exclusions, 66 proposals remained and were analyzed for their provisions to capture
employer health expenditures and/or move individuals with employer-based coverage into the
single-payer plan. While comprehensive, this set is not necessarily a census of all unique
legislative proposals during this period. Some bills may have been missed during the initial search
and others erroneously removed during the subsequent exclusion process.
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